Re: KT boundry event


John Harshman wrote:
UC wrote:

John Harshman wrote:
(snip)


It's not 'narrow'. It's just an explanation for those who don't read
German. He's talking about LANGUAGE and how science should leave
language alone.

But that's not what he says. He says that we can adopt terms and then
change their meanings without abandoning those terms. How is that
leaving language alone?

No, he does NOT. He says we can change the CONCEPTS to which those
terms refer! That is NOT the same thing as 'changing the meaning'.

Really? You'll have to justify that with something. Because it sure
sounds like changing the meaning to me.


How's this:

'Sunrise', 'sunset'. These are everyday terms understood by everbody.
We all know what they mean. Does the meaning change if we switch from a
terracentric universe to a heliocentric universe? No. Why? That
experience to which the terms apply is unchanged. Our understanding of
what causes that experience changes, but that is not a linguistic
change at all.

You may be right. It's certainly a small change at most, because we
never actually think about what's really happening. Hopefully, the
changes in the teleological term Sachs was talking about were greater,
though, because we are supposed to think about what's really happening
there. Note that he did indeed say that the meaning was changing.

Are you suggesting that we drop the terms 'sunrise' and 'sunset' from
our vocabulary, because they serve a discredited theory?

No, indeed I am not. I'm not suggesting we drop any term from our
vocabulary. What made you think I was?

Unlike 'influenza' or 'sunrise', there is no hint of theory in the term
'bird'.

Arguing about whether there is or isn't such a hint would be too boring.
But what does it matter whether there is theory or not?

"The role of science is not to clarify or modify words, but rather the
concepts to which they refer."

"die Wissenschaft hat nicht die Worte, sondern die durch die
bezeichneten Begriffe zu klären und zu verändern."

"die bezeichneten Begriffe" means "the refrerenced concepts"

Yes? There's a point?

Yes. See above.

You always say that as if, somewhere above, there is an answer to my
question. And there seldom is. Not, for example, in this case.

And your claim is that Sachs is saying that referents can't change. How
does this passage support that claim? (Feel free to drop the claim if
you want.)

See above.

"Above" directly contradicts what Sachs said.

See above.

You really should drop this habit. It inhibits communication, if indeed
communication is a goal for you.

Either way, it doesn't make sense.
That's not what Sachs is saying, and I never suggested that he was. I
suggested that it's what *you* were saying.






What he is asying is that It is
perfectly acceptable to update our concepts without changing the names
of things. He's referring to Darwinisim replacing telelolgy, but not
giving up teleological language.

Right. You can change the referents without changing the words. Like "bird".

No. You DON'T change either the referents or the word, but the concept
behind them. The word 'influenza' does not change; the disease (the
referent) does not change; our understanding of 'disease' changes.

This is a very narrow and limited explanation of what Sachs is saying,
and I see no justification for it. Nowhere does he say that referents
can't change.


That's because he's not discussing it at all. He's talking about
changing language to avoid connotations of teleology.

If that is indeed all he's talking about, why did you originally bring
it up? It's irrelevant to anything we were talking about.

It seemed relevant at the time. I forget now.

That's one of your problems. You say the first thing that pops into your
head, without regard to any consistent position, and this inevitably
leads you into self-contradiction.

I said I didn't recall, not that there was no good reason.

Nevertheless, you have indulged in quite a bit of self-contradiction.

It was about not allowing expressions like "birds are dinosaurs" which
is simply absurd and an abuse of vernacular language.

And what does the Sachs quote have to do with that, even if we allowed
your claim?

He says that meaning can change, and he doesn't limit that
meaning change to changes in concept that don't change referents.





Likewise with 'Zweckmässigkeit' or 'design'. We refer to the
'Zweckmässigkeit' or 'design' (or 'fitness') of an animal, but that
term is understood differently. What we observe is still the same: the
functional arrangement of limbs, circulatory system, etc. is still what
we are referring to by 'Zweckmässigkeit' or 'designedness', but we
now understand that there is no supernatural 'designer', but Natural
Selection is responsible for the design.

Why do you assume that the characteristics of the specific example he
uses to illustrate his point are all necessary features of his point?

