Re: Evolutionary question concerning God.


Ernest Major wrote:
In message <1157498524.271212.243290@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
someone2 <glenn.spigel2@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes

Ernest Major wrote:
In message <1157485547.802092.129840@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
someone2 <glenn.spigel2@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes

Ernest Major wrote:
In message <1157481453.482633.185440@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
someone2 <glenn.spigel2@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes

Ymir wrote:
In article <1157472692.873971.294440@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
"someone2" <glenn.spigel2@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:


Ymir wrote:
In article <1157408521.550826.96400@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:


Ymir wrote:
It's not (2) that is at issue here -- at least not in strict
ontological
sense; given that the laws of physics make no direct reference to
consciousness, then consciousness must ultimately follow from those
things which physics does make direct reference to. The fact that
consciousness derives from physical properties does not,
however, entail
that it is epistemically practical to talk about consciousness
in these
terms rather than relying on higher level abstracta. Those
here who have
claimed that physics and chemistry are not the appropriate
sciences for
dealing with conscious experience are (at least for the most part
AFAICT) objecting to methodological reductionism, not ontological
reductionism. No one here (other than you) is claiming that
consciousness in any way violates or is separate from the

laws of physics.

I'd be perfectly willing to accept (2), though a change in

verb from 'must' to 'can in principle' would probably make it more
palatable.

What is at issue is your leap to (3). Just because consciousness is
ultimately derived from the physical properties of matter

entail that consciousness does not effect behaviour. It
simply implies
that consciousness is a derived concept rooted in more fundamental
physical concepts. That doesn't preclude it from entering

relations, nor does it mean that it cannot afford a selective
advantage
to organisms which possess it.

Without (3), of course, the remainder of your argument collapses.


Of course.

So you accept:
1) If the organism follows the laws of physics as you so
clearly state,
then presumably it can be explained by physics.

and you accept:
2) Given physics doesn't reference 'consciousness', the organism's
behaviour must be explainable without reference to its
'consciousness'.

As I pointed out, I would prefer a wording with 'can in principle'
rather than 'must'.

You also seem to be overlooking the word 'fundamental' in my earlier
post. Everything in the universe ultimately derives from fundamental
physical laws, but we routinely make use of additional concepts
as well.

Would you, for example, consider the ideal gas law

pV = nRT

to be a law of physics?

Most would, but it refers to entities (notably temperature and
pressure)
which are not fundamental physical properties.

The behaviour of a gas ultimately results from the electrostatic forces
between the protons and electrons which comprise the molecules of the
gas (gravitational forces are also at work, but unless the body of gas
is quite large they can generally be ignored). However, actually
calculating the forces at work between each and every subatomic
particle
in the gas or tracking their individual kinetic energies is
simply not a
tractable problem. Therefore, we introduce abstractions such as
pressure
and temperature which allow us to describe the behaviour of the
aggregate without reference to the individual particles. Pressure and
temperature are very much real physical properties despite the
fact that
they can in principle be explained in terms of more basic physical
interactions. They have a causal role in explaining the way the
universe
works.

Consciousness is simply a higher order of abstraction. It allows us to
discuss the behaviour of an aggregate of neurons (or of
whatever since I
don't want to assume that consciousness can only arise in
creatures like
us) without the tedium of dealing with each individual neuron (and
neurons themselves are yet another abstraction which allows us to talk
about a particular assembly of proteins etc. as a single entity rather
than talking about each of its component parts). More fundamental laws
of biology will not refer to consciousness, but consciousness can be
derived from those laws, which can in turn be derived from yet more
fundamental laws of chemistry, which can in turn be derived from even
more fundamental physical laws.

but you don't accept:

3) Therefore 'consciousness' does not effect behaviour, as it is not
required to explain any behaviour.

It is not *required* in the same sense that temperature and
pressure are
not required. However, it is a lot more convenient to refer to
consciousness than it is to deal with the interactions between every
neuron in your body, which is in turn more convenient than describing
the behaviour of each neuron in terms of organelles, molecules, atoms,
or quarks and leptons.

Your point seems to be: "Just because consciousness is ultimately
derived from the physical properties of matter does *not*
entail that
consciousness does not effect behaviour."

Correct. I can't see anyone accepting such a proposition.

Though in accepting (2) you have already agreed that behaviour can be
explained without any reference to 'consciousness', how can
this be, if
'consciousness' effects behaviour?

It can be in exactly the same way that it can be that pressure effects
the behaviour of a gas despite the fact that pressure can itself be
derived from more fundamental interactions between particles
governed by
forces which do not make reference to pressure.

