Re: Criticism of philosophical materialism (and a comment on someone2)


"urthogie" <urthogie@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
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On May 4, 3:53 pm, "Robert Barstead" <barste...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
"urthogie" <urtho...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message

news:1178302854.264411.28020@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> On May 4,
1:23 pm, "Robert Barstead" <barste...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
"urthogie" <urtho...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message

news:1178297545.661431.124640@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

On May 4, 11:33 am, "Robert Barstead" <barste...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
"urthogie" <urtho...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message

...snip





7. If subjective experience were physical (e.g. waves energy
particles, anything physical), it would violate the First Law of
Thermodynamics because it would be something (whatever it might
be,
whether its waves or matter or energy or light) out of nothing
(per
5., the brain acitivity balances itself out, without even
considering
consciousness), extending beyond the "balanced" reactions.

This is a very Troll-like statement. As with any part of the body,
the
brain is not an isolated thermodynamic system so conservation of
energy
is a
complete red herring. Please think about this more. This is one
of
the
stupidest things you've written in this discussion. In fact, it's
one
of
the stupidest things I've ever come across, and that's saying
something.
Don't assume what I'm saying, you might make an ass out of both of
us. The conservation of energy I was referring to was not limited
to
the brain, but meant that energy was being conserved in the
universe.
I argue that if we introduce consciousness as a physical entity, the
law of energy conservation is violated, because the universe is
creating something out of nothing.

If consciousness were material, what exactly would have to be created
of
nothing?
The material of consciousness would have to be created out of nothing.

What is the material of consciousness?

Why is brain activity any different than muscle activity with regard
to
thermodynamic laws?
It isn't any different in my view, because they both follow the laws
of thermodynamics and consciousness isn't physical.

The form of your argument suggested to me that you were trying to show a
contradiction in the materialist position. Your stated premise was "If
subjective experience were physical." Your stated conclusion was "it
would
violate the First Law of Thermodynamics." I'm not sure, but this
conclusion
seems to depend on the opposite of your premise; i.e., that subjective
experience is not physical. Please clarify.

You don't seem to understand basic syllogistic logic. The whole point
of counterexamples is to show that certain positions (such as yours,
that consciousness is physical) are contradictory.


There is no syllogism here and you didn't give a counter example. You wrote
a sentence with a premise and a conclusion. Typically, in such cases, the
conclusion follows from the premise.

Your sentence reads, "If subjective experience were physical..." The rest
of the argument should proceed given that premise. If it *were* physical,
then it would involve the normal physical components of cells: proteins,
nucleic acids, lipids sugars, etc. Let's, then, restate the premise: If
subjective experience were a function of the normal physical components of
cells like those listed above, then it would violate the First Law of
Thermodynamics. Does this still make sense to you? How about if we recast
this as follows: If muscle contraction were a function of the normal
physical components of cells, then muscle contraction would violate the
First Law of Thermodynamics. In both cases the premise is the same; that
is, a given biological phenomenon is take to be physical. Does the argument
make sense when we replace "subjective experience with "muscle contraction?"

Bob Barstead

.

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