Re: Why Should Evolution be Taught as Science in Schools?

On Apr 3, 1:49 am, "Steven J." <steve...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Apr 2, 8:19 pm, "sss1000" <ssha...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:



On Apr 1, 10:45 pm, "Steven J." <steve...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

-- [snip]

How does free will fit into dualism, or supernaturalism? The problem
with free will is not naturalism, or evolution, but the principle of
cause and effect. Either our choices are constrained and caused by
our internal mental states (our "desires, beliefs, and intentions"),
or they are not. If they are, then our actions are
"determined" (directly, by our DB&I, or indirectly by whatever causes
led to our current DB&I). If they are not, then we have a different
problem: in what sense are our actions "ours," except in the sense
that they happen to happen when we're around? Normally, while we like
to think our will is undetermined, we also like to think that our
character can be inferred from, and gives rise to, our actions: there
are things we will do, if the situation arises, and others we will
never do, because we're that sort of person. This problem arises
whether there is a materialistic explanation for mind and will or not,
it seems to me.

Are desires, beliefs, and intentions solely a product of ones physical
makeup and/or physical forces acting on the individual? time.)

I think probably so. I also think that, from the standpoint of
whether we have free will, or rather, what sorts of free will we can
have, it doesn't matter. See below.


Steven: I'm reading responses from newer to older, so I apologize if
earlier e-mail responses from me may have asked questions that you
answered in this message.

Appreciate the direct answer.



One of the books on my bookshelf is Ron Rosenbaum's _Explaining
Hitler_. One of the questions it considers is how the cherubic
toddler in the cover photo became the genocidal tyrant of history.
Some of the explainers insist on deterministic accounts: Hitler caught
syphilis from a Jewish prostitute (no one knows if this is true), and
so decided to kill every Jew in Europe, or his mother died under the
ministrations of a Jewish physician (this is true), so he decided to
kill every Jew in Europe (except that physician). Others, contrarily,
insist that explanations of why Hitler became HITLER are impossible
and impermissible. The latter position is easy enough to understand,
and goes back to antideterministic concepts of free will: if something
caused Hitler to be the monster he became, then he is as innocent as
any artillery shell with no choice of its trajectory or target. But
why the former position? Consider: if Hitler at any time could just
have "decided" to incorporate the Jews as full members of Nazi society
rather than murder them, no matter what his prejudices and
experiences, then the filmmaker who spent years making a nine-hour
documentary on the Holocaust could equally well decide to turn around
and make a twelve-hour documentary denying the Holocaust. What value
free will, if it's so free that our choices don't follow from our
character?

Don't understand your point.

My point is this. On the one hand, it is possible that our choices
are caused by our desires, beliefs, and intentions, and that, in turn,
our desires, beliefs, and intentions are caused by the interaction of
earlier states of mind and our environment (and those earlier states
of mind are caused, in turn, by still earlier states of mind
interacting with still earlier environmental factors). Again, it
doesn't matter whether some aspects of our mind are nonphysical, or
whether our minds are purely physical phenomena. What matters, is
that something *causes* our states of mind. If this happens, then our
will is not "free" in the sense of being "uncaused" or "completely
nondeterministic." However, our will can be "free" in the sense that
we really want to make these choices; they are not being forced on us
against our will (e.g. some sort of "mind control"), nor are we being
mntally nor physically manipulated like marionettes.

These are pretty good points. You used the phrase "it doesn't matter
whether some aspects of our mind are physical or non-physical..."
Agree that in everyday events it doesn't matter. However, isn't it of
extreme importance from a religious/scientific view. If part of the
mind is non-physical, then man must have a non-physical, or spiritual
part of him. This is sometimes called the soul.

Your comments on human psychology are all very reasonable. Are you
open to the idea that evolution may apply to animals, but that humans
are distinct entities. Wouldn't this explain a lot of the differences
between man and animals and also explain free will?

Or, on the other hand, it is possible that our choices are *not*
caused by our DB&Is, and/or our DB&Is are themselves uncaused. This
might seem to give rise to a will that is more "free," but consider:
it implies either that we can choose to do things that don't accord
with what we think is right and what we want (what else would it mean
to say that our desires, beliefs, and intentions don't
deterministically cause our decisions?), or else that we can want
things and act to get them, even though those wants don't follow
logically from our previous character and previous desires. As I
suggested before, that's a lot like suggesting that our decisions
aren't so much ours, as just things that happen while we're around for
the ride. This doesn't seem like a kind of free will worth wanting;
how is it "free" to know that we might end up deciding to do things
that we don't want to do and that don't serve our purposes or wishes.

