Re: Science, God, and Free Will

On Oct 9, 11:09 pm, Garamond Lethe <cartographi...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Tue, 09 Oct 2007 13:06:56 -0700, partso2 wrote:

I could get insulted. You didn't read my words - you replied to what
you thought I was going to argue, not what I argued.

Come on. Transistor can process information (what cannot?). FPA is
just a bunch of information processing, so it makes sense to assume
that a lot of transistors will be able to do the job. However, a blue
page doesn't show ANY ability to reflect red light, so there's no
reason to assume that 10^18 of them will. Electrons don't have a
'small mind' which can be additive - they seem to be completely
undefined in mental terms. I hope you don't think that the fallacy of
composition means that 0+0+0+0+....+0=0 is wrong.

Can zeros "process information"? Probably not. So adding zeros wouldn't
be expected to do much. Can "protons and electrons" "process
information"? Sure -- in fact, that's how transistors work. And that's
how we work, too.

Many materialists make this mistake. Electrons can process info, as
can (almost?) any other material entity, with a suitable definition of
info. No reason for any dualist to think our brain (or any other body
part) can't. That's why I spoke on self-awareness & volition (that's
what defines mind, unless you think any info processor is a mind).
Electrons have none. Their self-awareness quantifier is 0. Thus, 10^18
of them will have 0*10^18 self-awareness, even if this property is
additive.

<snip>

2u2, as usual.

I hope you don't think I'm going to scan 355k sites. Could you give
one good URL?

As I learned the hard way with SomeoneN, handing out URLs is not an
effective way of introducing an entire branch of science (with its
attendant branch of philosophy). Yes, you can go read the "dualism",
"physicalism", and "free will" entries at wikipedia and the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but you should have done that before you
started posting. But ten densely-crafted paragraphs about qualia or
quantum physics is *not* a substitute for reading a damn book. So at the
risk -- nay, certainty -- of boring everyone else who has seen this list
many, *many* times before, here we go....

_Consciousness Explained_, by Daniel Dennett. Written with the layman in
mind, it's not only a very good synthesis of neural science and
philosophy, it does an excellent job in explaining how physicalism is not
only plausible, but -- based on what we know now -- the only reasonable
choice.

_Principles of Neural Science_, Eric Kandel, ed. First, this is a
beautiful book -- lavish illustrations, very high-quality paper, great
typeface.... and it can also be used to subdue cattle. (You will need a
license to carry a book this large in rural Georgia.) And despite it
being intended as an introductory med-school textbook, it's really quite
approachable. Think of the characteristics you associate with your *self*
-- perception, inhibition, etc. Time after time, these were tied to
specific regions of the brain -- if there's a tumor or lesion there *you*
change. You become a different person.

_Philosophy of Mind_, by Jaegwon Kim. This is also geared as a textbook,
mostly to philosophy students. It was really neat to watch the
progression from dualism to behavioralism to identity theory to
functionalism, each theory giving way to a better one as we learn more
(and each taking us further away from dualism). Several parts were very
lucidly written, and the entire book was quite fair in outlining the pros
and cons of each theory. If you want to understand what physicalism is
and the best arguments against it, start here.

You seem to have misunderstood the basic argument for dualism. It
isn't a negative argument, saying we must accept dualism as
materialism has no explanation. This kind is risky, beacuse (a)
materialism may surprise tomoroow, and (b) we can't be sure of dualism
that way. No, it's a positive argument - materialism CAN NOT have an
explanation. It's the description-explanation thing again. It's a
tirivla a point, that it's easy to overlook it, especially if you're a
physicist (not to mention the guys who are familiar eliminativism...).
Let's see some example:


There's a needle in the gauges panel of a car. It's range's edges
are labeld 'F' and 'E'. A correlation may be espablished between its
position and the driving capability of the car. It's known that an
external hose may raise it, and an exact formula can be found,
connecting the raise angle to the connection time of the hose. Another
formula may describe the driving distance as a function of the
needle's angle. The materliast stops here. It's a testable,
scientifically refutable theory, and that's all we need. We can make
correct predictions according to it. What's wrong?

The dualist knows what's wrong. IT MAKES NO SENSE. No way the car
should stop at 'E', according to known mechanics laws. Thus, s/he has
to assume the existance of an invisible fuel tank, whose location and
volume are unknown (the volume can't be determined from the known
facts, what makes it seem as a fabrication - we can assign the volume
parameter in the above two equations, but it'll be defined up to
constant, and really, the equations worked without it). This
assumptions allows no new predictions - but now everything DOES make
sense. Now the correlation between the angle and the tank's content is
only that - a correlation (actually, a true identity theorist must
stop before, arguing that the needle reaching 'E' IS the car
stopping.... especially if s/he an eliminativist). That's all.