I'm interpreting his point. He's a botanist.

How is his being a botanist relevant? What does this have to do with
birds and dinosaurs, unless his point was more general than you say?

He's talking about leaving language alone.

He said nothing of the sort. He's talking about language changing.

Are you blind? Can you not READ? He's talking about KEEPING the terms,
but changing our concepts (Begriffe) to which the terms refer.

Yes. How is that not a language change? Surely the connection between
word and meaning is an element of languge, and they that connection
changes, language changes. How is that wrong?

I explained about 'sunset' and 'sunrise' above. If we adopt a
heliocentic universe, our use of these terms need not be in any way
affected. In fact, they are used with perfect propriety today. It would
be pedantic in the extreme to yell at the weatherman that 'sunrise' is
a misnomer, because the Earth spins on its axis, thus giving merely the
appearance of the sun rising and setting.

But that's hardly what Sachs was talking about. He's talking about words
whose understood meanings have changed greatly. When we talk about
sunrise and sunset, we refer only to appearances. The words Sachs was
talking about actually have changed meaning.

He
approves of changing the meanings of words. How can that be interpreted
as leaving language alone?

WRONG!

READ THE DAMNED TEXT!

You will be surprised to know that exclamation points and all caps, or
even adding "damned", do not turn assertions into arguments.

Well, you seem to have great difficulty reading what Sachs wrote.
Frustration is setting in.

We have a disagreement about that. Get used to it. And explain yourself
if you want anyone to understand your point.

(snip)




True. And in the vernacular sense, Ichthyornis is a bird.

No, there is no vernacular term for it.

There is no vernacular term specifically for Ichthyornis, but there is
one for members of the class to which it belongs. And that word is
"bird". (There is no vernacular term for "Parotia" either, but it's
still a bird.) Can you find an example of someone avoiding that word
when referring to Ichthyornis?

I don't follow you.

Apparently not, but why? I said Ichthyornis is a bird, and you said no
it wasn't because there is no vernacular term for it.

'Bird' is a vernacular term, which by its nature cannot be used for
scientific applications. The ONLY context for talking about Ichthyornis
is a scientific one.
Therefore....(fill in the blank)

Therefore you make disconnected, bare assertions that are true because
you say so. If vernacular terms can't be used for scientific
applications, then we need a completely new language for all scientific
papers, most of which are full of vernacular terms. The specialized set
of terms is quite sparse in the average paper. And who says that a
vernacular term can't be taken intact for use as a scientific term?
Certainly Sachs lists one example. And why can't you talk about
Ichthyornis outside of a scientific context? Nothing you said above
makes any sense at all.

'Wurzel' (root) is a term used for a part of a plant. He's a botanist.
He's not referring to ancient life. 'Leg' or 'wing' both could become
unusable for early avians, which have something which is actually
neither: not quite yet a wing, not quite a leg anymore.

'Wurzel' (root) is not that sort of thing at all.

How do you know? You don't know what meaning change for "Wurzel" he's
talking about. And you persist in bringing up irrelevant differences as
if they are crucial. This is another series of disconnected statements.

Let's leave that out until we can identify what he's talking about.
Otherwise, we're just speculating.

You're the one who brought it up, not me.

And I said that
there is no vernacular term meaning specifically "Ichthyornis", but
that's not relevant to the question of whether we include Ichthyornis
among birds, because we (everyone but you) call it a bird whenever we
refer to it. What were you trying to say?

That you cannot use 'bird' to refer to it. You MUST use Ichthyornis if
you refer to it.

That's obviously false. You could, for example, call it an animal, and
nobody would object, even though "animal" is a vernacular term. Do you
ever devote a moment's thought to the things you say?

Then let's use 'organism'.

Why? Don't you like "animal"? It certainly not synonymous with
"organism". What is the relevance of your statement here?

I was answering YOUR objection.

What objection? I wasn't objecting to anything. I was pointing out the
silliness of saying that we can't use any other word than "Ichthyornis"
when referring to Ichthyornis. We can, however, use "bird", "animal", or
"organism", depending on how specific we want to be at the moment.

