Re: Criticism of philosophical materialism (and a comment on someone2)

On May 3, 1:14 pm, noctiluca <robertlc...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On May 3, 9:03 am, urthogie <urtho...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On May 3, 11:41 am, noctiluca <robertlc...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On May 3, 4:54 am, urthogie <urtho...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On May 2, 9:37 pm, noctiluca <robertlc...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On May 2, 11:14 am, urthogie <urtho...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On May 2, 1:47 pm, geop...@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

On May 2, 6:13 pm, urthogie <urtho...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On May 2, 1:00 pm, geop...@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

<snip>





Yes, the various ways that brain states are experienced by people are
immaterial. That is what I'm claiming. I am not claiming that we
can't know what color someone is looking at by looking at a brain
scan. Rather, I am claiming that we cannot know how they experience
it.

Actually, you appear to be claiming much more than that we cannot know
how someone else experiences a particular stimulus. From my reading of
this thread you are claiming that the cognitive state produced by that
stimulus is a separate and existentially different (though concurrent)
event from that of the conscious experience. In other words, you are
saying that the experience of "red" is different from the
neurophysical reaction to red.

In this, then, you appear to suffer from the same misconception as
does someone(n), and apparently for the same reasons: primarily
because you can "feel" that it is so (this dovetails with someone(n)'s
propensity to suggest that others intuitively know his ideas are
correct). But there is no evidence to suggest we should believe that
the experience of red and the brain state produced by red constitute
different phenomena.

There does seem to be some ambiguity in your terminology, though. If
you are using "immaterial" to mean non-physical (in some overly
literal sense) rather than supernatural (which is what most people
assume when someone decries rampant "materialism") then your use of
the word is too restrictive. Even if consciousness were posited as an
epiphenomenal property of, say, constantly cascading neural impulses,
this does not make it immaterial. It does make it non-physical (again,
in some overly literal sense). However, I don't think anyone
disagreeing with someone(n) suggested that consciousness had to be
phsically localized and amenable to observation in and of itself.

Lastly, you're attempts to equate what is a methodologically sound
default position - a phenomenon will be considered material absent
evidence to the contrary - with "faith" is also misguided. The
assumption that effects of material causes are themselves material is
logical and broadly supported. To go beyond that requires
extraordinary evidence, which if you are in possession of and are
willing to share I'm sure most of us would be willing to listen to,
just as we were willing to listen in someone(n)'s case.

RLC

By the way, I just wanted to say this was the most thoughtful
criticism of my view yet. I'd have to agree with you that a
naturalistic explanation of consciousness might be possible, although
it'd have to have certain qualifications, such as being non-reductive,
and it would require its own Physics to work.

Why? I can see you're no creationist, but can you see how this caveat
seems like special pleading? Inference to "its own Physics" sounds, to
my ears, uncomfortably similar to non-natural phenomena.

It's not special pleading because consciousness has several unique
characteristics that actually do seperate it from other things we
might study. I can't summarize what makes it different in
excruciating detail (some of the literature on it does), but several
things do make it different. Briefly:

1.It emerges from brain particles, but has no particles of its own.

A phenomenon of this universe, derived from this material universe's
physics, need not be composed of particles to be considered material.
There are waves, there is energy, there are emergent phenomena (which,
I suspect, will eventually reduce as do all other phenomena). This was
my point from an earlier response. Something need not be "particular"
for it to be material, and natural, and of this universe.

The activity in the brain is composed of balanced reactions, both
chemical and physical. To suggest that consciousness is a wave or a
particle is to contradict physics, which says that something cannot
come from nothing. (First law of thermodynamics).

2.It can be observed by the possessor, but not by others.

It cannot be directly experienced by others, but it can be observed.
And I see no reason why such observations (e.g. scans of brain states)
should be considered any less valid a picture of a phenomenon than
infra-red photos of black holes at the center of distant galaxies.

False-- you cannot know if someone else is conscious. You can only
use induction to assume that they are because you are, and you have a
similarly structured brain. Even if an invisibile cloud of
"consciousness" gas appeared around every brain, this would not be
evidence of consciousness. It would be evidence that brains create
gasses.

3. A reductive account of it would fail. We know this because we
can't describe it despite having it.

This seems presumptive to me. Why not accept that our ability to
describe this phenomenon is at present limited by our tools of
description, as are all potential descriptions of any natural
phenomena? In other words, we can describe it to the best of our
current understanding. Lack of understanding doesn't support reductive
impossibility, and I don't think you would accept that line of
argument if applied to other empirical fields.

Sounds an awful lot like linguistic determinism to me. The idea that
we are extremely limited by our language has been very much disproven
by modern psychology.

4. Philosophically, those who argue for consciousness being material
are unable to provide a solid account of how it could be studied, even
if they had access to any made up technology their hearts desired. In
other words, despite their already having a theory that they want to
be true, they have no idea how their theory could ever be proven
valid. In other words, they have faith in philosophical materialism.

Anyone who ascribes to philosophical materialism may be said to be
advancing an "ought" position, and thus be taking something on faith.
But that observation doesn't apply here. In this case we have
individuals accepting that materialist methodology is the most likely
process to produce empirical understanding - of consciousness. The
approach is the same as it would be for trying to understand the
origins of life, and is no more a faith proposition than that such
research will eventually produce a natural explanation. We assume
natural cause and effect because that's how science works.

