Re: Implausibility that we can be explained by evolution

On Tue, 07 Aug 2007 21:14:58 -0700, someone3 wrote:

On 8 Aug, 03:30, Garamond Lethe <cartographi...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Tue, 07 Aug 2007 18:37:18 -0700, someone3 wrote:

<snip>

Perhaps I could more usefully approach your hypothesis by learning more
about it.

1. What is your definition of consciousness?

2. If that definition involves "conscious experiences", what is your
definition of these?

3. How can we detect consciousness and, if necessary, conscious
experiences?

4. How could we falsify your hypothesis?

5. Could you summarize the physicalist position on consciousness and
conscious experiences?


1 & 2) Consciousness is the capacity to mentally experience. You have
said you are happy that you understand what mental experiences are.

3) It is irrelevent to the point in question.

Until you tell me otherwise, I'm going to take that as an "I don't know".


4) You can't falsify the point I am making, it isn't a hypothesis, it
is an implication of the known laws of physics.

5)

That statement (A) makes sense in reality, and that it is equivalent
to (B):

A) The physical activity X comprised the mental experience
B) The X mentally experienced.




First, the problems with falsifiability:

The hypothesis is most emphatically /not/ an extension of physics --
physics can be falsified, and then we redefine physics to include the new
observations. This is the show-stopper. Everything that ever was or
could ever be is compatible with this hypothesis. That puts it right up
there with "Invisible, massless angels push electrons around." We're done.





Second, the problems with detection:

Let's try a different thought experiment. I give you two robots (or two
people, or one of each -- you can't tell). Only one has a soul and
consciousness and all the undetectable dualistic goodies. Their behavior
is identical.

Now I can *imagine* this is possible if dualism is true, but the fact I
can imagine it does not make dualism true. The hypothesis tells you
nothing about the critters. You can't even distinguish between them.

What is the utility of this hypothesis?




Third, the definition of consciousness:

I had intentionally set the bar too high when I chose the Turing test to
determine consciousness. You've set it far too low. Are earthworms
conscious? Certainly they have experiences -- they react to stimuli --
and they do have a primitive nervous system which might qualify as "mental".

Yes, I was happy with "heat and pain", but that was because I was defining
them as observable physical neuronal actions. Your definition does not
tell me if mental experiences are physical or spiritual, observable or
intangible. But this issue is the easiest of the three to fix.




To sum up:
1) Your hypothesis isn't falsifiable.
2) You haven't given a method of detecting consciousness
and I don't think you can.
3) Your definition of consciousness is too inclusive.
4) You've also got the logical fallacies pointed out by DI
to deal with.



I think at this point you would be best served by thanking everyone for
their time, and perhaps asking folks who have followed this thread for a
reading list. There are excellent arguments for dualism out there, as
well as excellent attacks on physicalism. If you want to debate these,
then you're going to need to drop this idea -- I don't see how it's
salvageble -- and start reading.


So a few questions for you:

1) Could a mechanism following the known laws of physics pass the
Turing Test?

I hope I could, so yes.

2) Could a mechanism following the known laws of physics be explained
in terms of the mechanism following the known laws of physics?

The motion of a bird can be explained in terms of proteins, muscles, and/or
flight. These are not mutually exclusive.

A Turing-Test-passing machine can be explained in terms of assembly
language instructions, higher level language statements, or consciousness.
These are also not mutually exclusive.

Both can also be explained using physics. The answer is: Yes.

3) Would the behaviour of a mechanism which was mentally experiencing
only be explainable by those that asserted that it had mental
experiences, or would it also be explainable by those that asserted it
didn't have mental experiences and also by those that made no
assertions either way as to whether in reality it had mental
experiences or not?

(I presume in (3) you have no objections to a question where it is
suggested in the question that a mechanism was mentally experiencing)

Compatible, correct explanations of the same observations at several
different levels are possible and can coexist.

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: The Identity Theory of Mind
    ... The granularity (biochemical, electrical, ... So is classical physics. ... >>underyling sublime from which dualism and other ... >>mathematics, paradox, religion, consciousness itself). ...
    (sci.cognitive)
  • Re: The Identity Theory of Mind
    ... A process IS, indeed, 'spiraling', cycles just being ... So is classical physics. ... > underyling sublime from which dualism and other ... > mathematics, paradox, religion, consciousness itself). ...
    (sci.cognitive)
  • Re: Implausibility that we can be explained by evolution
    ... consciousness into phenomenal consciousness which is experience ... Neural network, Turing Machine, Turing Complete, Turing Equivalent, ... doesn't influence behaviour. ... by mental experiences. ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Implausibility that we can be explained by evolution
    ... How can we detect consciousness and, if necessary, conscious ... said you are happy that you understand what mental experiences are. ... Could a mechanism following the known laws of physics pass the ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Implausibility that we can be explained by evolution
    ... conscious experiences? ... said you are happy that you understand what mental experiences are. ... is an implication of the known laws of physics. ... consciousness and all the undetectable dualistic goodies. ...
    (talk.origins)