In other words, we *want* a certain degree (and a fairly high degree,
at that) of determinism in our decision-making. We don't want to be
as predictable and limited in our repertory of possible responses as,
say, a thermostat or a sphex wasp, but that is more a matter of
wanting complexity than wanting indeterminacy. There is another
poster, Dale Kelly, who defines "free will" in terms of recursiveness
(that is, we not only decide to act on our DB&Is, but we decide what
DB&Is to have). Surely our intellectual complexity gives us some
degree of recursivity, if not the infinite amount that Kelly insists
on. Again, note that this analysis of the problem does not depend on
the assumption that our minds are purely physical; it arises if you
believe in a nonphysical mind that is constrained by the rules of
logic and the principles of cause and effect.

Reasonable statements again, but where do the Desires, Beliefs, and
Intentions come from? Just neurons firing in the brain? If so, there
is no free will. If not, then humans have a spiritual nature. This
of course is something that is beyond science to measure and evaluate.






As far as I can tell, supernaturalism can answer this problem only by
granting an exception not merely to the laws of nature but to those of
logic as well. And if you're going to ask for exceptions to the
principles of logic, then why not just believe that -- illogical as it
may seem -- free will is also compatible with materialism? Now, as
I've noted above, I tend to take a compatibilist view: our choices are
caused, but the causes are part of us, and therefore our choices,
unless constrained by external force or internal derangements like
drunkenness or mental illness, are "free." Note, by the way, that our
choices need not be (indeed, in light of quantum indeterminacy,
probably cannot be) purely deterministic, but again, I tend to agree
with Daniel C. Dennett that mere indeterminacy cannot by itself be "a
kind of free will worth having," although it can play a role in such
free will.

Not clear what you're trying to say hear either. Do humans act purely
based on their physical makeup and physical laws? If so, then they
clearly don't have free will and are also not morally responsible for
their actions. If not, then there must be something non-physical that
controls their actions.

Having something non-physical that controls our actions doesn't mean
that our decisions are not determined; if nonphysical causes exist,
presumably cause and effect work for them as well as for anything else
(and you have the additional problem of how a nonphysical will
interacts with a physical brain: normally, something that can affect a
material object is physical, by definition).

Agree that non-physical control does not necessarily mean free will.
The key point in terms of evolutions is not as much "free will" as
"non-physical". Something that is non-physical cannot be measured by
science. It can be inferred by human actions. Do you believe that
some of man's actions are influenced by non-physical means?

To keep referring back (as near as I remember them) to Daniel C.
Dennett's arguments, he offers the analogy to a deer in a cage: a deer
in a ten by ten foot cage is clearly not free, but what about a deer
in a cage the size of Central Park in Manhattan? By the same token,
it is important not to assume that, if our minds work
deterministically, they must work as simply as a mousetrap or
something else that has a very limited repertory of responses and no
recursive ability to remodel itself. He sees, basically,
responsibility and free will as something that arises emergently as
the mind becomes more complex and powerful.



Of course


-- [snip]

Natural selection is not a moral principle. Evolutionarytheory
describes howlifehas changed over time; it does not prescribe a code
of conduct or tell us how we ought to order either our societies or
our lives. Evolution isn't the sort of thing that can have goals
towards which we can strive or purposes which we can serve (or, if
we're feeling contrary, flout). Even if our moral principles grew out
of natural selection, that doesn't mean that natural selection is,
itself, one of those moral principles, any more than a sculptor's
chisel is part of a statue, or sun, clouds, and the wind are parts of
a glacier. Humans *do* pursue abstract knowledge and an understanding
of the universe for its own sake (not "atallcosts," to be sure, but
often at some considerable cost); it's part of human nature. It
doesn't seem to be part of the nature of other species, but then,
we're not other species, we're our own species.

Steven: You seem to be acknowledging a uniquness of humans compared
to other species. I share this view. You also appear to believe in
moral principles. I also share this view. You state that humans
pursue knowledge for its own sake. I agree with this and would add
that it usually helps them in some way and/or gives them sense of
awe. Sometimes, they pursue it for pride, as you've probably
encountered when dealing with some scientists.

What is not clear is what the basis for any moral principles are
given a purely evolutionist, materialistic universe. Merriam's lists
the adjective moral as meaning:

1 a : of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior :
ETHICAL <moral judgments> b : expressing or teaching a conception of
right behavior <a moral poem> c : conforming to a standard of right
behavior d : sanctioned by or operative on one's conscience or ethical
judgment <a moral obligation> e : capable of right and wrong action

...

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