Re: Intelligence: Everywhere, Great and Small
- From: "UC" <uraniumcommittee@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 7 Sep 2006 13:57:50 -0700
Al wrote:
Science only develops through observation. The most basic observation
we can make
is that "it seems" (science talk) that no matter how far out we go and
no matter how small we observe, there seems to be no end to functional,
elaborate environments. In both large and small there is a suggestion
of intelligence everywhere.
Real basic, yet no angry evo-leftie ideologist wants to go there. Very
Curious.
The most basic and deepest of observations seem to say with terrific
frequency: Chaos subject to, "intelligence", and "design." -and those
intellectual aspirants tearing away from their religious roots seem to
be in such pain that they live in revolt and puffed up resentment from
the very idea, rather than in wonderment and humility.
Section VI Of the Impossibility of the Physico-theological Proof
If, then, neither the concept of things in general, nor the experience
of any existence in general, can satisfy our demands, there still
remains one way open, namely, to try whether any definite experience,
and consequently that of things in the world as it is, their
constitution and disposition, may not supply a proof which could give
us the certain conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being. Such a
proof we should call physico-theological. If that, however, should
prove impossible too, then it is clear that no satisfactory proof
whatever, from merely speculative reason, is possible, in support of
the existence of a Being, corresponding to our transcendental idea.
After what has been said already, it will be [p. 621] easily understood
that we may expect an easy and complete answer to this question. For
how could there ever be an experience that should be adequate to an
idea? It is the very nature of an idea that no experience can ever be
adequate to it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and
all-sufficient original Being is so overwhelming, so high above
everything empirical, which is always conditioned, that we can never
find in experience enough material to fill such a concept, and can only
grope about among things conditioned, looking in vain for the
unconditioned, of which no rule of any empirical synthesis can ever
give us an example, or even show the way towards it.
If the highest Being should stand itself in that chain of conditions,
it would be a link in the series, and would, exactly like the lower
links, above which it is placed, require further investigation with
regard to its own still higher cause. If, on the contrary, we mean to
separate it from that chain, and, as a purely intelligible Being, not
comprehend it in the series of natural causes, what bridge is then open
for reason to reach it, considering that all rules determining the
transition from effect to cause, nay, all synthesis and extension of
our knowledge in general, refer to nothing but possible experience, and
therefore to the objects of the world of sense only, and are [p. 622]
valid nowhere else?
This present world presents to us so immeasurable a stage of variety,
order, fitness, and beauty, whether we follow it up in the infinity of
space or in its unlimited division, that even with the little knowledge
which our poor understanding has been able to gather, all language,
with regard to so many and inconceivable wonders, loses its vigour, all
numbers their power of measuring, and all our thoughts their necessary
determination; so that our judgment of the whole is lost in a
speechless, but all the more eloquent astonishment. Everywhere we see a
chain of causes and effects, of means and ends, of order in birth and
death, and as nothing has entered by itself into the state in which we
find it, all points to another thing as its cause. As that cause
necessitates the same further enquiry, the whole universe would thus be
lost in the abyss of nothing, unless we admitted something which,
existing by itself, original and independent, outside the chain of
infinite contingencies, should support it, and, as the cause of its
origin, secure to it at the same time its permanence. Looking at all
the things in the world, what greatness shall we attribute to that
highest cause? We do not know the whole contents of the world, still
less can we measure its magnitude by a comparison [p. 623] with all
that is possible. But, as with regard to causality, we cannot do
without a last and highest Being, why should we not fix the degree of
its perfection beyond everything else that is possible? This we can
easily do, though only in the faint outline of an abstract concept, if
we represent to ourselves all possible perfections united in it as in
one substance. Such a concept would agree with the demand of our
reason, which requires parsimony in the number of principles; it would
have no contradictions in itself, would be favourable to the extension
of the employment of reason in the midst of experience, by guiding it
towards order and system, and lastly, would never be decidedly opposed
to any experience.
