Re: Dennett / Ruse Tiff Continues

On 29 Mar 2006 06:54:37 -0800, "Chimp" <pan_paniscus1859@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

catshark wrote:
Chimp wrote:
catshark wrote:
Chimp wrote:
catshark wrote:

Either the "God hypothesis" cannot make falsifiable predictions,
in which case we reject it in favor of theories with predicitive
power; or, if the "God hypothesis" _can_ make falsifiable
predictions then we simply test it like any other theory.

That is enough. It is clear that you advocate scientism. It doesn't
make you a bad person but it is a very restricted philosophy, IMHO.

You asked how science could address the possibility of
a "divine designer" so I told you. I do not agree that there
are avenues of exploration that science should decline to
follow.

But you go further than investigating avenues, you insist we are
justified in *deciding* those questions by science.

Not really,

Then you didn't mean this:

Either the "God hypothesis" cannot make falsifiable predictions,**in which
case we reject it** in favor of theories with predicitive power; or, if the
"God hypothesis" _can_ make falsifiable predictions then we simply test it
like any other theory. (Emphasis added)

I insist only that we are justified in _attempting_
to decide those questions by science . . . I've made no
claim about where attempts to explore avenues will lead.

Then, if you agree that there may be limits on our knowledge, if our
attempts fail to discern any empiric evidence for the supernatural we can
put that down to the limitations on our knowledge, right?


And it has been previously agreed on this thread that merely
_attempting_ to explore some area in a scientific way is
_not_ "scientism", but that "scientism" is the assertion that
one will always succeed.

No, I'm sorry, that was not agreed and if I somehow gave that
impression it was my mistake. Scientism is the assertion that claims
about the existence, nature and actions of God; life after death and
the ultimate significance of physical reality and human life are
answerable by science/empiricism. You have made clear that you
believe that to be true.

There is a difference between "are answerable" and "might be
answerable". I'm only claiming that since they "might be"
answerable we should not refuse to try answering them in
that way.

Be my guest. However, the *failure* of your "experiment" at the top of
this post tells us nothing about the supernatural except that there is no
humanly detectable effect of prayer when we are looking for it. The success
of your experiment will prove nothing by itself and, if a statistical
effect is detected, it may still be the effect of an unknown natural law
and *science*, as it has been practiced for the last 150 years, will not
assign a supernatural cause for it but will simply put it down as "unknown
cause". Since we *do* know this will be the result, the experiment can
only have limited success and that is why (at least in part) there has not
been that much interest in such studies.

Allen Orr in his recent review of Dennett's book explains this perhaps
better than I have been able to:

Science can certainly undermine particular factual claims made
by religion (the universe was created in six days), but it's
far less clear that it can challenge religion's general
metaphysical claims (the universe has a purpose). To insist on
this distinction is to recognize what it means for something to
be a metaphysical, not a physical, claim. What experiment could
prove that the universe has no purpose? To suppose that a kind
of physics can demolish a kind of metaphysics is to commit what
philosophers call a category mistake. Dennett is right to
emphasize that his scientific analysis doesn't require us to
prejudge religion's metaphysical claims, but that's only half
the story. It doesn't let us post-judge them, either.

This point is connected to a distinction often made by philosophers
of science between "methodological naturalism" (science is a set
of approaches to the world in which only naturalistic explanations
may be considered) and "metaphysical naturalism" (science describes
the ultimate state or meaning of the world). As many philosophers
and scientists argue, the first approach doesn't justify the second.
Science, they claim, is not in the business of issuing position
papers on metaphysics.
<http://www.newyorker.com/critics/books/articles/060403crbo_books>

It is interesting that you will, whether you know it or not, concede that
methodological naturalism is not necessary to science/empiricism and that
Intelligent Design is valid science with your approach.


Any qualifications that we don't presently have the
means to answer some of those questions, while denying
that there are any conceptual limits to human knowledge,
are mere quibbles and do not change the basic claim.

I'm not asserting that there are no conceptual limits to our
knowledge; but we don't know that the above areas
_are_ beyond our conceptual limits, and so we shouldn't
(currently) write them off as no-go areas for science.

We do know how science/empiricism works (we *invented* the damn thing) and
can see its conceptual limits.


And you have not shown that the philosophy I have outlined
is in any way restricted -- saying it is is an empty assertion.

You would reduce philosophy and theism to science. That is restricted.

You don't know for a fact that the areas traditionally labelled
as "theism" are not encompassed by science.

Yes I do, because I know what the definition of science is (I am not making
up my own but observing the one *scientists* -- who else? -- operate by)
and it does not encompass theist claims that do not include specific
empiric claims (and here we can quibble if they *are* theistic claims if
they are claims about empiric matters).


