War rhetoric in terror ridden Nuclear South Asia
- From: PakistanPal <pakistanpal@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2009 22:21:45 -0700 (PDT)
Nargis Zahra
Terror and terrorism have not only become buzzwords but also have
gradually replaced the words and now concepts of war and battlefield.
In this regard one can take example of Asia and specifically India and
Pakistan. The unique feature of this war in South Asia is traditional
security paradigm followed by both nuclear neighbours. This is evident
not only from Lahore attacks on Sri Lankan players and subsequent
blame game between India and Pakistan but Mumbai attacks were also
followed by the same rhetoric. For instance the External Affairs
Minister of India, Yashwant Sinha, in an interview to BBC London
dismissed suggestions that it was under US pressure to resume talks
with Pakistan. He said: "Was it a sign of soft State that we deployed
our Army on the border and achieved what we wanted,'' he further said
"nothing can be achieved by talks in the present circumstances" and
"it is not important what the US says, or the EU says. It is our
battle and we would win it. Support from different parts of the world
is a welcome step, but the fight is ours.''
On the other hand when US Senator McCain talked to Pakistani
authorities they were cautious in their response. Pakistani Premier
Gillani on the one hand gave vent to desire of cordial relations while
on the other he assured that Pakistan can make India pay in the same
coin if put into a war situation. South Asian neighbours are every now
and then going through a phase of diplomatic tension. Aggressive
statements are exchanged, media on both sides plays nationalist role
and war hysteria is ever present in the form of war phobia. Albeit
Lahore and Mumbai attacks were well planned and organised but not the
first or unique example in strategic history of nuclear South Asia.
These kind of attacks and diplomatic tensions sometimes lead to border
ambushes and wars. Not to one's surprise such tensions have become
routine for the public on both sides of the border. This factor is
especially prevalent in the wake of region's role in international war
against terror combined with the now and then surfacing tensions
between India and Pakistan. Following antagonistic history and
nuclearisation of twin states in 1998, there has been a profound and
persistent belief in the minds of Western policy makers and thinkers
that the region may be at risk of a nuclear war. This view is
reemphasized by the spokesmen of India and Pakistan who get support of
nuclear deterrence and threat of war prior to considering any other
option as a bargaining tactic. While nuclearisation could have brought
drastic changes to South Asian security thinking, the twin elements of
Indo-US nuclear deal and Pak-US joint anti terrorist ventures have
added new dimensions to the traditional security thinking in the
region.
Despite the world over paradigm shift from traditional to non-
traditional security, for South Asia the traditional sphere remains
paramount. This notion is based upon the factor of unequal military
force structures existing between India and Pakistan compounded with
the historical legacy of tensions and a long contiguous border.
Although there are strong arguments to affirm or negate the
probability of a nuclear war as an ultimate policy option for
security, the point to be pondered about is that now the capacity of
an absolute destructive weapon does exist on both sides of the border.
Moreover they use nuclear deterrence most frequently to resolve their
mutual disputes at any level. The nuclear neighbours of South Asia are
classic example of most distrustful coexisting states with refreshing
willingness to tempt war. Overt or covert, clear or unclear but both
states do have a nuclear policy and doctrine. These doctrines are of
utmost importance to understand the relevance and characteristics of
current traditional security paradigm in South Asia. The
nuclearisation of India and Pakistan has transformed the Asian region
into a unique part of the world having four nuclear states namely
China, North Korea, India and Pakistan. The impacts of the emergence
of such regional structure are bound to be multi-dimensional and long-
term in this most populated area of the world. South Asia is a region
showing contradictory parallel signs of development and poverty among
its population. The security structure of the region (South Asia) is
predominantly bipolar, where two out of seven states are nuclearised
having history of inter- and intra-state conflicts, fundamentalist and
westernized elite, absolute poverty of more than 40% and two
antagonistic, neighbours with nukes.
Though one may not term the region as war prone but it has history of
prolonged inter-state conflicts and wars? National security is still
the only definition of "security" in this region. Although socio-
economic and humanitarian factors have paved a way into the
discussions of theoreticians, the practitioners and policy makers are
persistently humming the tones of state security to ensure peace in
the region. This is evident from the following statement of former
president Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan Times (July 2007): "Despite a
paradigm shift in security world over, for South Asia the traditional
sphere of security would remain paramount till the resolution of all
disputes, mainly Kashmir." Whether it is life of Bombay civilians or
of Sri Lankans in Pakistan, it is taken in terms of state security .It
is to be noted that such attacks are harsh ground realities faced by
the citizens, giving a touch of uncertainty to their daily life
routines. These have to be tackled in ways other than passing the
blames and exchanging aggressive statements.
