Re: Criticism of philosophical materialism (and a comment on someone2)

On May 3, 11:41 am, noctiluca <robertlc...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On May 3, 4:54 am, urthogie <urtho...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:



On May 2, 9:37 pm, noctiluca <robertlc...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On May 2, 11:14 am, urthogie <urtho...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On May 2, 1:47 pm, geop...@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

On May 2, 6:13 pm, urthogie <urtho...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On May 2, 1:00 pm, geop...@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

I don't get this. Can you explain what you mean by subjective
experience? Below you say that material brain activity is associated
with thoughts, and that it can be manipulated physically. Surely
that's evidence that the mind arises from a physical entity (as
opposed to an immaterial source), or am I misunderstanding you?

No, you're not misunderstanding me. My claim is that subjective
experience exists, and it is correlated with physical events in the
brain. It's not either or.

Also, how can we have sensory evidence of the immaterial, if
immaterial means it can't be detected?

Because we experience existence. You are experiencing it right now.

You're not being terribly clear (like someoneX, I suspect). What
exactly is it that is immaterial in this case, or that we should
conclude is immaterial? The experience of consciousness?

Yes, the various ways that brain states are experienced by people are
immaterial. That is what I'm claiming. I am not claiming that we
can't know what color someone is looking at by looking at a brain
scan. Rather, I am claiming that we cannot know how they experience
it.

Actually, you appear to be claiming much more than that we cannot know
how someone else experiences a particular stimulus. From my reading of
this thread you are claiming that the cognitive state produced by that
stimulus is a separate and existentially different (though concurrent)
event from that of the conscious experience. In other words, you are
saying that the experience of "red" is different from the
neurophysical reaction to red.

In this, then, you appear to suffer from the same misconception as
does someone(n), and apparently for the same reasons: primarily
because you can "feel" that it is so (this dovetails with someone(n)'s
propensity to suggest that others intuitively know his ideas are
correct). But there is no evidence to suggest we should believe that
the experience of red and the brain state produced by red constitute
different phenomena.

There does seem to be some ambiguity in your terminology, though. If
you are using "immaterial" to mean non-physical (in some overly
literal sense) rather than supernatural (which is what most people
assume when someone decries rampant "materialism") then your use of
the word is too restrictive. Even if consciousness were posited as an
epiphenomenal property of, say, constantly cascading neural impulses,
this does not make it immaterial. It does make it non-physical (again,
in some overly literal sense). However, I don't think anyone
disagreeing with someone(n) suggested that consciousness had to be
phsically localized and amenable to observation in and of itself.

Lastly, you're attempts to equate what is a methodologically sound
default position - a phenomenon will be considered material absent
evidence to the contrary - with "faith" is also misguided. The
assumption that effects of material causes are themselves material is
logical and broadly supported. To go beyond that requires
extraordinary evidence, which if you are in possession of and are
willing to share I'm sure most of us would be willing to listen to,
just as we were willing to listen in someone(n)'s case.

RLC

By the way, I just wanted to say this was the most thoughtful
criticism of my view yet. I'd have to agree with you that a
naturalistic explanation of consciousness might be possible, although
it'd have to have certain qualifications, such as being non-reductive,
and it would require its own Physics to work.

Why? I can see you're no creationist, but can you see how this caveat
seems like special pleading? Inference to "its own Physics" sounds, to
my ears, uncomfortably similar to non-natural phenomena.

It's not special pleading because consciousness has several unique
characteristics that actually do seperate it from other things we
might study. I can't summarize what makes it different in
excruciating detail (some of the literature on it does), but several
things do make it different. Briefly:

1.It emerges from brain particles, but has no particles of its own.
2.It can be observed by the possessor, but not by others.
3. A reductive account of it would fail. We know this because we
can't describe it despite having it.
4. Philosophically, those who argue for consciousness being material
are unable to provide a solid account of how it could be studied, even
if they had access to any made up technology their hearts desired. In
other words, despite their already having a theory that they want to
be true, they have no idea how their theory could ever be proven
valid. In other words, they have faith in philosophical materialism.
5. Points 1-4 must be significant issues because we know consciousness
exists.

My view, though, is
that it is more likely that consciousness is immaterial. How did I
come to this view?:

Again, I'm not entirely sure how you are using "immaterial."

Meaning its not part of the same physical plane on which the brain
resides, ruled by our universe's physics.
"I came to this decision by the observation that we have
consciousness, that emerges from a physical brain without leaving any
physical traces of itself, that we can't even reduce even the most
basic conscious experience into reductive, scientific terms, and that
we can't even conceive of a workable experiment whereby *anything*
about consciousness could be revealed, let alone reported."

This is a statement of incredulity. Even if it were substantially true
(and I don't think it is, e.g., "a physical brain without leaving any
physical traces of itself," and "we can't even conceive of a workable
experiment whereby *anything* about consciousness could be revealed"
are, respectively, unevidenced and incorrect) it would simply stand as
a description of an empirical field of inquiry in its infancy.

it's deceptive to call this a field in its infancy. As a scientific
field producing objective evidence, it is nonexistent. In addition, I
provided reasons why it could never be a scientific field.
Incredulity is a valid position if you back it up with reasons why you
are incredulous.

Surely you would have no difficulty imagining some thoughtful
individual from two centuries past saying:

"I came to this decision by the observation that we have a
physiological pathology, that develops from some unknown source
without leaving any physical traces of itself, and that we can't even
reduce even the most basic immune functions into reductive, scientific
terms, and that we can't even conceive of a workable experiment
whereby *anything* about this disease could be revealed, let alone
reported."

RLC

I think I've provided reasons here why consciousness is different from
problems in pathology. Pathology was a question of figuring out the
chemical structures of diseases. Consciousness has no such
structures, according to my argument.

So I don't think I'm doing special pleading because what we know
suggests that consciousness truly is different. Several psychologists
and philosophers agree that it *must* be different, in fact. Are they
special pleading, too?

.

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