Assuming you can apply materialist methodologies to everything is
philosophical materialism. I have argued the case here that the more
empirical and logical position to take here is that consciousness is
immaterial.

I don't "want it [a material explanation of consciousness] to be true"
any more than I *want* abiogenesis to be true. In contrast, however,
your argument depends upon the assumption that consciousness is
something more than material. But if the materialist perspective is
correct, and I again suggest that this is the reasonable default
position, then when we are studying those (admittedly complex and
reticulated) physical processes that occur during cognition we *are*
studying consciousness itself. There is no need or warrant, apart from
the *wants* of those who suggest it, to posit a dualism.

Abiogenesis is getting more evidence every year. Consciousness being
material remains at zero evidence. Secondly, its possible to conceive
of a factual account of abiogenesis emerging from scientific
research. It is not possible to offer such an account for
consciousness. Lastly, abiogenesis is just like most difficulty
problems-- it is easy compared to the hard problem of consciousness.
Even the "easy" problem of consciousness is harder than developing a
theory of abiogenesis.

Our personal intuition that the self is something separate is an
illusion. We are all willing to accept that intuition can lead us
astray in so many circumstances of inquiry, yet somehow when it comes
to the subject of consciousness that discipline goes out the window.

*Who* or *what* is being lied to by the brain, exactly? This is a
contradictory statement. If its possible to be lied to by the brain,
subjective experience exists. (I'm assuming here that by "self" you
mean subjective experience. You are correct if you're merely pointing
out that the brain deludes us into thinking of our bodies as part of
us, but of course this doesn't challenge my point about subejctive
experience).

I think the material pursuit of consciousness will be fruitless for
the reasons I've discussed here, and I don't think need repeating. If
you can challenge the reasons I've provided, and show that they are
invalid, then you will be correct in saying that I don't have
"discipline" or patience in regards to the study of consciousness.

5. Points 1-4 must be significant issues because we know consciousness
exists.

Significant is not equivalent with correct.

True, but this was addressed at some people who were actually denying
the existence of subjective experience. Read through this thread and
you'll see a couple of them.


My view, though, is
that it is more likely that consciousness is immaterial. How did I
come to this view?:

Again, I'm not entirely sure how you are using "immaterial."

Meaning its not part of the same physical plane on which the brain
resides, ruled by our universe's physics.

Can you explain to me how I am to distinguish this from an inference
to magic?

"Magic" in the fairy tale sense has some effect on the physical world,
and can therefore be either falsified or reduced through
methodological naturalism.



"I came to this decision by the observation that we have
consciousness, that emerges from a physical brain without leaving any
physical traces of itself, that we can't even reduce even the most
basic conscious experience into reductive, scientific terms, and that
we can't even conceive of a workable experiment whereby *anything*
about consciousness could be revealed, let alone reported."

This is a statement of incredulity. Even if it were substantially true
(and I don't think it is, e.g., "a physical brain without leaving any
physical traces of itself," and "we can't even conceive of a workable
experiment whereby *anything* about consciousness could be revealed"
are, respectively, unevidenced and incorrect) it would simply stand as
a description of an empirical field of inquiry in its infancy.

it's deceptive to call this a field in its infancy. As a scientific
field producing objective evidence, it is nonexistent.

This is simply not true.

Actually, it is true. If it isn't true, I've been lied to by a lot of
evolutionary psychologists, philosophers of mind, and neuroscientists.

In addition, I
provided reasons why it could never be a scientific field.

Now who is making statements of faith?

If you provide logical reasons why something can't be a scientific
field, then you're making an argument based on reason, not faith.

Incredulity is a valid position if you back it up with reasons why you
are incredulous.

There are always valid reasons for being incredulous. There are just
no valid reasons for accepting incredulity as an argument against
natural epistemology.
I believe my argument is valid because I think adequatly addressed
criticisms that attempt to undermine it. I don't think I can be
accused of circular logic or any such trickery, either.

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Criticism of philosophical materialism (and a comment on someone2)
    ... physics, need not be composed of particles to be considered material. ... The activity in the brain is composed of balanced reactions, ... Our consciousness is the pattern of brain activity developed by ... they have faith in philosophical materialism. ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Evolutionary question concerning God.
    ... The organism will follow the laws of physics by analysing the situation ... that is presented in his/her consciousness and taking ... I assume you mean the brain is structured in such a way ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Evolutionary question concerning God.
    ... There is no coincidence involved. ... signal that the brain interprets as a color. ... process in the brain that produces consciousness. ... If physics and chemistry are correct, then there can be no evolutionary ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Does Light Propagates?
    ... that is sorted by our brain. ... I think what you are really asking is "What is consciousness." ... is a view that sometimes called materialism. ... passed their introductory physics courses. ...
    (sci.physics.relativity)
  • Re: Evolutionary question concerning God.
    ... The organism will follow the laws of physics by analysing the situation ... that is presented in his/her consciousness and taking ... I assume you mean the brain is structured in such a way ...
    (talk.origins)
Loading