Re: Science of choices falls out of research

In article <1147008056.122543.153520@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
"nando_ronteltap@xxxxxxxxx" <nando_ronteltap@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Well you made that up yourself, talking about probabilities being
compared, I didn't suggest it, not here anyway.

Maybe not explicitly, but by claiming that a probability changes you are
implicitly comparing it at two different points in time.

It's a reasonable
suggestion, to name the relationship between alternative results of a
probability a comparison. But in this context it is just a name with
the definition as given, and any other meaning to comparision is
unevidenced in this context.

??

Your description of fundamental indeterminacy is obviously still
lacking the concept of a point where the probability is realized or
negated, or a point where a probability changes.

A probability isn't 'realised'. A probability represents an uncertain
outcome.

If one were to look
throughout the day, one certainly wouldn't measure a 60 percent
probability of rain continuously, one would measure other values as the
day progresses. For this change in probability, you obviously need the
concept of decision.

No. You don't need any concept of decision. The probability changes only
because our uncertainty changes.

And so when one would continuously measure the
probability of rain, then one would get a graph of changing
probability, and the changes in the graph represent decisions at
locations in the weather that are relevant to the probability of rain.

No. They do not. They represent our changing estimate about whether it
will rain.

To doubt fundamental indeterminacy is real, is not at issue here, it is
just about making a working conceptual model of it, for if it is real.
I've presented a working model of fundamental indeterminacy, while you
have not.

You haven't presented any type of model at all. You've simply made some
rather vague assertions that decisions are related to changes in
probability, and that probabilities can somehow be dissociated from the
uncertainty inherent in other models.

To present a model you would need to provide some means of actually
establishing what values these probabilities have and how to assess
them. You have not done so. When presented with specific cases and asked
to assess the probabilities you have not done so. To constitute a
'model' you're view must minimally be able to answer such simple
questions.

So do you agree that I presented a working concept of fundamental
indeterminacy?

No.

Obviously your position is very weak now, to rely on
there "possibly" being no fundamental indeterminacy at all. It is
merely philosophical.

You, on the other hand, assert without evidence that such indeterminacy
exists and refuse to entertain even the possibility that 'decisions'
might be just as deterministic as those systems which we currently can
predict. You then go on to ascribe some sort of mystical content to
probabilities which is neither verifiable, falsifiable, nor, as far as I
can tell, meaningful.

André

--
André G. Isaak
n.b. there are no monotremes in my email address

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