Another example (true story): years ago, I was in a dinning room.
There were no eggs that day. A physics student asked the kitchen man
for that. He answered, "There's this special kind of cheese. Every day
it's present, there're no eggs". Satisfied, the student walked on his
way. Another guy asked the kitchen man why is that. Only then, the
student stopped and thought, "really, why?" (it was something about
the price - together they just costed too much). I think it's very
true - physicist got used to finding correlations, which can give
predictions, even if they make no sense at all (just WHY does any mass
bother to attract any other one??!!?!).


And last, most beautiful example. A few posts ago, I argued that
modern physics research could have no effect on philosophical
questions. That's the situation in any two different fields - that's
what makes them different. This point also is demonstrated here. I
think it clarifies that all neuroscience research is meaningless to
this question.

The greeks thought that emotions are rooted in the heart. That's
because the emotional state (excitement etc.) has a detectable effect
of the workings of the heart. Now, suppose some greek materialist (of
course there were none...) would use some primitive EKG (even a hand
on the neck) to assosiate a heart pattern to each known emotion, and
then shout 'Eurikka! I'm an Identity Theorist! an emotion IS a heart
working pattern!!!". Do you think it's ridiculous? but that's exactly
what the new brain researchers do - they assosiate self-awareness
patterns with the working of the 4th cortex (or whatever) and then
argue that self-awareness IS the working on this cortex. I think the
identity theorists really have to explain why emotions should be brain
patterns more than heart patterns. Luckily, the greeks didn't make
this mistake. An emotion is a FEELING. It can be correlated to the
workings of the heart - no more than that. That's why they were all
dualists. The modern materialists cannot think they're wiser than
Plato and his gang, as the new knowledge isn't really relevant. They
must think they're more intelligent than him.


Pushing further these examples, one might get into subjects of what
is knowable, and our certainty of our knowledge. But I don't think
it's necessary, as long as we agree that we must assume a car has a
fuel tank...

Now, to reward you for reading this far, here's the best single url I know
that explains why I think physicalism is compelling.

http://ffrf.org/fttoday/2003/april/index.php?ft=sapolsky

I don't think he addresses the points in my argument. If you think
he does, please tell me.

Anyway he's a neurological biologist. A kardiolog could do the
opposite thing - identify the heart patterns of certain diseases, and
then argue that these affect the brain patters. Some effort might be
needed, but no reason to think that such an argument, properly stated,
will be less compelling that Sapolsky's.

His correlation between religion and certain neuoral effects could
be stated reveresly by a theologist, of course. God has created a
normal tendency of people to belive. That's why most of us find it
natural, and naturally believe (in something) in young ages. Of course
we have free will to use this ability to believe in other things - The
Eternity of Nature Laws, or whatever. Also, like any other mental
element, this one can be sick, overworking or the opposite. Since the
mind controls the body, and does that through the brain (unless you're
the kardiolog from the last paragarph), these tendencies and illnesses
manifest themselves in the brain's structure, and then in the body
behaviour. So it's an interesting fact, but as an 'evidence', it's
neutral at best. Which one of these viewpoints is more convincing,
depends mainly on whether you spent most of your life as a biologist,
or as a theologican. It determins your viewpoint on the world.

So is the matter about people behaving differently without the
frontal cortex. The mind, naturally, has the ability to move the right
hand. If someone cuts your right hand, you'll lose that ability. It
doesn't mean the mind has changed - only this function can't get to
work now. Like your ability to get angry can't be set to work
(usually) unless someone annoys you. So damaging any part of the body
limits the mind's possibility to work. I hope he didn't think it
proves materialism. I also hope he didn't think that the old greek
dualists didn't know that cutting one's hand limits him, causes him
mental feelings (pain, anger) and may eventually change his
personality. Other physical damages may do it faster. So I hope he
doesn't think he's a greater philosopher than Aristoteles...

The "Freedom From Religion" foundation gave Robert Sapolsky an award --
this is his acceptance speech. The audience isn't professional
researchers or philosophers, just folks. Despite that, he manages to tie
in Huntington's Disease, schizophrenia, and the evolutionary basis of
religion. If you're going to just read one thing, that would be it. Yes,
it is possible to be a dualism after reading this, but why would you want
to be?

Why would you want to assume that tank's existance?

I visited few of these site, and found nothing of
interest, except (quote) "Neuroscience cannot, at present, tell us the
anatomical basis of mind with certainty, but it gives a great many
clues". I hope you don't confuse 'description', 'clue' or 'guess' to
be an 'explanation'. See my last post, in the paragraphs about the
needle, to clarify the difference between description and explanation,
in case you ARE confused.

Explanations allow predictions. Thus, dualism is not an explanation.

Some people (wrongly) think that evolution explains some things. No
one think it can predict anything (how will ravens look in 10000
years, without any human effects, assuming the climate is known?). The
Needle theory above predicted everything, explaining nothing. The
tank's assumption explained everything (based on mechanics laws), but
added no more predictions. Theoretically, you could argue that the
tank's assumption allow predicting that damage to the bottum part of
the car will create some holes, and cause the needle to lower faster.
That's outside the example. But theoretically, maybe in 200 years a
soul-detector would be invented? so there are theoretical
implications, even outside philosophy.

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