Re: Were the Japanese trying to surrender for months before Hiroshima?

On Sun, 21 May 2006 19:02:29 +0200, James Hammerton wrote
(in article <9o6172hsratlef57jvh5sfu1vr3a1t5a17@xxxxxxx>):

On Sun, 21 May 2006 16:08:33 +0200, the auroran sunset <upm@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

On Sun, 21 May 2006 14:22:27 +0200, Greg Hennessy wrote
(in article <2lk072duvpmnts95spa0omjtclv6vdqopb@xxxxxxx>):

On Sat, 20 May 2006 23:43:15 +0100, James Hammerton
<jameshammerton@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Pinging Greg H, and others who have discussed this subject here in the
past...


Blum's argument rests on the following factual claims (for references
see the original article):

1. `By 1945, Japan's entire military and industrial machine was
grinding to a halt as the resources needed to wage war were all but
eradicated.

The Japanese had stockpiled vast supplies of men and materiel on the
home islands in preparation for the invasion.

The navy and air force had been destroyed ship by ship,
plane by plane, with no possibility of replacement.

Apart from a stockpile of IIRC 6000 odd aircraft + aviation spirit
waiting for the invasion.

When, in the
spring of 1945, the island nation's lifeline to oil was severed, the
war was over except for the fighting.

5 minutes getting an idea of the cost of retaking Manila and Rangoon
in Spring 45 will give an idea of how much 'the war was over'.

By June, Gen. Curtis LeMay, in
charge of the air attacks, was complaining that after months of
terrible firebombing, there was nothing left of Japanese cities for
his bombers but "garbage can targets".

The scale of conventional raids against Japanese targets in late July,
early august would indicate otherwise.

http://www.airandspacemagazine.com/ASM/Mag/Index/1995/AS/tlrd.html

It also takes no account of the plans to interdict Japanese power and
communications in preparation for Operation Olympic.

In addition to the forces already in theatre, the 8th and 9th air
forces were being transferred from Europe and the UK was going to
provide 1000 Avro Lincolns + Lancasters as part of the RAF's tiger
force. In particular, 617 sqdn would have the responsibility for
precision targetting of infrastructure such as bridges.

By July, U.S. planes could fly
over Japan without resistance and bomb as much and as long as they
pleased. Japan could no longer defend itself.[6]'

Considering that the last US aircrew losses due to enemy air action
came as a result of a B32 Dominator being shot down around Aug 15, the
notion that Japan could not defend itself is moot.

2. `Japan was militarily defeated long before Hiroshima. It had been
trying for months, if not for years, to surrender; and the U.S. had
consistently rebuffed these overtures. A May 5 cable, intercepted and
decoded by the U.S., dispelled any possible doubt that the Japanese
were eager to sue for peace. Sent to Berlin by the German ambassador
in Tokyo, after he talked to a ranking Japanese naval officer, it
read:

"Since the situation is clearly recognized to be hopeless, large
sections of the Japanese armed forces would not regard with disfavor
an American request for capitulation even if the terms were hard. [7]"

'large sections' of the Japanese war cabinet thought otherwise and
officially reprimanded diplomats who were acting without any form of
authorisation.

[snip]

Is there any evidence to cast doubt on the sincerity or authenticity
of the offers of surrender from the Japanese,

There was no surrender offers period. Japanese diplomats did *not*
have any authority to enter into negotiations for surrender.

The magic decrypts make this unarguable.

When one realises that it took the 2nd bomb + an attempted mutiny +
Soviet invasion of Manchuria to make the Japanese see sense, the
notion that the 4 hardliners in the 6 man war cabinet would have
suddenly turned about is specious to say the least.

or any evidence that the
Japanese war machine was stronger than Blum is claiming here?

The ketsu-go preparations to defend against operation Downfall are
sobering. The level of civilian casualties they were willing to
inflict, never mind accept are just mind boggling.

Richard Frank 's book on the matter is the definitive reference.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/downfall.htm

interesting post and looks like an interesting book. tkx.

i'd add that japanese were having severe fuel shortage problems - cf the
yamato's final suicide mission (there's a fairly dire, but interesting and
apparently popular in japan, recent film about that ship called iirc
"yamato
- otoko-tachi no kouei"). there were also serious food problems: the people
were being systematically starved to feed the soldiers, who were also
starving, just less... large amounts of the food production was in the
process of being converted for use in making bio-fuels when the surrender
came.

japan was finished in any reasonable sense, but as you amply point out,
that
doesn't mean the fanatics in charge had any sense. it still amazes me that
such people are still regarded in japan as "leaders who must be respected",
rather than as traitors who knowingly and deliberately destroyed japan for
their own petty vanities.

Hmmm.

So Blum's claim that Japan was already defeated has a large degree of
truth... it's just that the Japanese leadership didn't accept reality.

realistically speaking, the japanese were already defeated before they
started the war.. admiral yamamoto is alleged to have told the fanatics as
much.. and when realising that he wouldn't get it through their thick skulls
and was likely putting his skin in danger by speaking out, felt honour-bound
to prosecute the war to the best of his ability (iirc there some on this in
the oil book - worth reading anyway!).

as with all these would be rulers of the world, they were seriously lacking
in any serious grasp on reality. reality doesn't fit their ridiculous
inflated self-images.

But then...

The mindset of fighting to the last man suggests that they weren't
about to surrender and the fact that they could still inflict a lot of
damage to an invading army, despite the shortages and problems,
suggests that that had yet to accept that they were defeated.

I'm reminded of a documentary I watched about Hannibal last week.
Apparently, this man had led a huge army right into Italy and defeated
Rome's armies several times on their home ground and believed they'd
defeated "Rome". It could be argued that Rome had been defeated...

.. but "Rome" didn't concur, bided their time, refused to get drawn
into any more military battles and later destroyed Carthage
completely.

indeed.. it is strongly suggested that hannibal would have won if he had just
plucked up the courage to march on rome, rather than waiting around in the
italian countryside for another decisive battle or a voluntary surrender..
meanwhile fabia using eponymous fabian tactics and scipio outflanking him by
sailing off to africa and marching on carthage, meant he lost the opportunity
created by his march and defeats of the major roman armies in italy.

this reluctance to kick rome when they were down was common during their many
wars near the end of the republican period, from the germans to the big
italian uprising to jugurtha in africa and again to mitharates in pontus.
there seemed to have been a great fear of going up against the sleeping
giant, leading to dithering and lack of killer instinct.. giving the romans
time to arm, recruit and slowly grind down these enemies. by the time of
caesar with the various marian and sullan reforms and all these great enemies
defeated, rome was pretty much unstoppable.

the parallels are quite interesting!
(mccullough's "first man in rome" series of historical novels are solid fun
way to get some background to this sort of thing, although obviously remember
that she is embellishing in order to novelise.. she tends to be gratuitous,
both with violence and sex. be warned.)

Rome showed more sense than the Japs, but equally they didn't accept
the defeat...

i think you would be better analogising america as rome and the japanese as
carthage..

A land invasion of Japan could well have been seriously bloody, even
though victory might have been assured and the Japs' situation was
ultimately hopeless.

indeed.

to infinity and beyond.
--
the auroran sunset / tithonus / fennel
personal website: http://www.aoiko.net/
party: http://www.emancipationparty.org/
work: http://www.abelard.org/

.

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