Re: Problem for physicalist evolutionists

On 26 Mar, 17:24, leland.mcin...@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
On Mar 26, 1:11 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 26 Mar, 15:52, leland.mcin...@xxxxxxxxx wrote:

On Mar 26, 11:21 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 26 Mar, 11:45, leland.mcin...@xxxxxxxxx wrote:

On Mar 25, 11:02 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 26 Mar, 01:53, leland.mcin...@xxxxxxxxx wrote:

On Mar 25, 9:23 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 26 Mar, 00:00, leland.mcin...@xxxxxxxxx wrote:

On Mar 25, 4:05 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

<snip>

Regarding the point was that for there to be a "what it is like" to be
a robot, and for it to have a first person perspective of a tree, it
would have to simultaneously have to have knowledge of data contained
in numerous seperate nodes at the same time. That if there is only the
physical, it would have to be physically possible for the information
to be known at the same time, yet how physically can the information
from the seperate nodes to be known at the same time, when each one is
a mile apart from the others.

To quote Dennett (from memory, so forgive a little accidental
paraphrasing): "If you make yourself small enough you can externalise
almost everything". Your problem is in in saying "*it* would have to
know..." What exactly is "it" in that sentence? One would think "it"
should be the robot, but then you talk about "it" knowing "data
contained in numerous separate nodes", so the it is something
observing these nodes. Since the nodes are the robot, the "it" must be
something else -- some kernel of consciousness, or homonculus, that
"knows" about the states of nodes. You've made the "it", the
"consciousness", small enough to externalise, well, everything. The
physical robot is just the collection of nodes, so the "it" which
somehow lies between/outside the nodes -- but that's outside the
physical existence of the robot. You're not proposing physicalism,
you're proposing dualism.

The answer, if making the place where consciousness comes together,
smaller simply results in dualism, is to simply make "it" bigger.
Consciousness is not some central place "where everything comes
together" but is distributed across the whole. Just as there is no
central point in your brain where consciousness is centered, a
"Cartesian theatre" to use Dennett's nomenclature, the robot doesn't
have one either. "It" is conscious of the information on all those
dispersed nodes because "it" encompasses those nodes and more.

All of this is well explained in Dennett's book "Consciousness
Explained". In particular he sketches out exactly how such a
distributed model of consciousness might work, along with some
empirical experiments that bear out that model. The book itself is
quite old, and there's been more work since then that continues to
bear out most of Dennett's ideas (I would suggest "The Illusion of
Conscious Will" by Daniel Wegner for more empirical material). Do
yourself a favour and get Consciousness Explained from the library (or
better, buy it since this seems to be an interest of yours). If you
are going to argue against physicalist conceptions of consciousness it
would be best to actually have the faintest idea what one of the most
prominent physicalist models of consciousness is.

I'm asking how there could be a first person perspective for the robot
with physicalism. If it had a robot eye which was looking at a tree,
then for the robot to have a first person perspective of the tree,
simultaneous information from multiple nodes would be required. I am
asking how you would be suggesting it would be physically possible?

Yes, and I answered that the "it" having the perspective can span many
nodes, and so doesn't need to access information from multiple nodes
simultaneously, because "it" already has the information in some of
the multiple nodes that constitute "it". You then ignored my answer,
and re-asked the question.

Of course if you really want an answer then you should take my
suggestion and read "Consciousness Explained" by Dennett since he
covers exactly this in way more depth than my feeble memory can manage
(I really ought to buy a copy). I must admit that I'm troubled that
you seem utterly unacquainted with the work given the number of
pointers to it that people gave you the last time you were here.

I've read some of Dennett's and I don't think much of him. Like his
quining qualia for example. I thought his suggestion about surgically
swapping the taste buds was slightly strange. The suggestion seemed to
be that taste buds could be surgically swapped over such that the
salty ones would fire on the nerves that were previously attached to
the sweet ones, and the sweet ones would fire on the nerves that were
previously attached to the salty ones. He seemed to suggest that at
first an icecream might taste salty, but the brain would maybe adjust
over time, so that it would be eventually experienced as sweet.