I am happy to accept that science _might_ be limited, and
after trying to explore avenues scientifically we might
_discover_ that it is not the right tool.

We *already* know that it not the right tool to address non-empiric claims.

But that is very
different from saying that, a priori, science cannot
explore certain avenues.

Yes we *can* say that since we invented science and can know its
limitations.


"You are asserting that something can be "real "
despite its existence being conceptually indistinguishable
from its non-existence. I'm just interested by what
_you_ mean by "real" in that usage."

But that is the *point*! You are making a circular argument: you claim
reality is defined by having an empiric difference and will accept
nothing but an *empiric* difference as any definition of an alternative
reality.

Well actually, I am open to alternatives. Tell me about them.
What properties does the "existence" of something have if
its "existence" is conceptually indistinguishable from its
"non-existence"?

The human *knowledge* of its existence is conceptually indistinguishable
from the human *knowledge* of its non-existence. You keep building
scientism back into your philosophy with this hidden assumption that our
knowledge of its existence/non-existence is the same as its actual
existence/non-existence.


In what way is something "real" if it can never, even in
principle, have any interaction or influence on any
observable aspect of our universe?
[E,g, I can conceive of a "seperate-reality" universe that
is causally disconnected from ours.]

I really am not ruling these things out; I am open
to updating my definition of "real" if given a good
reason to do so.

You are free to have any damn definition of "real" you want. After all,
theists have one that is different than yours. *All* I'm trying to show
you is that you are choosing that definition on philosophical, even
theological, grounds, not on any "objective" basis (if any such thing
exists -- but *that's* a discussion for another day).


But that doesn't mean I should accept that such
things are "real" just because someone claims that
are "real" (while telling me nothing about the
properties of this "real"-ness).

You certainly don't have to accept anything into your philosophy.


That alternative reality is, according to theists,
supernatural and not amenable to scientific demonstration
or explanation.

That's a mere claim on their part. Whether or not
such "alternative reality" exists (and whether it is
amenable to scientific demonstration) are facts
about the universe that aren't made "true" just
because a believer claims them to be true.

Quite correct. Whether or not the whole of their claims are amenable to
science is determined by -- who else? -- scientists.

I am
quite entitled to withold assent from such claims
until presented with decent evidence (whether
"scientific" evidence or othewise) that they are true.

First, you are free to go outside science as much as theists are but, if
you care about not making category errors, you have to be clear when you
are doing so. *That* is still the only point I am arguing.

Second, whether any claims by theists are within science will be determined
by scientists as a group, not you.


Reality in their usage would include "heaven", "God" and
"soul". Your claim that those have to be amenable to proof of
their existence by empiric definition or else they are non-real
is an assertion about their nature that you have made but not
demonstrated.

Firstly, all the believers I've come across believe that
"God" is indeed capable of influencing the observable
universe; that a "soul" will indeed have an influence
of the moral behavior of a human, and thus on the
observable universe; and that a human being will
indeed (at some point in the future) be capable of
distinguishing between "heaven" and "hell". Thus,
if these claims were correct, then such things would
indeed meet my criterion for being "real".

Yes, when *specific* empiric claims are made, they can be tested. Those
tests, of necessity, because of the nature of science as practiced, will
have limited results. The core claims of most theists cannot be tested at
all.


Thus, these concepts are _not_ the "indistinguishable
even in principle" concepts that we have been
discussing.

Only if you ignore most of what theists claim.


But if a believer _were_ to postulate a "God" that could
not have any influence whatever on any aspect of
the observable universe, even if he wanted to, then
I think I am perfectly entitled to ask what properties
that "God" has that it qualifies as "real", and I don't
think that I'm obliged to add it to the category "real"
just because someone claims it is so.

"Influence" is a term so broad that *science* would not tackle the issue.
And you are free to question what you want. You are not free to claim it
is science that is doing the questioning for you.


You seem to be giving too much weight to mere
claims as opposed to establishing whether
something is indeed the case.

It is the claims of scientists that I am listening to, though, describing
what they can do and can't do within the process of science.


[. . .] except that it is your preference for how the universe
should work. In my book, that counts as an assumption.

Wrong, I have never said that that is my preference for
how the universe should work. A _definition_ of terms
does not alter how the universe works. Thus my using
terms as above is _not_ a statement about how the
universe works.

Oh please. Theists define reality differently than you do.
According to them, *you* are defining it wrongly.

I'm perfectly willing to listen to alternative defintions
of "real". [And, most theists _do_not_ define it
differently -- I have never met a single theist who
regards "God" as incapable of changing the
observable universe.]

The whole isssue is how anyone can tell, if at all,
who is right. Your asserting that your definition
is the right one doesn't make it so.