This proof will always deserve to be treated with respect. It is the
oldest, the clearest, and most in conformity with human reason. It
gives life to the study of nature, deriving its own existence from it,
and thus constantly acquiring new vigour.
It reveals aims and intention, where our own observation would not by
itself have discovered them, and enlarges our knowledge of nature by
leading us towards that peculiar unity the principle of which exists
outside nature. This knowledge reacts again on its cause, namely, the
transcendental idea, and thus increases the [p. 624] belief in a
supreme Author to an irresistible conviction.
It would therefore be not only extremely sad, but utterly vain to
attempt to diminish the authority of that proof. Reason, constantly
strengthened by the powerful arguments that come to hand by themselves,
though they are no doubt empirical only, cannot be discouraged by any
doubts of subtle and abstract speculation. Roused from every
inquisitive indecision, as from a dream, by one glance at the wonders
of nature and the majesty of the cosmos, reason soars from height to
height till it reaches the highest, from the conditioned to conditions,
till it reaches the supreme and unconditioned Author of all.
But although we have nothing to say against the reasonableness and
utility of this line of argument, but wish, on the contrary, to commend
and encourage it, we cannot approve of the claims which this proof
advances to apodictic certainty, and to an approval on its own merits,
requiring no favour, and no help from any other quarter. It cannot
injure the good cause, if the dogmatical language of the overweening
sophist is toned down to the moderate and modest statements of a faith
which does not require unconditioned submission, yet is sufficient to
give rest and comfort. I therefore maintain that the
physico-theological proof can never establish by itself alone the
existence of a [p. 625] Supreme Being, but must always leave it to the
ontological proof (to which it serves only as an introduction), to
supply its deficiency; so that, after all, it is the ontological proof
which contains the only possible argument (supposing always that any
speculative proof is possible), and human reason can never do without
it.
The principal points of the physico-theological proof are the
following. 1st. There are everywhere in the world clear indications of
an intentional arrangement carried out with great wisdom, and forming a
whole indescribably varied in its contents and infinite in extent.
2ndly. The fitness of this arrangement is entirely foreign to the
things existing in the world, and belongs to them contingently only;
that is, the nature of different things could never spontaneously, by
the combination of so many means, co-operate towards definite aims, if
these means had not been selected and arranged on purpose by a rational
disposing principle, according to certain fundamental ideas.
3rdly. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or many),
which must be the cause of the world, not only as a blind and
all-powerful nature, by means of unconscious fecundity, but as an
intelligence, by freedom.
4thly. The unity of that cause may be inferred with certainty from the
unity of the reciprocal relation [p. 626] of the parts of the world, as
portions of a skilful edifice, so far as our experience reaches, and
beyond it, with plausibility, according to the principles of analogy.
Without wishing to argue, for the sake of argument only, with natural
reason, as to its conclusion in inferring from the analogy of certain
products of nature with the works of human art, in which man does
violence to nature, and forces it not to follow its own aims, but to
adapt itself to ours (that is, from the similarity of certain products
of nature with houses, ships, and watches), in inferring from this, I
say, that a similar causality, namely, understanding and will, must be
at the bottom of nature, and in deriving the internal possibility of a
freely acting nature (which, it may be, renders all human art and even
human reason possible) from another though superhuman art - a kind of
reasoning, which probably could not stand the severest test of
transcendental criticism; we are willing to admit, nevertheless, that
if we have to name such a cause, we cannot do better than to follow the
analogy of such products of human design, which are the only ones of
which we know completely both cause and effect. There would be no
excuse, if reason were to surrender a causality which it knows, and
have recourse to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation,
which it does not know.
According to this argument, the fitness and harmony existing in so many
works of nature might prove [p. 627] the contingency of the form, but
not of the matter, that is, the substance in the world, because, for
the latter purpose, it would be necessary to prove in addition, that
the things of the world were in themselves incapable of such order and
harmony, according to general laws, unless there existed, even in their
substance, the product of a supreme wisdom. For this purpose, very
different arguments would be required from those derived from the
analogy of human art. The utmost, therefore, that could be established
by such a proof would be an architect of the world, always very much
hampered by the quality of the material with which he has to work, not
a creator, to whose idea everything is subject. This would by no means
suffice for the purposed aim of proving an all-sufficient original
Being. If we wished to prove the contingency of matter itself, we must
have recourse to a transcendental argument, and this is the very thing
which was to be avoided.