All theories are explanations, and all explanations involve causation.
This is elementary. Science tests the explantions. Good ones pass, bad
ones fail. If I explain the motion of my car by invoking the work of
squirrels, that is testable.

So why isn't a phylogenetic hypothesis that explains character
distributions in a set of animals a theory? And what sort of causation
is involved in Newton's theory of gravity? (As it happens, the lack of
explicit causation was one of Leibniz's big complaints against Newton.
But that's a matter for the philosophers.)

Read Nozick, for starters.

Why? What will it tell me? That's even more vague than telling me to
read Kant and the Platypus. You've gone from a book to an entire
author's works that I'm supposed to wade through to answer some unknown
question.

You asked for some accounts of explanation.

That's maddeningly vague. Which question(s) that I asked is this reading
intended to answer? And why are you unable to explain it in your own words?

Here ya go:

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0674664795/sr=8-1/qid=1146936303/ref=sr_1_1/103-8317828-1387830?%5Fencoding=UTF8



The reason I found Sachs originally was to help illuminate what Kant
meant. Sachs is using Zweckmäßigkeit exactly as Kant did.

Here's Kant arguing against the teleological argument for the existence
of God (also called the argument from design). In German, it's called
the "Beweis aus der Zweckmässigkeit'. Kant calls it the
"physico-theological proof".

An excerpt follows. German text at:
http://www.phil.pku.edu.cn/resguide/kant/krvb/krvb107.htm:

"This present world presents to us so immeasurable a stage of variety,
order, fitness [Zweckmässigkeit], and beauty,

[Die gegenwärtige Weit eröffnet uns einen so unermeßlichen
Schauplatz von Mannigfaltigkeit, Ordnung, Zweckmäßigkeit und
Schönheit,]

whether we follow it up in the infinity of space or in its unlimited
division, that even with the little knowledge which our poor
understanding has been able to gather, all language, with regard to so
many and inconceivable wonders, loses its vigour, all numbers their
power of measuring, and all our thoughts their necessary determination;
so that our judgment of the whole is lost in a speechless, but all the
more eloquent astonishment. Everywhere we see a chain of causes and
effects, of means and ends, of order in birth and death, and as nothing
has entered by itself into the state in which we find it, all points to
another thing as its cause. As that cause necessitates the same further
enquiry, the whole universe would thus be lost in the abyss of nothing,
unless we admitted something which, existing by itself, original and
independent, outside the chain of infinite contingencies, should
support it, and, as the cause of its origin, secure to it at the same
time its permanence. Looking at all the things in the world, what
greatness shall we attribute to that highest cause? We do not know the
whole contents of the world, still less can we measure its magnitude by
a comparison [p. 623] with all that is possible. But, as with regard to
causality, we cannot do without a last and highest Being, why should we
not fix the degree of its perfection beyond everything else that is
possible? This we can easily do, though only in the faint outline of an
abstract concept, if we represent to ourselves all possible perfections
united in it as in one substance. Such a concept would agree with the
demand of our reason, which requires parsimony in the number of
principles; it would have no contradictions in itself, would be
favourable to the extension of the employment of reason in the midst of
experience, by guiding it towards order and system [Zweckmässigkeit],
and lastly, would never be decidedly opposed to any experience.

[durch die Leitung, welche eine solche Idee auf Ordnung und
Zweckmäßigkeit gibt, zuträglich, nirgend aber einer Erfahrung auf
entschiedene Art zuwider ist.]

"But although we have nothing to say against the reasonableness and
utility of this line of argument, but wish, on the contrary, to commend
and encourage it, we cannot approve of the claims which this proof
advances to apodictic certainty, and to an approval on its own merits,
requiring no favour, and no help from any other quarter. It cannot
injure the good cause, if the dogmatical language of the overweening
sophist is toned down to the moderate and modest statements of a faith
which does not require unconditioned submission, yet is sufficient to
give rest and comfort. I therefore maintain that the
physico-theological proof can never establish by itself alone the
existence of a [p. 625] Supreme Being, but must always leave it to the
ontological proof (to which it serves only as an introduction), to
supply its deficiency; so that, after all, it is the ontological proof
which contains the only possible argument (supposing always that any
speculative proof is possible), and human reason can never do without
it.

