Re: Converstation with Jeckyl and someone about implausibility of

On 2 Oct, 00:19, Garamond Lethe <cartographi...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Mon, 01 Oct 2007 14:38:11 -0700, someone3 wrote:

<sigh>

Yes, from a physicalist perspective there would be no expected
difference in behaviour between hypothesised realities regarding a
particular mechanism, where in one hypothesised reality it consciously
experiences and in the other it doesn't.

Really?

Can you point me to a single physicalist who believes this? (Name and
academic institution, please, with citation.)

No?

Not a single one?

You are right in that I have never seen a physicalist present
physicalism in this way. For to do so would be to present it as an
implausible perspective. People have tried to point it out to them, by
using such devices as the zombie arguments, but physicalists put
forward objections as to why the zombie argument should not be
considered valid. Those objections can't be used against the reasoning
I am putting forward though.

Can you not understand, that neither hypothesised reality would need
to differ with regards to the *known* laws of physics. Since the
mechanism is behaving as expected given the known laws of physics, the
expectation of its behaviour won't differ between the two hypothesised
realities (the hypothesis where it is consciously experiencing, and
the hypothesis where it isn't). Is it that you need someone to tell
you whether that would be the case or not?

[Neither hypothesised reality suggests within it could exist two
physically identical mechanisms one consciously experiencing and the
other not.]

.

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