Re: Emergence denial: the consequences

r norman <r_s_norman@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On Mon, 19 Nov 2007 11:17:02 +1000, j.wilkins1@xxxxxxxxx (John
Wilkins) wrote:

Perplexed in Peoria <jimmenegay@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

"John Wilkins" <j.wilkins1@xxxxxxxxx> wrote...
r norman <r_s_norman@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Yes, John W, another personal attac--- I mean, another interesting
subject for your comments. dkomo -- this is also for you.

The New York Times magazine section today (Sunday, Nov. 18) has a
piece by Jim Holt titled "Mind of a Rock: Is everything conscious". It
describes the philosophy of 'panpsychism' describing it originating
with Thomas Nagel and continuing through David Chalmers and Roger
Penrose to Galen Strawson. Basically, if you deny that consciousness
(or any other property for that matter) 'emerges' from complex system
organization and interactions, then you have to accept that the system
components themselves somehow 'contain' consciousness as a fundamental
property. As the article says: "So the entire universe must consist
of little bits of consciousness." It goes on to consider the atoms
in yonder rock. They wiggle and jiggle but not at random; the "see"
the entire universe through the gravitational and electromagnetic
influence of every other particle. As a result: "such a system can be
viewed as an all-purpose information processor... and where there is
information, says panpsychism, there is consciousness. In David
Chalmers' slogan 'Experience is information from the inside; physics
is information from the outside'.

So, John, you have a choice: it's either emergence or conscious
atoms (not to mention intelligent bacteria!). And if you try to
insist there is a third or 'middle way', you should know that that is
exactly the pathway of emergence that physicist R Laughlin describes.
dkomo, I already know your choice: it is atoms with information
processing, whether or not that implies consciousness.

For my own part, I far prefer emergence.

Or, you can refuse t commit the fallacy of composition and just assume
that combinatorial properties are the sum of the properties of the parts
and their interctions, and treat emergence as a handy way to talk about
this without believing that there is anything special going on
ontologically.

I agree that there is nothing special ontologically going on in emergence.
Emergence is an almost purely epistemological phenomenon (or
'epiphenomenon', or whatever). But that doesn't make it any less
'real' or less important. After all, we have no direct access to the
ontological level, nor any assurance that we have reached it (or even
*can* reach it). All we have is our models, and they live in the
epistemological domain.

I have never denied any of this. I agree with everything you say here.
Emergence is (purely) an epistemological phemonenon. So we can stop
trying to imply that there is something ontological about it (can't we
Richard?)

Chalmers' privileging of experience presumes that there can be no
reduction of that kind, and he is, in my view, relying on a *verbal*
trick.

I haven't read Chalmers - perhaps I should. But I like his slogan
quoted above: "'Experience is information from the inside; physics
is information from the outside". However, it is a bit of a leap to
get from "This rock processes information and is a component of
a larger information-processing system" to "This rock contains a
quantum of 'consciousness'". So, I'm not sure that I agree with
Richard that this NYT Sunday Magazine article deserves a place
as a poster-child of the ill-effects of emergence-denial. All kinds
of things may emerge in the universe as a whole without 'consciousness'
being one of them.

Again I agree with you. One of us must be ill.

The NYT article deserves a place merely as an excuse to jab Wilkins
one more time. Certainly he already knew (even if I did not) about
panpsychism. However the piece itself seemed to be quite pertinent to
other threads we have had recently here on t.o.

The article is, incidentally,

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/magazine/18wwln-lede-t.html?_r=1&adxnnl=
1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1195437616-5o+/M71ecoCS/TEMOfUnkg or go to
www.nytimes.com and search "Hold Mind of a Rock". I subscribe so I can't
tell if everybody can get free access.

As far as ontology vs epistemology, let me ask you, John, whether
consciousness really 'exists' as an ontology entity or whether it is
merely an epistemological sleight of hand (sleight of tongue?) useful
for describing a particularly unusual pattern of nerve activity or a
particular unusual configuration of electron states the those neurons.

Consciousness is, in my view, not a substantive ontological category.
It's something that is _functionally_ circumscribed - we call some
system "conscious" if it exhibits a particular kind of [internal or
external] behaviour in terms of response to environmental stimuli. In
short, if it acts like a (prototype of) a conscious being (let's say
it's George W. Bush) or better, then it is conscious.

Chalmers' trick is to use the non-equivalence of first person
description with third person description and say "Aha! Consciousness
does not reduce to third person descriptions!" But if you give thrid
person physical description of a conscious system, and include in that
the obvious fact that the system has a perspective on the world, that
trick evaporates rather dramatically.

If consciousness actually 'exists', then it arises from the activity
of objects that do not in themselves possess it. If everything about
us and about the world is nothing more than Schrodinger's equation (or
the equivalent is some better physical description of the world) plus
some a collection of words that we humans simply use as shorthand,
then everything is epistemology and ontology doesn't exist.

I won't draw conclusions from physics at that level. Basically, this is
because I am not competent in physics. But it seems to me as a general
point that there is a fallacy in taking the description (in this case
Schrödinger's wave equation) for the thing described. Epistemology is
what happens in our heads - and the world doesn't happen in our heads
(well, most of the world doesn't).

Let me try a different area, more familiar to me and less freighted
with a history of abuse. Do mathematical constructs 'exist'? Are
there such things as integers and real numbers, lines and surfaces,
groups, integral domains, Klein bottles, Hilbert spaces and all the
rest or are there only sets with this or that property? I believe the
emergent constructs to be as real as mathematical constructs. That
probably puts me firmly into the epistemology camp but I have my
doubts. Remember, I am not a philosopher. I just do stuff, not
think about what it is.

Well I am not a (mathematical) Platonist, so I don't think any of these
mathematical constructs have any reality apart from as linguistic types
that are tokened in heads of mathematicians and those they inflict such
subjects upon. So I am not inclined to make emergence, which is as I
know it a mathematical property of models anyway, a real aspect of the
universe outside our heads. Remember, I am just a philosopher, and I
just think about stuff, not do anything.

--
John S. Wilkins, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Philosophy
University of Queensland - Blog: scienceblogs.com/evolvingthoughts
"He used... sarcasm. He knew all the tricks, dramatic irony, metaphor,
bathos, puns, parody, litotes and... satire. He was vicious."

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Emergence denial: the consequences
    ... if you deny that consciousness ... exactly the pathway of emergence that physicist R Laughlin describes. ... As far as ontology vs epistemology, let me ask you, John, whether ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Emergence denial: the consequences
    ... if you deny that consciousness ... exactly the pathway of emergence that physicist R Laughlin describes. ... As far as ontology vs epistemology, let me ask you, John, whether ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Emergence denial: the consequences
    ... piece by Jim Holt titled "Mind of a Rock: ... if you deny that consciousness ... exactly the pathway of emergence that physicist R Laughlin describes. ... As far as ontology vs epistemology, let me ask you, John, whether ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Emergence denial: the consequences
    ... themselves somehow 'contain' consciousness as a fundamental ... So, John, you have a choice: it's either emergence or conscious ... at the electron currents. ... a different pattern represents a completely different one. ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Emergence denial: the consequences
    ... piece by Jim Holt titled "Mind of a Rock: ... if you deny that consciousness ... Chalmers' slogan 'Experience is information from the inside; physics ... exactly the pathway of emergence that physicist R Laughlin describes. ...
    (talk.origins)