Re: Fodor misreads Darwin in Against Darwinism article

On May 4, 2:12 am, "Perplexed in Peoria" <jimmene...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
"John S. Wilkins" <j...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in messagenews:1iz6g74.1qz9ixq2p9q2N%john@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx





Perplexed in Peoria <jimmene...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

"John S. Wilkins" <j...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote
Perplexed in Peoria <jimmene...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

The thing that puzzles me is that when philosophers discuss 'aboutness', it
seems as if they think they are discussing something which is objectively
present or not present in a situation.  It seems obvious to me, however,
that aboutness resides in *accounts* of situations - that is, aboutness
is in the mind of a beholder.  One can produce accounts of situations
either with or without intentionality in the thing described (of course,
you always need intentionality in the relation between the account and
the thing described, but that is not what I'm talking about ;-).

This merely puts the problem one step further back - how is it that
accounts of situations are about them? What makes them about those
situations and not, say, some fictive situation that closely resembles
them, or in fact any arbitrary situation at all?

If you have nothing to anchor the accounts given to the situations, then
you cannot explain why language works, let alone why certain biological
traits are adaptive.

I suppose I might need an 'anchor' to explain why language works
perfectly, or why perfect adaptation exists.  But, pretty much as you
argue below, perfection is not to be found in satisficing nature.

Even if you want relative anchoring, NS still won't give it to you. All
you get is persistence of terms and traits that satsifice, as you
rightly note; and no account of error other than failing in some cases
to satisfice. There's no "aboutness" implied here; and I wonder why we
ever required there was - I know, it's because as linguistic organisms
we think it is Very Important that it track truth; but evolution doesn't
track truth, it tracks (or fails to) fitness.

I tend to a totally deflationary view: so what? The
presumption that aboutness needs to be so anchored is on a par with the
view that traits have to be about the environment. Terms and traits
either do happen to be fit or not. There is no sense of absolute "error"
because there is no sense of absolute reference or truth - just what
works and what doesn't.

But to my mind, you are also just shifting the problem back one step.
Yes, terms and traits have only a loose fit to entities in the real world.
But they can match exactly with entities in the models we construct in our
minds.

That simply states A = A, not "A" = A.

Hmmm.  No I think we still have "A" = A (or rather "A" denotes A)
when we consider a verbal description of a mental model.  Or a verbal
argument based on a mental model.

So we still need an explanation for intentionality.  My point is that the
missing explanation is not a *physical* explanation.  The explanation
resides at the emergent level of mind, rather than at the physical level
of brain.

No such thing as emergent properties that does not reduce to "we are
surprised that property exists given our knowledge of the constituents"..

What you mean "we", white man?  Philosophers, including those reviewed
by Sedley [rejoin URL]
 http://www.amazon.com/Creationism-Critics-Antiquity-Classical-Lectures/
    dp/0520260066/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1241399000&sr=8-1
may be surprised by emergent properties but t.o scientists are more blase'.

Au contraire. If scientists weren't surprised by natural phenomena
that they study, then why study them?

I barely understand the article at
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence>
but I'm confident that it's a precise description of how a system that
is only the sum of elements that you clearly understand, has behaviour
that is not typical of the individual elements and that you probably
weren't expecting before you saw it. At least, that's Weak
Emergence.

Strong Emergence seems to be like when you have something so
interesting (in whatever respect) that it attracts the attention of
the gods, who proceed to do something significant: I'm thinking of
Pygmalion, but there are other mythical examples, such as any number
of mortal women connected to Zeus. There's also any number of
miracles associated with Christian saints that fit the bill: the woman
who grew a beard to avoid unwanted male attention comes to mind.

A more mundane equivalent is where your tax return document is
sufficiently complex to get you audited.

I'm not altogether convinced by Strong Emergence. My prejudice is in
favour of naturalism from fundamental particles upwards, and I think
the appearance of Strong Emergence is really because you're studying
an object which is participating in a larger system which you are not
considering.

For instance, a certain simple design of electronic circuit will emit
rock music which is not incorporated in its design: that's because
it's a radio.

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Fodor misreads Darwin in Against Darwinism article
    ... that aboutness resides in *accounts* of situations - that is, ... One can produce accounts of situations ... But to my mind, you are also just shifting the problem back one step. ... So we still need an explanation for intentionality. ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Fodor misreads Darwin in Against Darwinism article
    ... that aboutness resides in *accounts* of situations - that is, ... One can produce accounts of situations ... If you have nothing to anchor the accounts given to the situations, ... But to my mind, you are also just shifting the problem back one step. ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Fodor misreads Darwin in Against Darwinism article
    ... that aboutness resides in *accounts* of situations - that is, ... One can produce accounts of situations ... If you have nothing to anchor the accounts given to the situations, ... But to my mind, you are also just shifting the problem back one step. ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Fodor misreads Darwin in Against Darwinism article
    ... that aboutness resides in *accounts* of situations - that is, ... One can produce accounts of situations ... If you have nothing to anchor the accounts given to the situations, ... But to my mind, you are also just shifting the problem back one step. ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
    ... >> It is true that mind is not a separate substance. ... >> phenomenon dependent on the physical substrate of the the bloody goo. ... >Emergence is a handy dandy excuse to use when one does not know how to ...
    (sci.math)