Re: Signs of Deliberate Artifact?

The argument from design was demolished more than 200 years ago:

Here's Kant arguing against the teleological argument for the existence

of God (also called the argument from design. In German, it's called
the "Beweis aus der Zweckmässigkeit'. Kant calls it the
physico-theological proof.


An excerpt follows


"But although we have nothing to say against the reasonableness and
utility of this line of argument, but wish, on the contrary, to commend

and encourage it, we cannot approve of the claims which this proof
advances to apodictic certainty, and to an approval on its own merits,
requiring no favour, and no help from any other quarter. It cannot
injure the good cause, if the dogmatical language of the overweening
sophist is toned down to the moderate and modest statements of a faith
which does not require unconditioned submission, yet is sufficient to
give rest and comfort. I therefore maintain that the
physico-theological proof can never establish by itself alone the
existence of a [p. 625] Supreme Being, but must always leave it to the
ontological proof (to which it serves only as an introduction), to
supply its deficiency; so that, after all, it is the ontological proof
which contains the only possible argument (supposing always that any
speculative proof is possible), and human reason can never do without
it.


The principal points of the physico-theological proof are the
following. 1st. There are everywhere in the world clear indications of
an intentional arrangement carried out with great wisdom, and forming a

whole indescribably varied in its contents and infinite in extent.


2ndly. The fitness of this arrangement is entirely foreign to the
things existing in the world, and belongs to them contingently only;
that is, the nature of different things could never spontaneously, by
the combination of so many means, co-operate towards definite aims, if
these means had not been selected and arranged on purpose by a rational

disposing principle, according to certain fundamental ideas.


3rdly. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or many),
which must be the cause of the world, not only as a blind and
all-powerful nature, by means of unconscious fecundity, but as an
intelligence, by freedom.


4thly. The unity of that cause may be inferred with certainty from the
unity of the reciprocal relation [p. 626] of the parts of the world, as

portions of a skilful edifice, so far as our experience reaches, and
beyond it, with plausibility, according to the principles of analogy.


Without wishing to argue, for the sake of argument only, with natural
reason, as to its conclusion in inferring from the analogy of certain
products of nature with the works of human art, in which man does
violence to nature, and forces it not to follow its own aims, but to
adapt itself to ours (that is, from the similarity of certain products
of nature with houses, ships, and watches), in inferring from this, I
say, that a similar causality, namely, understanding and will, must be
at the bottom of nature, and in deriving the internal possibility of a
freely acting nature (which, it may be, renders all human art and even
human reason possible) from another though superhuman art - a kind of
reasoning, which probably could not stand the severest test of
transcendental criticism; we are willing to admit, nevertheless, that
if we have to name such a cause, we cannot do better than to follow the

analogy of such products of human design, which are the only ones of
which we know completely both cause and effect. There would be no
excuse, if reason were to surrender a causality which it knows, and
have recourse to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation,
which it does not know.


According to this argument, the fitness [Zweckmässigkeit]and harmony
existing in so many works of nature might prove [p. 627] the
contingency of the form, but
not of the matter, that is, the substance in the world, because, for
the latter purpose, it would be necessary to prove in addition, that
the things of the world were in themselves incapable of such order and
harmony, according to general laws, unless there existed, even in their

substance, the product of a supreme wisdom. For this purpose, very
different arguments would be required from those derived from the
analogy of human art. The utmost, therefore, that could be established
by such a proof would be an architect of the world, always very much
hampered by the quality of the material with which he has to work, not
a creator, to whose idea everything is subject. This would by no means
suffice for the purposed aim of proving an all-sufficient original
Being. If we wished to prove the contingency of matter itself, we must
have recourse to a transcendental argument, and this is the very thing
which was to be avoided.


The inference, therefore, really proceeds from the order and design
[Zweckmässigkeit]
that can everywhere be observed in the world, as an entirely contingent

arrangement, to the existence of a cause, proportionate to it. The
concept of that cause must therefore teach us something quite definite
about it, and can therefore be no other concept but that of a Being
which possesses all might, wisdom, etc., in one word, all perfection of

an all-sufficient Being. The [p. 628] predicates of a very great, of an

astounding, of an immeasurable might and virtue give us no definite
concept, and never tell us really what the thing is by itself. They are

only relative representations of the magnitude of an object, which the
observer (of the world) compares with himself and his own power of
comprehension, and which would be equally grand, whether we magnify the

object, or reduce the observing subject to smaller proportions in
reference to it. Where we are concerned with the magnitude (of the
perfection) of a thing in general, there exists no definite concept,
except that which comprehends all possible perfection, and only the all

(omnitudo) of reality is thoroughly determined in the concept.


Now I hope that no one would dare to comprehend the relation of that
part of the world which he has observed (in its extent as well as in
its contents) to omnipotence, the relation of the order of the world to

the highest wisdom, and the relation of the unity of the world to the
absolute unity of its author, etc. Physico-theology, therefore, can
never give a definite concept of the highest cause of the world, and is

insufficient, therefore, as a principle of theology, which is itself to

form the basis of religion.


