Re: Dennett / Ruse Tiff Continues

catshark wrote:
Chimp wrote:
catshark wrote:
Chimp wrote:
catshark wrote:

Either the "God hypothesis" cannot make falsifiable predictions,
in which case we reject it in favor of theories with predicitive
power; or, if the "God hypothesis" _can_ make falsifiable
predictions then we simply test it like any other theory.

That is enough. It is clear that you advocate scientism. It doesn't
make you a bad person but it is a very restricted philosophy, IMHO.

You asked how science could address the possibility of
a "divine designer" so I told you. I do not agree that there
are avenues of exploration that science should decline to
follow.

But you go further than investigating avenues, you insist we are
justified in *deciding* those questions by science.

Not really, I insist only that we are justified in _attempting_
to decide those questions by science . . . I've made no
claim about where attempts to explore avenues will lead.

And it has been previously agreed on this thread that merely
_attempting_ to explore some area in a scientific way is
_not_ "scientism", but that "scientism" is the assertion that
one will always succeed.

No, I'm sorry, that was not agreed and if I somehow gave that
impression it was my mistake. Scientism is the assertion that claims
about the existence, nature and actions of God; life after death and
the ultimate significance of physical reality and human life are
answerable by science/empiricism. You have made clear that you
believe that to be true.

There is a difference between "are answerable" and "might be
answerable". I'm only claiming that since they "might be"
answerable we should not refuse to try answering them in
that way.

Any qualifications that we don't presently have the
means to answer some of those questions, while denying
that there are any conceptual limits to human knowledge,
are mere quibbles and do not change the basic claim.

I'm not asserting that there are no conceptual limits to our
knowledge; but we don't know that the above areas
_are_ beyond our conceptual limits, and so we shouldn't
(currently) write them off as no-go areas for science.

And you have not shown that the philosophy I have outlined
is in any way restricted -- saying it is is an empty assertion.

You would reduce philosophy and theism to science. That is restricted.

You don't know for a fact that the areas traditionally labelled
as "theism" are not encompassed by science.

I am happy to accept that science _might_ be limited, and
after trying to explore avenues scientifically we might
_discover_ that it is not the right tool. But that is very
different from saying that, a priori, science cannot
explore certain avenues.

"You are asserting that something can be "real "
despite its existence being conceptually indistinguishable
from its non-existence. I'm just interested by what
_you_ mean by "real" in that usage."

But that is the *point*! You are making a circular argument: you claim
reality is defined by having an empiric difference and will accept
nothing but an *empiric* difference as any definition of an alternative
reality.

Well actually, I am open to alternatives. Tell me about them.
What properties does the "existence" of something have if
its "existence" is conceptually indistinguishable from its
"non-existence"?

In what way is something "real" if it can never, even in
principle, have any interaction or influence on any
observable aspect of our universe?
[E,g, I can conceive of a "seperate-reality" universe that
is causally disconnected from ours.]

I really am not ruling these things out; I am open
to updating my definition of "real" if given a good
reason to do so.

But that doesn't mean I should accept that such
things are "real" just because someone claims that
are "real" (while telling me nothing about the
properties of this "real"-ness).

That alternative reality is, according to theists,
supernatural and not amenable to scientific demonstration
or explanation.

That's a mere claim on their part. Whether or not
such "alternative reality" exists (and whether it is
amenable to scientific demonstration) are facts
about the universe that aren't made "true" just
because a believer claims them to be true. I am
quite entitled to withold assent from such claims
until presented with decent evidence (whether
"scientific" evidence or othewise) that they are true.

Reality in their usage would include "heaven", "God" and
"soul". Your claim that those have to be amenable to proof of
their existence by empiric definition or else they are non-real
is an assertion about their nature that you have made but not
demonstrated.

Firstly, all the believers I've come across believe that
"God" is indeed capable of influencing the observable
universe; that a "soul" will indeed have an influence
of the moral behavior of a human, and thus on the
observable universe; and that a human being will
indeed (at some point in the future) be capable of
distinguishing between "heaven" and "hell". Thus,
if these claims were correct, then such things would
indeed meet my criterion for being "real".

Thus, these concepts are _not_ the "indistinguishable
even in principle" concepts that we have been
discussing.

But if a believer _were_ to postulate a "God" that could
not have any influence whatever on any aspect of
the observable universe, even if he wanted to, then
I think I am perfectly entitled to ask what properties
that "God" has that it qualifies as "real", and I don't
think that I'm obliged to add it to the category "real"
just because someone claims it is so.

You seem to be giving too much weight to mere
claims as opposed to establishing whether
something is indeed the case.

[. . .] except that it is your preference for how the universe
should work. In my book, that counts as an assumption.

Wrong, I have never said that that is my preference for
how the universe should work. A _definition_ of terms
does not alter how the universe works. Thus my using
terms as above is _not_ a statement about how the
universe works.

Oh please. Theists define reality differently than you do.
According to them, *you* are defining it wrongly.

I'm perfectly willing to listen to alternative defintions
of "real". [And, most theists _do_not_ define it
differently -- I have never met a single theist who
regards "God" as incapable of changing the
observable universe.]

The whole isssue is how anyone can tell, if at all,
who is right. Your asserting that your definition
is the right one doesn't make it so.

I really am not asserting that my definition is the
only "right" one, it really is just a definition.

What I am insisting on is that we be clear about
our meanings, to avoid the semantic trick. "Let's
label X as real". "Ah, ha, X is "real"." "Therefore
X is as real as my cat."

Your problem is that you persist in using the word
"real" in a way that, quite literally, has no meaning.

You *claim* it has no meaning.

That's because you haven't assigned any meaning to
"exists" when you insist on applying it to something
whose "existence" is conceptually indistinguishable
from its "non-existence".

I've asked you about the properties of this sort of
"existence" and you haven't given me any.

Theists claim that terms such as "heaven", "God"
and "soul" do have meaning even if they cannot be
demonstrated empirically.

Not at all. Theists claim that "heaven", "God" and
"soul" _do_indeed_ have consequences for things
that humans can observe (many of these consequences
are supposedly observable here are now, some might
only be observable in the future after death). It is
those _observable consequences_ that gives
them their meaning.

So, I ask you again, what is the difference between
a "mutation" and a "whibble-whibble mutation" where
(a) "whibble-whibble mutation" is defined as
not-a-"mutation", and (b) a "whibble-whibble mutation"
is conceptually indistinguishable from a "mutation"
in all possible cases?

In that scenario, what do the words "whibble-whibble"
mean? [Of course, this scenario is identical to your
use of "supernatural mutation".]

Attempts at ridicule make your case weaker, not stronger.

It genuinely is not an attempt at ridicule! It is an
attempt to show that words don't actually have
meanings unless you attach _meanings_ to them.

Supernatural mutation means "mutation brought about
by the action of God, instead of by the natural laws of chemistry".

So I could watch it happening and see the action
of the natural laws of chemistry and if it was a
"supernatural mutation" then I would see a
violation of these laws of chemistry?

Well, in that case it is _distinguishable_. Again,
we aren't arguing about that case; we are arguing
because you want to attach meaning to different
word phrases even when they are "conceptually
indistinguishable".

*You* may find that meaningless but billions of
people have no problem understanding the concept.

I only find it "meaningless" when you additionally
assert that the two are "conceptually indistinguishable".

If they are indeed distinguishable then I have
no difficulty in finding it meaningful.

Chimp

.

Relevant Pages

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