Re: Materialist Evolutionists

On Apr 13, 6:47 pm, "someone3" <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 13 Apr, 03:04, "Sonofagunzel" <soas...@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:





On Apr 13, 7:19 am, "someone3" <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 12 Apr, 20:51, j.wilki...@xxxxxxxxx (John Wilkins) wrote:

someone3 <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 12 Apr, 02:20, j.wilki...@xxxxxxxxx (John Wilkins) wrote:
someone3 <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 11 Apr, 02:52, j.wilki...@xxxxxxxxx (John Wilkins) wrote:
someone3 <glenn.spig...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
...
If you mean that "experience" is only a word to describe the 'internal
perspective' of the physical activity, whereas viewing the physical
activity were an 'external perspective' for example, then I understand
what you are saying.

Though presumably you are not suggesting that a cup has an 'internal
perspective', i.e. is experiencing. So the question still made sense,
and as such you were able to answer that you would not need to know if
the system is experiencing to explain its behaviour.

Would you ever consider it possible that the system was experiencing?

Yes, if it had sufficient complexity. Some of the properties of systems
needed to be experiencing systems in some active sense (as opposed to
passive undergoing of local causal forces like the cup*) include:

- high rate of information transfer into the system (sensory data)
- ability to process that input rapidly
- feedback loops in the data processing to at least three levels
(representations of representations of internal states)
- memory storage

Anything that lacks any one of these features cannot be said to be
experiencing. The fallacy of panpsychism (in which rocks are conscious)
is based on a failure to specify what counts as a self-aware system. I
think that at *least* these features are required. There may be other
necessary features, such as a "semantic bias" such that the system has
preferences. Without a bias of that kind, it may treat all inputs the
same (but I think that neural nets actually self-organise these
preferences, so it may be an emergent feature of the system).

So the system might be experiencing, but might not be experiencing,
either way it wouldn't affect the explanation of the behaviour which
you have agreed requires no knowledge of whether the system was
experiencing. Would you agree that this means the system behaviour
could never be said to be due to it experiencing?

In philosophese you are asking if experience is epiphenomenal.

If it has no downstream effect upon behaviour, then yes. But a system
with feedback *is* affected by its own states. Whether it is affected by
the totality of states that go to make up experience depends entirely on
the particular facts of that system, but in terms of human experience, I
think it clearly does.

The system at t1 includes the inputs, and the subsequent processing. At
t2 it experiences t1 plus novel inputs. At t3 it experiences t2 (which
now includes the experience) plus novel inputs. And so on.

Each time the internal "registers" or memory store includes some
representation of the experience of prior inputs and states. This has to
influence the subsequent processing of novel inputs. We call it
"learning", but in this case it is learning about internal states.

The constraint here is the amount of memory and the duration of it. An
experience is not fully recalled, because it would mean that the amount
of memory would increase exponentially.

It would seem that you are saying that no knowledge of whether the
system is experiencing is required to explain its behaviour, and the
system in question (we are using a robot as an illustration, where
nodestates feedback to other nodes etc), even though its behaviour can
be explained with the assumption that it isn't experiencing, that if
it had of been, then its behaviour was due to it experiencing, have I
understood you correctly?

I'm not sure if I understand *you* correctly. If the robot has the
capacity to experience, then that must affect its behaviour. Let's make
this a bit simpler.

Suppose there is a function of complex information processing systems.
Let's call it E. To get E, a system has to have some number N of
subsystems _e_1 to _e_i. If a robot system is below the ith _e_, then it
does what it does in terms of the _e_s that comprise it.

But if it has N _e_s, then it has E, and having E means that its future
states is in part determined by its present E.

Now both cases must be explained by its having the _e_s, but the second
case means that to understand the states of the _e_s in a later step,
you must have regard to the fact that it has a function E.

You might be able to explain E in terms of being a function of many
_e_s, or not (as a physicalist and reductionist I think you must in
principle, but you may not be able to yet). Nevertheless, if you have
enumerated the _e_s and their connections, no matter how surprising the
outputs, you have *fully* explained the robot's behaviour. E is an
"emergent" property of these _e_s, and so the full description is a full
account.