The step leading to absolute totality is entirely impossible on the
empirical road. Nevertheless, that step is taken in the
physico-theological proof. How then has this broad abyss been bridged
over? [p. 629]


The fact is that, after having reached the stage of admiration of the
greatness, the wisdom, the power, etc. of the Author of the world, and
seeing no further advance possible, one suddenly leaves the argument
carried on by empirical proofs, and lays hold of that contingency
which, from the very first, was inferred from the order and design of
the world. The next step from that contingency leads, by means of
transcendental concepts only, to the existence of something absolutely
necessary, and another step from the absolute necessity of the first
cause to its completely determined or determining concept, namely, that

of an all-embracing reality. Thus we see that the physico-theological
proof, baffled in its own undertaking, takes suddenly refuge in the
cosmological proof, and as this is only the ontological proof in
disguise, it really carries out its original intention by means of pure

reason only; though it so strongly disclaimed in the beginning all
connection with it, and professed to base everything on clear proofs
from experience.


Those who adopt the physico-theological argument have no reason to be
so very coy towards the transcendental mode of argument, and with the
conceit of enlightened observers of nature to look down upon them as
the cobwebs of dark speculators. If they would only examine themselves,

they would find that, after they had advanced a good way on the soil of

nature and experience, and found themselves nevertheless as much
removed [p. 630] as ever from the object revealed to their reason, they

suddenly leave that soil, to enter into the realm of pure
possibilities, where on the wings of ideas they hope to reach that
which had withdrawn itself from all their empirical investigations.
Imagining themselves to be on firm ground after that desperate leap,
they now proceed to expand the definite concept which they have
acquired, they do not know how, over the whole field of creation; and
they explain the ideal, which was merely a product of pure reason, by
experience, though in a very poor way, and totally beneath the dignity
of the object, refusing all the while to admit that they have arrived
at that knowledge or supposition by a very different road from that of
experience.


Thus we have seen that the physico-theological proof rests on the
cosmological, and the cosmological on the ontological proof of the
existence of one original Being as the Supreme Being; and, as besides
these three, there is no other path open to speculative reason, the
ontological proof, based exclusively on pure concepts of reason, is the

only possible one, always supposing that any proof of a proposition, so

far transcending the empirical use of the understanding, is possible at

all."



Richard Forrest wrote:
Seanpit wrote:
Noone Inparticular wrote:
Explain it to me. How do archeologists tell the difference between a
real human-made artifact and a naturally-made stone shard or other
material. Explain the process to me.


There's no point in explaining anything to Sean, so don't bother.

I've given a fairly detailed account of how an archaeologist identifies
artefacts, both in general terms and quite specific terms.

from here, and in response to such a request from Sean:
http://groups.google.com/group/talk.origins/msg/29545c6b0b8bbcf4?dmode=source

"What archaeologists have is a knowledge of the *deliberate* processes
by which such tools are made. I spent a lot of time in my late teens
collecting flint tools from the fields in the area around my school. I
even co-authored a paper on the subject for an archaeological journal.
To identify a flint which is worked by man, as opposed to one which
hasn't, one looks quite specifically for indications of *how* the
object is made. One looks for a striking platform, a bulb of
percussion, for reworking of edges, and other indications of
*processes* which it is virtually impossible for natural agents to
produce. Even so, one looks for clusters of such finds: faced with a
single such object from an unknown location, the evidence that it is
man-made rather than natural needs to be very clear. "

The devastating response from Sean was the assertion that
archaeologists recognise flint arrowheads as artefacts because of their
reflective symetry.

And this from a posting in another thread, though I'm not sure if Sean
was involved or not:

"If I find an object in a field which looks as if it might be a flint
tool, I can only deduce that is it designed if I can form an hypothesis
of how it was manufactured which can be tested against evidence from
the object.

In the early days of archaeology there was some interest in collections
of apparently worked flints to which the label of "eoliths" was
applied. It was thought that they were primitive stone tools. As
archaeologists learned more about how flint tools were made, and the
distinctive patterns and marks left by the methods used, it became
clear that these eoliths were not manufactured. Subsequent research
showed that they are frost-shattered flints which occur in clusters
because they were formed under large beached ice-bergs".

http://groups.google.com/group/talk.origins/msg/beb392428b26300d?dmode=source

I need to add that I made a statement on this posting which is wrong. I
wrote "Every manufactured object is designed."

This is of course not true. An object can be a waste product of the
manufacture of a designed object. A granite cube might be manufactured
as a granite cube, but might also be an offcut from the manufacture of
a larger granite object, such as a work surface.

So if one were to find a granite cube, one could conclude from the
evidence from the cube that it was manufactured, but not that it was
designed.

Which all goes to show what a tricky proposition it is to claim the
knowledge that something was designed by examining even something as
simple as a granite cube.


So much for Sean's knowledge of archaeology, and an excellent example
of the utter pointlessness of trying to explain anything to Sean.

It's a waste of time and effort.

I have posted an analysis of part of his web site here:
http://www.plesiosaur.com/creationism/pitman/index.php

Needless to say, Sean has not investigated any of the references I
provided, but sticks to his assertions, which are based on a vast
ignorance of geology and palaeontology and are demonstrably false.

He is an ignorant man, and relies on his ignorance to preserve his
shallow belief system.

It's not worth the effort of replying to his posts.

RF


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