The leaders on both sides of the border would have to realise that
individual is inevitable building block of a nation and individual
security should be foremost priority to be assured. Instead having
overlapped security pacts and arms deals is not going to help counter
threats to civilian security. Albeit the fact India has always been
expediently seeking for defence pacts across the globe specifically to
counter China and not forgetting to mention Pakistan. India has
reached a most comprehensive and far reaching military agreement with
USA, named the 123 Agreement. Under the agreement, US will enlist
India as the chief agency that helps it "embed" itself strategically
in Asia to ensure Washington's dominance in this increasingly
important region in the face of a rising challenge from China. In
return, India is likely to be given the firm offer of some 1970s-
generation weapons platforms like F-16 warplanes, and a new version of
the Patriot anti-missile system, as well as co-production of US-
developed weapon. It conforms to the stated US goals of containing
China; stabilising Afghanistan, Nepal and Bangladesh, countering and
curbing terrorism in the tribal belt of Pakistan and dissuading Iran
from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.
India's global aspirations are compelling it to get involved in
military exercises with different countries. This strategic picture
does not present a wishful optimistic outcome or at least strategic
culture in future of South Asia. Whosoever is behind Mumbai attacks?
The riddle is not to be resolved the way it is being? Such nuclear
rhetoric from Pakistani political elite and war hysteria from Indian
side may escalate into war. It is alarming for the security equation
of South Asia in traditional terms that India not having formal
obligations of alliance agreements at large, at one hand, is incurring
development of forces on the other. It had first joint Naval exercise
named Malabar with US in 1992.Since then it has held joint exercises
with Japan, Singapore, United Kingdom and some countries of West Asia.
Not to mention the notion of insecurity is deeply inculcated in the
psychology of Pakistani strategists, which may lead to another episode
of arms race. Once proudly non-aligned India is now involved in a
global-cum-regional arms race and development. It is evident from the
fact that Indian DRDO and nine defence production undertakings of
public sector are running profitably. India is keeping all the doors
for military cooperation open in turn making Pakistan insecure who is
seeking its security through utilising the current major non NATO ally
status (MNNAS) enduring drone attacks on its mainland and looking
forward to the Obama's policy towards South Asia. As India is
strategic ally of US and Pakistan that of China, the fact could have
served Pakistan's security dilemma in the region.
But the realities of traditional security paradigm in South Asia are
more complicated than seem to a man in the street. China has gone
through another round of joint military exercises on Indian land at
the end of last year, the previous exercises took place on Chinese
land. India also had exercises with three other states including USA,
Japan and Singapore in 2007 in the Bay of Bengal which raised concerns
among Chinese leadership. Indian broader aspirations and Pakistani
regional security concerns lead to contradicting security objectives
of both states. This is the fault line of mutual cooperation where
long-term, persistent reconciliation seems difficult to be approached.
Once again, however, the emergence of transnational threats from
Islamist extremists, and continuing internal ethnic, sectarian, and
tribal tensions dominate the security problems in this region.
Conventionally India is maintaining third largest forces (Army, Navy,
Air Force put together) in the world. In segregation, it possesses
third largest army, fourth largest navy and fifth largest air force.
India is spending 8.5 bn $ per annum under head of defence budget. On
the other, Pakistan, in an effort to follow the suite is spending more
than Rs 4 bn $ a year on its forces development and maintenance. As
far as manpower is concerned Pakistan armed forces are 6,000, 000,
while Indians are one million.
It is to be noted that Pakistan is spending more on its defence in
terms of per capita income. One may conclude that though nuclear
security is a form of traditional security but it has not served the
purpose of irrelevance of conventional forces in South Asia. Both
states collectively share 80% of the regional military spending.
Considering the case of India and Pakistan one can easily relate the
1948, 1965, 1971, 1999 wars, and the crisis of 2002 then 2003 and now
2008-09, with the concept of war or threat of war as an instrument of
policy. Keeping in mind the love for military expenditures on both
sides of the border one can recall the recurrent hostility in history.
In 1948 both India and Pakistan tried to capture princely state
Kashmir. In 1965 war broke out in escalation from Rann of Kutch
episode, following the revelation of a Russian scientist that the area
is rich in oil resources. In the spring of 1965, both the states
stepped up patrolling activity in that area and soon serious clashes
occurred, where Pakistani forces quickly out-manoeuvred Indian troops,
winning an easy victory.
The Rann of Kutch encounter left Pakistani forces dangerously over-
confident and the Indians frustrated. Pakistan's over-confidence that
it would be able to capture the remaining part of Kashmir brought the
two nations to war. Similarly in 1971 India exploited the opportunity
of internal dissention in East Pakistan, intervened militarily which
led to a war and then the dismemberment of Pakistan. Following that,
the occupation of Siachen by India in 1984, Brass-tacks event of 1987,
and Kargil strategic miscalculation of 1999, strained diplomatic
relations in 2001 and 2002, and last but literally not least the
recent Mumbai attacks and following war threats, all are examples of
either use or probability of use of military instrument to achieve
political objectives. With the nuclearization of South Asia it is
observed that both India and Pakistan have started to become more self-
reliant. Though many analysts may take it as confidence but talking in
war terms every now and then may lead to serious consequences anytime.