The inference, therefore, really proceeds from the order and design
that can everywhere be observed in the world, as an entirely contingent
arrangement, to the existence of a cause, proportionate to it. The
concept of that cause must therefore teach us something quite definite
about it, and can therefore be no other concept but that of a Being
which possesses all might, wisdom, etc., in one word, all perfection of
an all-sufficient Being. The [p. 628] predicates of a very great, of an
astounding, of an immeasurable might and virtue give us no definite
concept, and never tell us really what the thing is by itself. They are
only relative representations of the magnitude of an object, which the
observer (of the world) compares with himself and his own power of
comprehension, and which would be equally grand, whether we magnify the
object, or reduce the observing subject to smaller proportions in
reference to it. Where we are concerned with the magnitude (of the
perfection) of a thing in general, there exists no definite concept,
except that which comprehends all possible perfection, and only the all
(omnitudo) of reality is thoroughly determined in the concept.
Now I hope that no one would dare to comprehend the relation of that
part of the world which he has observed (in its extent as well as in
its contents) to omnipotence, the relation of the order of the world to
the highest wisdom, and the relation of the unity of the world to the
absolute unity of its author, etc. Physico-theology, therefore, can
never give a definite concept of the highest cause of the world, and is
insufficient, therefore, as a principle of theology, which is itself to
form the basis of religion.
The step leading to absolute totality is entirely impossible on the
empirical road. Nevertheless, that step is taken in the
physico-theological proof. How then has this broad abyss been bridged
over? [p. 629]
The fact is that, after having reached the stage of admiration of the
greatness, the wisdom, the power, etc. of the Author of the world, and
seeing no further advance possible, one suddenly leaves the argument
carried on by empirical proofs, and lays hold of that contingency
which, from the very first, was inferred from the order and design of
the world. The next step from that contingency leads, by means of
transcendental concepts only, to the existence of something absolutely
necessary, and another step from the absolute necessity of the first
cause to its completely determined or determining concept, namely, that
of an all-embracing reality. Thus we see that the physico-theological
proof, baffled in its own undertaking, takes suddenly refuge in the
cosmological proof, and as this is only the ontological proof in
disguise, it really carries out its original intention by means of pure
reason only; though it so strongly disclaimed in the beginning all
connection with it, and professed to base everything on clear proofs
from experience.
Those who adopt the physico-theological argument have no reason to be
so very coy towards the transcendental mode of argument, and with the
conceit of enlightened observers of nature to look down upon them as
the cobwebs of dark speculators. If they would only examine themselves,
they would find that, after they had advanced a good way on the soil of
nature and experience, and found themselves nevertheless as much
removed [p. 630] as ever from the object revealed to their reason, they
suddenly leave that soil, to enter into the realm of pure
possibilities, where on the wings of ideas they hope to reach that
which had withdrawn itself from all their empirical investigations.
Imagining themselves to be on firm ground after that desperate leap,
they now proceed to expand the definite concept which they have
acquired, they do not know how, over the whole field of creation; and
they explain the ideal, which was merely a product of pure reason, by
experience, though in a very poor way, and totally beneath the dignity
of the object, refusing all the while to admit that they have arrived
at that knowledge or supposition by a very different road from that of
experience.
Thus we have seen that the physico-theological proof rests on the
cosmological, and the cosmological on the ontological proof of the
existence of one original Being as the Supreme Being; and, as besides
these three, there is no other path open to speculative reason, the
ontological proof, based exclusively on pure concepts of reason, is the
only possible one, always supposing that any proof of a proposition, so
far transcending the empirical use of the understanding, is possible at
all.
.
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