Re: On Determinism
- From: alex.j.k@xxxxxxxxx
- Date: 6 Jun 2006 22:30:19 -0700
Dave Smith wrote:
alex.j.k@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
My take on fitting randomness with free-will is this: I have
free-will because the randomness that is original to my brain is in
fact part of _me_ -- hence, in combination with my abilities to reason,
emote and make judgments, it becomes is _my_ free-will. Randomness is
the essential component of the spontaneity of most acts of my will, and
hence the essential component of my free-will.
Hi, Alex, I think we may have had a long discussion a while ago on this
topic. It seems to me that you confuse free will with indeterminism. In
the relevant literature, free will is said to involve 'origination'.
Hi David.
There is no single definition of "free-will" available as far as I
can tell -- and there is certainly no requirement that one should not
stray away from any traditional definitions.
Indeed, if you subscribe to some form of compatibilism between
free-will and determinism -- as presumably you do-- then you implicitly
have a definition of free-will that is different from the one that you
would have me subscribe to no matter what. That's somewhat of a double
standard.
Ted Honderich defines origination thus:
"as an event or occurrence it is the emergence or bringing about of a
mental event such as a decision or an action (1) in such a way that the
opposite mental event or action might at that moment just as well have
occurred although the person had remained in every respect the same and
his or her situation had remained the same,
So this part is satisfied, with the caveat that "at that moment"
seems to me too strong a condition -- it may take time before a random
event in the brain becomes a macro-world action.
and (2) in such a way that
the person had control of the mental event or action and can in a
certain way be held responsible for it or credited with responsibility
for it.
As far as responsibility for the action goes, I think that "mental
capacity" in the form of the ability to reason about the consequences
of one's actions is the best guide to whether a person should be held
morally responsible for an act -- and I agree that this does not really
depend on the determinism vs. free-will question.
Regarding the "control of the mental event" part, that' a loaded
question -- "control" is just one part of free-will as I see it; the
other part is spontaneity. Control is exercised by circuits in the
brain that might also do their job in a deterministic world -- it is
spontaneity in one's actions that is caused by randomness.
So I think that my notion of free-will as described above is
perfectly coherent and fits with the laws of physics well.
Cheers,
Alex
.
- Follow-Ups:
- Re: On Determinism
- From: Dave Smith
- Re: On Determinism
- From: Peter . H . M . Brooks
- Re: On Determinism
- References:
- Einstein might have had a point
- From: Peter H.M. Brooks
- Re: Einstein might have had a point
- From: Lance
- Re: Einstein might have had a point
- From: Dave Smith
- Re: Einstein might have had a point
- From: Lance
- Re: Einstein might have had a point
- From: Dave Smith
- Re: Einstein might have had a point
- From: Lance
- Re: Einstein might have had a point
- From: Dave Smith
- Re: Einstein might have had a point
- From: Lance
- Re: Einstein might have had a point
- From: Mark . Wright
- On Determinism
- From: alex . j . k
- Re: On Determinism
- From: Dave Smith
- Einstein might have had a point
- Prev by Date: Re: What'll they do?
- Next by Date: Re: Determinism and Popper - was Albert's die.
- Previous by thread: Re: On Determinism
- Next by thread: Re: On Determinism
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|