Claiming that consciousness rests on physical properties is
not, despite
what you might believe, equivalent to denying that it is a real
physical
entity. The *fundamental* laws of physics do not reference
consciousness
any more than they reference gasses, organisms, or any other larger
scale collection of molecules. This does not, however, entail that
derived laws (whether they be treated as laws of physics or of biology
or of neuropsychology, or whatever) cannot reference these things or
that these things cannot be used as part of explanations.

Regarding (3),
3) Therefore 'consciousness' does not effect behaviour, as it is not
required to explain any behaviour.

You replied:
It is not *required* in the same sense that temperature and pressure
are not required. However, it is a lot more convenient to refer to
consciousness than it is to deal with the interactions between every
neuron in your body, which is in turn more convenient than describing
the behaviour of each neuron in terms of organelles, molecules, atoms,
or quarks and leptons.

So basically seem to be saying that you accept (3), is that right?

Your questions are sufficiently badly posed that anyone who gives you a
yes/no answer runs a severe risk of having their position misrepresented
by you in short order. People have pointed out the problems with your
questions; but you continue to pose them as if they mean something.

For an analogy, in principle the weather can be explained without
resorting to ensemble properties such as pressure, temperature, wind
speed and humidity. In practice to do so is completely and utterly
impracticable. However by your apparent "argument" pressure,
temperature, wind speed and humidity do not effect the weather, as they
are not "required" to explain the weather.

They are concepts based on aggregate behaviour of the underlying. As
such they are social constructions used in physics. You are right
though, if the behaviour of every atom were known, you wouldn't require
them.

Are you suggesting that the conscious experience of the colour green is
a social construction?

Social construction is a horrible choice of words on your part.

Pressure, temperature, wind speed and humidity are ensemble/emergent
properties. You should by now have realised that several people, myself
included, have been trying to tell you that we have no reason not to
reject the hypothesis that "the conscious experience of the colour green
is" an ensemble/emergent property.

To help you understand what I am talking about, imagine a universe with
similar laws of physics to ours, i.e. both act according to our current
understanding of physics, but the laws are different in what is
experienced. In this imaginary universe there is a being identical
organically to yourself, but experiences no auditory sense, nor touch,
nor taste, nor smell, nor does it experience thought. It experiences
green. Note, the organism is set up the same though, it has eyes, ears
etc, it is just the experience that differs.

I'm not a dualist. If an organism doesn't experience sensory
impressions, nor thought, then it's not identical organically to myself.


Now you have already agreed to (1) and (2)
1) If the organism follows the laws of physics as you so clearly state,
then presumably it can be explained by physics.
2) Given physics doesn't reference 'consciousness', the organism's
behaviour must be explainable without reference to its 'consciousness'.

though you struggle with (3)
3) Therefore 'consciousness' does not effect behaviour, as it is not
required to explain any behaviour.

given (1) and (2) why would you expect the behaviour of this being to
be any different to that of yourself?

Or do you see (3) now?


By your argument the humidity of the atmosphere doesn't affect the
weather because "it is not required to explain" the weather. However
humidity does effect the weather. You're not likely to get anyone to
accept that because that an ensemble property can be reduced (sometimes
only theoretically, rather than demonstrated) to the interactions
between its components then that the ensemble property has no effects.
--
alias Ernest Major

I described humidity, pressure etc as concepts based on aggregate
behaviour of the underlying. Do you disagree with that?

With regards to your answer to the imagined universe, you replied:
"I'm not a dualist. If an organism doesn't experience sensory
impressions, nor thought, then it's not identical organically to
myself."

Did you understand the question.
"Imagine a universe with similar laws of physics to ours, i.e. both act
according to our current understanding of physics, but the laws are
different in regards to what is experienced.

In this imaginary universe there is a being identical organically to
yourself, but experiences no auditory sense, nor touch, nor taste, nor
smell, nor does it experience thought. It experiencesgreen. Note, the
organism is set up the same though, it has eyes, ears etc, it is just
the experience that differs."

The reason it doesn't experience sensory impressions isn't that it is
not identical organically to you, it is, it is just the laws are
different in the universe to what is experienced, not how atoms behave,
nor how they are set up in the organism.

So presuming you can understand the question, would the being in the
imaginary universe act the same or not?

Oops. Sorry. I assumed that your question had some relevance, and
therefore missed the qualification. How does the situation in a
hypothetical universe, carefully constructed to meet your requirement,
apply to the situation in this universe?
--
alias Ernest Major

It is carefully constructed to highlight the issue at hand, yes
obviously.

It applies to the situation in this universe in the sense that you
won't be able to keep standing with one foot in the "organism's
behaviour is totally explainable by physics camp", and the other in the
"what the organism experiences effects it behaviour camp".

So are you going to answer which way you are saying the organism would
act, or if you like you could suggest two possibilities, one where it
acts the same, and one where the organism acts differently, and we
could go through the first, and then through the second.

Or aren't you going to risk it?

.

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