Re: Problem for physicalist evolutionists

On 25 Mar, 13:19, Tony Raymonds <to...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
In article
<6cb79b26-036c-42cd-a540-775ff646f...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
someone2 <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes

The first is that if the robot that passed the Turing Test were an
artificial neural network for example, and the nodes within it were
separated out such that each was a mile apart and no longer
communicated by via electrical conductor but by transmission of light
signals such the system would still maintain its function. Perhaps you
could suggest how there could exist a first person perspective which
would require data from numerous nodes simultaneously. How would it be
physically possible for the information to be known, and how could
there be a "perspective" without the information being available
simultaneously?

Why do you think there is a connection between the distance the distance
the neurones are apart and a first person perspective?

Experiments show  that consciousness lags behind the information
reception and decision parts of the brain i.e. it is  an *observer* to
the process rather than a driver.  Look at Benjamin Libet's experiments:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet

A lag of 500 milliseconds is plenty of time for the brain to stitch
together data coming from multiple sources even if the information
didn't arrive precisely simultaneously.

In addition, neurones which were a mile apart and which communicated by
light would almost certainly communicate faster than those in the brain
anyway, given the respective speeds of nerve impulses and light.

So your assumption that simultaneous information is needed for a first
person perspective is incorrect, so your final question makes no sense.
There is no evidence that simultaneous information is needed for even
our own first perspective, never mind a robots.

Even if the distances were enough to cause a noticeable lag then the
robot could still think and be conscious, all it would need would be a
longer lag between reality and the illusion of consciousness.

If the lag were too long then the robot might seem a bit slow on the
update, but there is nothing to say it couldn't be conscious.

*Illusion* of consciousness? I hear you exclaim...

http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/journalism/ns02.htm
--
to...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx


Thank you for the link to Benjamin Libet, I couldn't remember who it
was, and can see now that where it says in the article (
http://www.answernot42.com/index.html )

"Experiments it is claimed suggest that neural activity representing
an outcome is present before the sensation of any conscious choice is
made might be mentioned. Though these presuppose that the
manifestation within the physical construct of our spiritual will
being carried out, isn't analogous to a strings being pulled in
various parts of the puppet brain. That the result of a string being
pulled is evident in the primary motor cortex for example."

I can see from Wikipedia that it is in the secondary motor cortex that
the activity was initiated (my mistake), I'll republish.

The point was that for there to be a "what it is like" to be a robot,
and for it to have a first person perspective of a tree, it would have
to simultaneously have to have knowledge of data contained in numerous
seperate nodes at the same time. How is this physically possible,
where would this be happening in the physical, and how would it be
physically possible for the state of these seperate nodes to be known
at the same time? Take for example an extract from the last website
you quote "Psychologists Daniel Simons of Harvard University and
Daniel Levin of Kent State University, Ohio, suggest that during each
visual fixation our brain builds a fleeting representation of the
scene", well that scene isn't represented in a single node, nor is any
single part you are concentrating on.

A further issue, is that of representation, such that you would have a
perspective of a bunch of neurons such that it appears to you as a
physical world. To highlight the point further, consider a robot brain
in a vat. How a robot brain could have a first person perspective of
any objects observed by its camera eyes for example. To highlight the
issue, consider the robot brain in a vat. Whether the processing in a
robot brain in a vat with lead walls 100 miles thick represented
visual information from the input, and processing of visual
information, and outputting of a report on the visual information to a
speaker system, or whether the processing represented auditory
information from the input, and the processing of it used to determine
which fairy lights should light up, and the output being output to a
fairy light controller system, would depend on context. If the input
source was indeed some type of automated synthesiser keyboard, and the
outputs did indeed go to a fairy light controller, then the processing
did indeed represent which fairy lights would go on based on the sound
input. How could the robot brain in a vat experience what the
processing represented without the context, and how would there be
context, given the 100 mile thick lead walls, through which the inputs
and outputs were fed. There is no means by which the perspective could
have context, and as mentioned previously there could be no placing
the likelyhood of one representation over the other, devoid of
context, based on raison d'etre of the operations on such data,
without a suggestion of purpose, which physicalism doesn't allow for.
I assume that to be a physicalist, you must have an a priori
assumption that your "perspective" of the physical world reflects the
context your physical self finds itself in. Yet as just pointed out,
how could that be, composition and activity of it has no intrinsic
representation devoid of context.

There is the further point, if the physicalist story happened to be
one which suggested that in principle, if the physical state of
reality were known, and any rules in terms of the physical which
governed interactions within reality were also known, the change in
state of reality over time (the behaviour) could be explained:

Consider that if conceptually a robot which didn't show deviation from
the *currently known* laws of physics was built, and it behaved in a
way indistinguishable from us, as suggesting by Alan Turing in
'Computing Machinery and Intelligence', then functionalists could
suggest that there is a "what it is like"/first person perspective for
the robot (considering "what it is like" to be linked to function),
others could suggest that there isn't a first person perspective for
the robot, any more than there is for a mobile phone with a camera,
and that "what it is like"/first person perspective is linked to
organic chemistry. Since neither side would be disputing the known
laws of physics, or how the robot is built, there could be no way to
distinguish between the theories. The issue here is separate from the
how physically the required discrete bits of data could be perceived
simultaneously, and there is no intrinsic representation of the
physical composition and its activity, this is that iwhichever theory
was true in the example above, there would be no difference in
behaviour. Therefore no difference in behaviour whether the was a what
it was like to be the robot, or there wasn't.
To highlight the point further let us consider that to test between
the theory of whether it was linked to organic chemistry or whether it
was linked to function, some that had absolutely no comprehension of
the problem suggested slowly through a series of operations replacing
the neurons with silicon based functionally equivalent ones, then
asking the person whether there was still a what it was to be like the
new silicon/carbon based brain. Now before the experiment the person
claimed there most certainly was what it was like to be the brain, and
after each operation they claimed the same. Those that performed the
experiment then claimed that "what it was like" to be the brain was
indeed due to function, as it was no longer based on organic
chemistry, and yet the person still behaves the same, and reports
there being a "what it is like" to be the brain. Those that suggested
it was linked to organic chemistry point out, what did you expect, the
brain is still functioning as before, as function was maintained. That
doesn't show that there is still a "what it is like" to be the brain.
Their theory that "what it is like" to be the brain is linked to
organic chemistry, isn't expecting the brain to function any
differently if bits of it were substituted by functionally equivalent
bits. So the experiment wouldn't distinguish between the two theories.
This point obviously was investigating the physicalist story suggested
above. The point is though, that the story would suggest that we
couldn't be talking about the perspective because of the existance of
such a persepective. Given the lack of intrinsic representation in our
brain, devoid of context (and this issue is dealt with in more detail
in http://www.answernot42.com/index.html), it would have to be a
coincidence that we are talking about the representation we have.
Furthermore understanding that there is such a first person
perspective, as reflected in art forms such as films, and being able
to say that you understand it, and can say so, shows that your
behaviour is affected by "what it is like" to be you, and therefore
the physicalist story which suggested that in principle, if the
physical state of reality were known, and any rules in terms of the
physical which governed interactions within reality were also known,
the change in state of reality over time (the behaviour) could be
explained, was wrong. The reason being that it predicts that "what it
is like" to be you could not affect your behaviour (as shown by the
robot that passes the Turing Test thought experiment above).








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