I really am not asserting that my definition is the
only "right" one, it really is just a definition.

That you have chosen because you prefer it, right?


What I am insisting on is that we be clear about
our meanings, to avoid the semantic trick. "Let's
label X as real". "Ah, ha, X is "real"." "Therefore
X is as real as my cat."

I have been clear all along that I am saying nothing about the truth or
falsity of those claims. I am talking about the limits of
scientific/empiric knowedge.


Your problem is that you persist in using the word
"real" in a way that, quite literally, has no meaning.

You *claim* it has no meaning.

That's because you haven't assigned any meaning to
"exists" when you insist on applying it to something
whose "existence" is conceptually indistinguishable
from its "non-existence".

Again, the question is whether human beings can conceptually attain the
*knowledge* of its existence/non-existence.


I've asked you about the properties of this sort of
"existence" and you haven't given me any.

Theists claim that terms such as "heaven", "God"
and "soul" do have meaning even if they cannot be
demonstrated empirically.

Not at all. Theists claim that "heaven", "God" and
"soul" _do_indeed_ have consequences for things
that humans can observe (many of these consequences
are supposedly observable here are now, some might
only be observable in the future after death).

Well, if you call knowledge after death "empiric" than we have a basic
definitional problem here. If not, just be clear that you have now left
science and empiricism far behind.

It is
those _observable consequences_ that gives
them their meaning.

You have a very limited knowledge of theism then. For example, read this:

<http://www.beliefnet.com/story/187/story_18786_1.html>


So, I ask you again, what is the difference between
a "mutation" and a "whibble-whibble mutation" where
(a) "whibble-whibble mutation" is defined as
not-a-"mutation", and (b) a "whibble-whibble mutation"
is conceptually indistinguishable from a "mutation"
in all possible cases?

In that scenario, what do the words "whibble-whibble"
mean? [Of course, this scenario is identical to your
use of "supernatural mutation".]

Attempts at ridicule make your case weaker, not stronger.

It genuinely is not an attempt at ridicule! It is an
attempt to show that words don't actually have
meanings unless you attach _meanings_ to them.

Don't be insulting then. There was never any such problem in our
discussion and the terms "natural" and "supernatural" were more than
adequate for our purposes. The only reason for using nonsense words was to
imply that "supernatural" is nonsense without actually saying it out loud
and demonstrating that you are making philosophical/theological claims.


Supernatural mutation means "mutation brought about
by the action of God, instead of by the natural laws of chemistry".

So I could watch it happening and see the action
of the natural laws of chemistry and if it was a
"supernatural mutation" then I would see a
violation of these laws of chemistry?

Sure. Just as soon as you demonstrate that you *know* all the laws of
chemistry (that *knowledge* problem again).


Well, in that case it is _distinguishable_. Again,
we aren't arguing about that case; we are arguing
because you want to attach meaning to different
word phrases even when they are "conceptually
indistinguishable".

Conceptually distinguishable by *human* means.

*You* may find that meaningless but billions of
people have no problem understanding the concept.

I only find it "meaningless" when you additionally
assert that the two are "conceptually indistinguishable".

If they are indeed distinguishable then I have
no difficulty in finding it meaningful.

Conceptually distinguishable by *human* means. Now I've said that often
enough that you are aware of my meaning (giving you the benefit of the
doubt, even though I've said it multiple times before). If you want to
misrepresent what I am saying we can end this here before I get nasty.

--
---------------
J. Pieret
---------------

Consistency we should expect of philosophies,
but perhaps not of philosophers.

- Neal C. Gillespie -

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Dennett / Ruse Tiff Continues
    ... science doesn't really test hypotheses in a vacuum. ... possibilities about a God, and God as usually conceived by ... issue of scientism and tend not to get mentioned. ... the universe in a way that is blatantly obvious to science? ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Dennett / Ruse Tiff Continues
    ... are avenues of exploration that science should decline to ... about the universe that aren't made "true" just ... You *claim* it has no meaning. ... that humans can observe (many of these consequences ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: The Pope does not back intelligent design
    ... excludes God by fiat is simply not true. ... science answers the 'how' questions. ... How did the universe start? ... What makes you think there must be any such meaning? ...
    (uk.religion.christian)
  • Re: Sex bias in Biological hypotheses
    ... I've lost your meaning here. ... piece together using what the 'process of Science' keeps ... of people's individual "Actention Selecting Systems" ... (in phylogeny of multi-cellular fauna) ...
    (sci.bio.evolution)
  • Re: What would science be like if intelligent design hadnt been a dishonest scam?
    ... Also science does not deal with meaning. ... That emotions are the product of the brain is common knowledge. ... intelligent design folk are liars, Stew here is the liar obviously. ...
    (talk.origins)