Re: Deconversion
- From: Richard Dudley <abraxalito@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2008 05:26:11 -0800 (PST)
On Jan 28, 12:53 am, Paul <pgr...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
[ me, to Richard ]
Causality is another dualistic notion, so no, there wasn't a 'first
cause' - there was constant evolution I'd say.
How can you escape dualism?
The answer is within. Or perhaps, the answer is 'within'.
There is you reading this post and there
is this post.
Well actually, if you do the accounting very carefully this is an
error.
I disagree.
Of course you do, you're a dualist :-)
What I'm looking at is my percept, my percepts are most
definitely me.
Yes, but the post exists before you look at it.
Depends what you mean by 'post' - please clarify. If you're meaning
some binary data on a disk within one of Google's servers, then I
agree with you. If you mean the visual perception on my screen, then I
disagree.
Put another way, what I see is all in my mind
No it isn't, there is 'something' outside your mind, otherwise how
does everyone see the same tree?
They don't all see the 'same tree'. They construct their own tree, and
I assume that the biology of the brain/eye makes them look jolly
similar, but I can't know this and neither can you. I agree that there
is something 'outside my mind' but since no-one can know what that is,
what's the point of speculating ?
If it was all in your mind there
wouold only be your tree and no way for everybody to agree that, say,
it has four branches.
Broken dualist thinking I'm afraid. Having my tree in my mind in no
way precludes you from having your tree in your mind. The way that we
agree how many branches it has is by whatever gives rise to both our
trees in each case being the same thing (unknown and unknowable) and
us both having pretty similar brain/eye biology so that the trees we
both construct we are able to agree on. Furthermore, being able to
agree (beyond merely on branches) depends on us both having been
taught the same names for colours in our respective cultures, not
forgetting such basics as having a common meaning for 'branch' and so
on.
my mind
projects the contents of perception 'outwards' and hoists 'reality'
for me.
The mind has to have some external reality to work with to create a
shared objective reality.
I agree with the first part, disagree that there's a 'shared objective
reality'. There's symmetry between both of our constructed subjective
realities.
Your mind does the same for you - we are 'windowless monads'
to borrow a phrase.
Sounds like Leibniz? I'm trying to push Kant's view, which seems to
express reality better to me. How can windowless monads see the same
tree?
If this question really engages you, I suggest Donald Hoffman's
'Visual Intelligence'. He's done some of the spadework on how our
brains get to agree on the things we see.
There needs to be a window so each monad can look out and agree
the tree has four branches.
That's dualism for you! The eyes aren't that window - if they were,
why does 'reality' stay still when we move our gaze elsewhere ? Why
doesn't 'reality' disappear when our eyes saccade? How is it that
'reality' is 3D whereas all our retinas have is 2D images?
There's a dualism.
Yes, but that dualism is illusory when carefully examined.
It doesn't seems so to me. There's me, and there's the tree. I agree
my mind has a lot to do with creating how the tree appears to me. But
there is still a me/tree duality.
So you say, and you're a dualist, so this makes perfect sense :-) When
you've dissolved your self-image, you'll realise your mistake.
<snippage>
Richard
.
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