Re: Moulinearn crossing crash - a bit of sense at last

David Hansen wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 12:43:16 +0100 someone who may be "Alan J.
> Flavell" <flavell@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote this:-
>
> >Without for a moment wanting to make excuses for someone who AIUI was
> >found by the court to have failed to keep a proper lookout, I must
> >say that the operation of the crossing as described here strikes me as
> >unintuitive and, frankly, dubious.
>
> Why?
>
> One walks, cycles or drives up to the crossing. If one is unfamiliar
> then one reads the signs, which are clear enough.
>
> One then checks if the green light is showing, if it is one presses
> the button to raise the barriers. One then checks to see if the
> green light is still showing, if it is one crosses. On the other
> side one lowers the barriers. Fairly obvious to most people, as is
> demonstrated by the fact that many people managed to cross the line
> here without impailing themselves on the front of a train.

Many train drivers stopped at signals showing a stop aspect before ATC,
AWS, or TPWS. I'm sure that most signalmen would manage to perform
most movements if the interlocking of their frames or panels was
removed. I don't think that anyone would advocate the removal of such
safety aids.

As I have twice mentioned, the Welwyn control release provides a good
analogy, and may well prove useful in the event of an appeal.

The crossing could have ben made much more safe at minimal cost.
>
> Some people even manage to operate far more complicated devices,
> such as computers, video recorders and cars.

Would you say that it would be acceptable to have the pins, rather than
holes, at the end of the computer and video power leads? They'd be
live if anyone plugged the lead in and swithched on at the outlet, but
that would be OK because we'd have told them not to do it, wouldn't it?

.

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