<snip>

Of course there are experiments that back up this intuition. Swapping
tastebuds is a little hard, but getting someone to wear glasses that
invert the image is quite possible. Surprisingly enough, after a long
enough period of time wearing such glasses, subjects said the world
stopped seeming to be "upside down", and just seemed normal. Then,
when the experiment was over and the glasses were removed, they
claimed that the world seemed to look upside down. Other experiments
with pressure-pads to transmit visual information by touch came up
with similar results. Apparently the brain can, and does, rewire
itself, or at least it's "perceptions" to cope with such changes.
Dennett's speculation is really quite grounded.

Besides, whether you think much of him or not, his books have answers
to many (if not all) of these questions you keep asking and re-asking
and re-asking and re-asking. Perhaps you should try getting the
answers there first, and then we can discuss what you find inadequate
about them.

Anyway, back to the point, what physically is spanning many nodes?

I may as well ask you "what is having to collect information from
multiple nodes simultaneously". The answer to that question from your
perspective is the answer to the question you just asked me from mine.
What is spanning many nodes? The thing that is having the first person
perspective. The "I" that the robot would say it had.

Well the answer is that there is only the spiritual. You are a
spiritual being, and are being communicated a spiritual experience of
the physical world. So the binding problem, or the representation
problem (composition having no representation devoid of context)
aren't problems, nor is there the issue of if "what it is like" to be
a human having to be epiphenomenal as in some physicalist stories,
such as those that suggest in principle, if the physical state of
reality were known, and any rules in terms of the physical which
governed interactions within reality were also known, then the change
in state of reality over time (the behaviour) could be explained.

Ah so your answer is also that the physical is in the mind of God, and
that therefore they aren't seperate, so no need to look at it upside
down and be thinking of something having to be spanning physical
space.

I have no idea exactly what that even means, let alone how you
interpreted my answer to mean that. Let's try again. When you say "You
are a spiritual being" you are using the word "you" to refer to a
thing. I call that thing "me" or "I". You want to claim that the
robot's "you" (or "me" or "I" from the robot's perspective) has to
'collect information from many different nodes simultaneously' in
order to represent the tree, and that this isn't possible physically.
My response is that the robot's "you" doesn't have to be a singple
point, but can instead be bigger. I'm saying that the robot's
"you" (just as I presume is the case, pending further evidence, for my
"me" ) is not a spiritual being, but rather a state that spans many
nodes. Does that mean the robot's "you" potentially changes when the
states of nodes change? Yes, but then I am not the same "me" that I
was 10 years ago (or even 5 seconds ago). So how does the robot's
"you" manage to represent the tree? As long as all the nodes
containing the information about the tree are part of the nodes making
up the robot's "you" it doesn't need to collect any information, it
already has it.

What I am not understanding is that as there is nothing physically
spanning these many nodes, and that according to you there only is the
physical, shouldn't there be something physically spanning the node?

Are you suggesting forests don't physically exist? What spans multiple
nodes is a configuration of information, states, and relationships
between nodes.

I'm not suggesting there aren't forests. What I am having a problem
with, is that if there was a picture made up of a 10 x 10 array of
pixels, and each pixel was place individually in the trunk of a tree
scattered in forest, are you suggesting that as a high density of
trees can be labelled as a forest, that it therefore is obvious that
the forest could have a first person perspective of what the picture
was of?

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Problem for physicalist evolutionists
    ... a robot, and for it to have a first person perspective of a tree, it ... "consciousness", small enough to externalise, well, everything. ... You're not proposing physicalism, ... If it had a robot eye which was looking at a tree, ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Problem for physicalist evolutionists
    ... a robot, and for it to have a first person perspective of a tree, it ... "consciousness", small enough to externalise, well, everything. ... You're not proposing physicalism, ... If it had a robot eye which was looking at a tree, ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Problem for physicalist evolutionists
    ... a robot, and for it to have a first person perspective of a tree, it ... "consciousness", small enough to externalise, well, everything. ... You're not proposing physicalism, ... If it had a robot eye which was looking at a tree, ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Problem for physicalist evolutionists
    ... a robot, and for it to have a first person perspective of a tree, it ... "consciousness", small enough to externalise, well, everything. ... You're not proposing physicalism, ... If it had a robot eye which was looking at a tree, ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Problem for physicalist evolutionists
    ... a robot, and for it to have a first person perspective of a tree, it ... "consciousness", small enough to externalise, well, everything. ... You're not proposing physicalism, ... If it had a robot eye which was looking at a tree, ...
    (talk.origins)