I'm sure I must have misunderstood, for how can it behaviour be *due*
to it having an 'experiencing point of view', when as you agreed, no
knowledge of whether it had the 'experiencing point of view' would be
required to explain its behaviour, and thus its behaviour could be
explained with the assumption that it did not. In case of a
misunderstanding on my side of what it sounded like you might be
suggesting above, or your misunderstanding of the question (hopefully
now made clearer) that it was an answer to, the question was (reworded
for hopefully for clarity), would you agree that this means the system
behaviour could never be said to be due to it having an 'experiencing
point of view'?

No. You have misunderstood.
--
John S. Wilkins, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Biohumanities Project
University of Queensland - Blog: scienceblogs.com/evolvingthoughts
"He used... sarcasm. He knew all the tricks, dramatic irony, metaphor,
bathos, puns, parody, litotes and... satire. He was vicious."

There seems to be a conflict between the two views that you hold

1) The robots behaviour can be explained without knowledge of whether
it was experiencing.

You yourself said:
---
One does not need to know if the system is "experiencing" to explain
its behaviour.
---

2) If it was in fact experiencing, it would affect its behaviour.

Which I assume is what you meant when you said:
---
If the robot has the capacity to experience, then that must affect its
behaviour.
---

As if (2) was true, then (1) couldn't be, and if (1) was true then (2)
couldn't be.

Have I understood (1) and (2) correctly, and if I have can you see why
to hold both views is logically inconsistent?- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

Feel free to ignore this.

You can explain the weather if you know the forces operating on each
of the molecules in the system. If you know that, you don't need to
know whether some of those molecules have formed a high pressure
system in order to explain the weather.

But that doesn't mean that a high pressure system does not affect the
weather.

You will object that hurricanes are behavior and consciousness is
not. I respond that if an assumption of consciousness helps to model,
explain or predict behavior or nodal interactions, then it is unsafe
to assume that consciousness does not arise and does not affect the
observed behavior of the system.

Does that help?

Your reply to the objection that hurricanes are behaviour doesn't
work. It is not about whether conscious could have arisen or not, it
is about whether it affects the behaviour, and it cannot be both (1)
and (2) (from the post you were responding to) as they are mutually
exclusive. With (1) the behaviour could be explained with the
assumption that consciousness hadn't emerged (even if it had), with
(2) if it had, the behaviour could not be explained without knowledge
of it, as its emergence affects behaviour.

So to the question, can or can't the behaviour be explained with the
assumption that consciousness had emerged, the answer cannot be
"both". It either can, or it can't.

I'm not getting into a discussion with you, I will continue the
discussion with John Wilkins, you yourself have said:
---
I look forward to your unfolding conversation with John Wilkins to see
if you have changed your ways and/or learnt anything.
---

I hope you are not so closed minded as to block out the possibility
that you might learn something.

The two views you claim are inconsistent are:

1) The robots behaviour can be explained without knowledge of whether
it was experiencing.

and

2) If it was in fact experiencing, it would affect its behaviour.

Substitute "weather" for the robot's behavior and "high pressure
system" for "consciousness", and you get:

1) The weather can be explained without knowledge of whether there was
a high pressure system.

and

2) If there was in fact a high pressure system, it would affect the
weather.

As I said in the post you replied to, you can explain the weather if
you know the forces operating on each of the molecules in the system.
If you know that, you don't need to
know whether some of those molecules have formed a high pressure
system in order to explain the weather. That means statement 1 is
true.

But that doesn't mean that a high pressure system does not affect the
weather. The high pressure system is simply sum total of a system of
interacting molecules, and is a much simpler way of modelling,
predicting and explaining the weather than trying to measure the
molecules individually. The system has properties that affect the
weather. That means statement 2 is also true.

So statements 1 and 2 are not mutually exclusive.

Exactly the same statements can be made about nodal interactions,
consciousness, and behaviour. If an assumption of consciousness helps
to model, explain or predict behavior or nodal interactions, then it
is unsafe to assume that consciousness does not arise and does not
affect the observed behavior of the system.

I know you will not respond to this because you can't.

.

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