The principal points of the physico-theological proof are the
following. 1st. There are everywhere in the world clear indications of
an intentional arrangement carried out with great wisdom, and forming a
whole indescribably varied in its contents and infinite in extent.

2ndly. The fitness of this arrangement is entirely foreign to the
things existing in the world, and belongs to them contingently only;
that is, the nature of different things could never spontaneously, by
the combination of so many means, co-operate towards definite aims, if
these means had not been selected and arranged on purpose by a rational
disposing principle, according to certain fundamental ideas.

3rdly. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or many),
which must be the cause of the world, not only as a blind and
all-powerful nature, by means of unconscious fecundity, but as an
intelligence, by freedom.

4thly. The unity of that cause may be inferred with certainty from the
unity of the reciprocal relation [p. 626] of the parts of the world, as
portions of a skilful edifice, so far as our experience reaches, and
beyond it, with plausibility, according to the principles of analogy.

Without wishing to argue, for the sake of argument only, with natural
reason, as to its conclusion in inferring from the analogy of certain
products of nature with the works of human art, in which man does
violence to nature, and forces it not to follow its own aims, but to
adapt itself to ours (that is, from the similarity of certain products
of nature with houses, ships, and watches), in inferring from this, I
say, that a similar causality, namely, understanding and will, must be
at the bottom of nature, and in deriving the internal possibility of a
freely acting nature (which, it may be, renders all human art and even
human reason possible) from another though superhuman art - a kind of
reasoning, which probably could not stand the severest test of
transcendental criticism; we are willing to admit, nevertheless, that
if we have to name such a cause, we cannot do better than to follow the
analogy of such products of human design, which are the only ones of
which we know completely both cause and effect. There would be no
excuse, if reason were to surrender a causality which it knows, and
have recourse to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation,
which it does not know.

According to this argument, the fitness [Zweckmässigkeit] and harmony
existing in so many works of nature might prove [p. 627] the
contingency of the form, but not of the matter, that is, the substance
in the world,

[Nach diesem Schlusse müßte die Zweckmäßigkeit und Wohlgereimtheit
so vieler Naturanstalten bloß die Zufälligkeit der Form, aber nicht
der Materie, d. i. der Substanz in der Welt beweisen]

because, for the latter purpose, it would be necessary to prove in
addition, that
the things of the world were in themselves incapable of such order and
harmony, according to general laws, unless there existed, even in their
substance, the product of a supreme wisdom. For this purpose, very
different arguments would be required from those derived from the
analogy of human art. The utmost, therefore, that could be established
by such a proof would be an architect of the world, always very much
hampered by the quality of the material with which he has to work, not
a creator, to whose idea everything is subject. This would by no means
suffice for the purposed aim of proving an all-sufficient original
Being. If we wished to prove the contingency of matter itself, we must
have recourse to a transcendental argument, and this is the very thing
which was to be avoided.

The inference, therefore, really proceeds from the order and design
[Zweckmässigkeit] that can everywhere be observed in the world, as an
entirely contingent arrangement, to the existence of a cause,
proportionate to it. The
concept of that cause must therefore teach us something quite definite
about it, and can therefore be no other concept but that of a Being
which possesses all might, wisdom, etc., in one word, all perfection of
an all-sufficient Being. The [p. 628] predicates of a very great, of an
astounding, of an immeasurable might and virtue give us no definite
concept, and never tell us really what the thing is by itself. They are
only relative representations of the magnitude of an object, which the
observer (of the world) compares with himself and his own power of
comprehension, and which would be equally grand, whether we magnify the
object, or reduce the observing subject to smaller proportions in
reference to it. Where we are concerned with the magnitude (of the
perfection) of a thing in general, there exists no definite concept,
except that which comprehends all possible perfection, and only the all
(omnitudo) of reality is thoroughly determined in the concept.