It was such kind of confidence in self-reliance on part of William
Kaiser of Germany and Nicholas of Russia which led to the 1st World
War. Not only this, similar thinking patterns led to a miscalculated
war against terror which in turn became a major cause for current
economic crunch in international market. In case of South Asia
Pakistan has an Indian centric security strategy and following the
Indian suit it has also entered into a strategic partnership but with
China and has already gone through a round of the military exercises
with Saudi navy on Pakistani coastal area.
Though tacitly but an arms and development race is under way in South
Asia on conventional front. One can conclude that whether the
animosity is historical or religious, traditional paradigm of security
calculation is never irrelevant for both South Asian states. With the
induction of nuclear weapons in South Asia, war that was a win-lose
game became the lose-lose game. That is why both the nuclear states of
South Asia refrained from all-out war. If we analyze the history of
Indo-Pak relationship, we find a number of low-intensity conflicts
along with major wars. The most crucial example is that of Kargil,
which took place soon after the nuclearisation and here we see that
both the states tried their best to refrain from using the nuclear
weapons and let the conflict escalate into a full-scale war. They knew
that if the situation gets out of control it would not only be
threatening to them but also to the entire region. Keeping the
historical practices in view, it could be said that in future there
will only be low-intensity conflicts between India and Pakistan,
mainly because of contentious issues like of Kashmir, terrorism and
extremism as both the states have urged for more CBMs before
proceeding ahead to resolve Kashmir issue.
But the fact of coming to negotiating table is an obvious outcome of
the nuclear status enjoyed by both state. Conclusion of a nuclear arms
deal between India and USA has left many question marks for other
powers in the Asian region specifically Pakistan. In addition to it
the presence of United States in the region on permanent basis, Indian
economic and defence relations with US, Pak-China strategic
partnership, extremist elements and probable evaporation of state writ
in Pakistan, all present a complex alarming picture to predict future.
It might be concluded that the nature of war has changed. Now
rationale for fighting a war is more ideology based in form of
frustrated cultural deprivations. For a long time the world remained
indifferent towards the fate of South Asia. Major Powers, particularly
the United States, neglected it. Now the nuclear bangs of the two
countries have suddenly alerted everybody that South Asia exists and
it has enormous problems and potential for initiating a nuclear
conflict at the regional and global levels, which the world so
desperately wants to avoid. Thus, South Asian states face multi-
dimensional challenges to security. They face the threat of war in the
absence of mechanism that prevent conflicts and promote peaceful
solutions to outstanding problems. They run the risk of being drawn
into a ruinous arms race as in case of India and Pakistan, or into an
ever-increasing defence burden because of internal strife.
They are to face, contain and curb the extremist elements in their
politics and societies. Both South Asian nuclear antagonists need to
re-think their security paradigms in more comprehensive and
cooperative terms. It should not only include probable threat of war
against each other but also existing war against extremism. Its future
paradigm must not rest on security against but security with the all
neighbouring South Asian states. The nature of threats to security is
so complex and varied that the mere size and resources of the larger
states provide little protection against them; in fact, lager the
state, more numerous are the vulnerabilities of over-stretched and
over-taxed administrative systems. A radical new view of cooperative
security can have a decisive multiplier effect on the capacities of
South Asian states to counteract the manifold threats that they face
on the eve of a new millennium. The political pundits of India and
Pakistan should feel more responsible towards their military buildups.
They should not exchange threats at every blast by the terrorists.
They need to give rise to more mature a strategic culture which leaves
least chances for any war or crossfire. It will serve the people
better than the nukes they stockpile or are pride of. People are
ultimate unit to be secured, the very logic for existence of state.
Terrorism is an outcome of ignorance of non-traditional security
concerns and can be successfully addressed by the same. It should be
over with traditional security in South Asia as war is major tool for
traditional security and nukes with both states have left no room for
any other war.
Article Source : http://www.thefrontierpost.com/News.aspx?ncat=ar&nid=823&ad=28-03-2009
.
- Follow-Ups:
- Re: War rhetoric in terror ridden Nuclear South Asia
- From: B1ackwater
- Re: War rhetoric in terror ridden Nuclear South Asia
- Prev by Date: Fictions and facts
- Next by Date: Pakistan's ISI rendered many sacrifices in terror war
- Previous by thread: Fictions and facts
- Next by thread: Re: War rhetoric in terror ridden Nuclear South Asia
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|
Loading