Now I hope that no one would dare to comprehend the relation of that
part of the world which he has observed (in its extent as well as in
its contents) to omnipotence, the relation of the order of the world to
the highest wisdom, and the relation of the unity of the world to the
absolute unity of its author, etc. Physico-theology, therefore, can
never give a definite concept of the highest cause of the world, and is
insufficient, therefore, as a principle of theology, which is itself to
form the basis of religion.

The step leading to absolute totality is entirely impossible on the
empirical road. Nevertheless, that step is taken in the
physico-theological proof. How then has this broad abyss been bridged
over? [p. 629]

The fact is that, after having reached the stage of admiration of the
greatness, the wisdom, the power, etc. of the Author of the world, and
seeing no further advance possible, one suddenly leaves the argument
carried on by empirical proofs, and lays hold of that contingency
which, from the very first, was inferred from the order and design
[Zweckmäßigkeit] of the world.

[Nachdem man bis zur Bewunderung der Größe der Weisheit, der Macht
usw. des Welturhebers gelangt ist, und nicht weiter kommen kann, so
verläßt man auf einmal dieses durch empirische Beweisgründe
geführte Argument, und geht zu der gleich anfangs aus der Ordnung und
Zweckmäßigkeit der Welt geschlossenen Zufälligkeit derselben.]

The next step from that contingency leads, by means of transcendental
concepts only, to the existence of something absolutely necessary, and
another step from the absolute necessity of the first cause to its
completely determined or determining concept, namely, that of an
all-embracing reality. Thus we see that the physico-theological
proof, baffled in its own undertaking, takes suddenly refuge in the
cosmological proof, and as this is only the ontological proof in
disguise, it really carries out its original intention by means of pure
reason only; though it so strongly disclaimed in the beginning all
connection with it, and professed to base everything on clear proofs
from experience.

Those who adopt the physico-theological argument have no reason to be
so very coy towards the transcendental mode of argument, and with the
conceit of enlightened observers of nature to look down upon them as
the cobwebs of dark speculators. If they would only examine themselves,
they would find that, after they had advanced a good way on the soil of
nature and experience, and found themselves nevertheless as much
removed [p. 630] as ever from the object revealed to their reason, they
suddenly leave that soil, to enter into the realm of pure
possibilities, where on the wings of ideas they hope to reach that
which had withdrawn itself from all their empirical investigations.
Imagining themselves to be on firm ground after that desperate leap,
they now proceed to expand the definite concept which they have
acquired, they do not know how, over the whole field of creation; and
they explain the ideal, which was merely a product of pure reason, by
experience, though in a very poor way, and totally beneath the dignity
of the object, refusing all the while to admit that they have arrived
at that knowledge or supposition by a very different road from that of
experience.

Thus we have seen that the physico-theological proof rests on the
cosmological, and the cosmological on the ontological proof of the
existence of one original Being as the Supreme Being; and, as besides
these three, there is no other path open to speculative reason, the
ontological proof, based exclusively on pure concepts of reason, is the
only possible one, always supposing that any proof of a proposition, so
far transcending the empirical use of the understanding, is possible at
all."


.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: KT boundry event
    ... He's talking about LANGUAGE and how science should leave ... That is NOT the same thing as 'changing the meaning'. ... Some here have said that the word 'bird' refers to a theory about avian ... combination 'bird' may refer to long extinct animals as well as extant ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: KT boundry event
    ... He's talking about LANGUAGE and how science should leave ... That is NOT the same thing as 'changing the meaning'. ... Sachs was arguing against those who wanted to drop the term ... concepts to which they refer." ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: KT boundry event
    ... He's talking about LANGUAGE and how science should leave ... That is NOT the same thing as 'changing the meaning'. ... Sachs was arguing against those who wanted to drop the term ... concepts to which they refer." ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: KT boundry event
    ... He's talking about LANGUAGE and how science should leave ... That is NOT the same thing as 'changing the meaning'. ... Sachs was arguing against those who wanted to drop the term ... Some here have said that the word 'bird' refers to a theory about avian ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: KT boundry event
    ... He's talking about LANGUAGE and how science should leave ... That is NOT the same thing as 'changing the meaning'. ... Sachs was arguing against those who wanted to drop the term ... concepts to which they refer." ...
    (talk.origins)