Re: Dennett / Ruse Tiff Continues

catshark wrote:
"Chimp" <pan_paniscus1859@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
catshark wrote:
On 25 Mar 2006 "Chimp" <pan_paniscus1859@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
catshark wrote:
Chimp wrote:

Then I don't understand what you meant when you said that supernatural
effects merely require "a great deal of data and statistical analysis to
detect (that may be beyond our current capabilities)". What do you mean
by "observables" other than observable by empiric means?

Yes, by "observable" I did mean empirically observable. [I was
just holding out the possibility that mere observability is not
sufficient to guarantee accessibility to science.]

If that is what you mean, then you *do* assume that everthing
that is real is an "observable" of science.

Again, it is not an assumption, it is a definition of "real".

I am asserting that for something to "exist", to be "real",
there must be some observable distinction (somewhere,
someplace) between that thing existing and not existing.

If "A exists" and "A doesn't exist" have entirely identical
implications for all observables then "A exists" is
inditinsguishable from "A doesn't exist" and effectively
A doesn't exist.

Second, the above is not an _assertion_, it is a _definition_
of "real" and "meaningful". In other words, for X to be "real"
there has to a way of distinguishing X from not-X. If there
isn't, X is entirely equivalent to not-X and thus not-real.

But if you are limiting the method of distinguishing them to
"observables" that are accessible by science, it isn't a valid
definition.

Well I didn't add "accessible by science" but still . . .

A supernatural mutation is different in origin or cause than
a natural one, even if there is nothing even conceptually
observable by science to distinguish them.

That is an unsupported assertion. I am asserting the
opposite. First, delete the two words "by science",
since that is a diversion.

Now, if "mutation" and "mutation by whibble-whibble" are
indistinguishable in that nothing even conceptually
observable differentiates them, then the two are identical.

Just because I can write the phrase "whibble-whibble"
doesn't mean it has any meaning, and just because you
can write "supernatural mutation" doesn't mean it has
any meaning different from "mutation", unless you specify
some way in which the two are distinguishable.

Similarly for "meaning"; if the two statements A and not-A
are in all cases entirely equivalent then A and not-A are
indistinguishable and one can't assign a "meaning" to A
which not-A doesn't also have. Thus A has no meaning.

What counts as being "entirely equivalent"? Wouldn't different
origins for A and not-A result in them not being *entirely* equivalent?

Only if "origin of A" and "origin of not-A" are conceptually
distinguishable by observables (and if they are then we
can distinguish A from not-A). If the origins are not
distinguishable, both are the same and thus A and not-A
do not have different origins.

So really I am defining the terms "meaning" and "real"
in this way. I guess if others want to regard as "meaningful"
and "real" something that can never have any influence
or affect on them, then that, to me, is a peculiar use of
language.

Yes. You are defining terms so that your position must be right.
<Shrug> that's easy and uninteresting, if that is all you want to do.

Try giving me an alternative definition of "real".

That which exists in any way, whether or not we can even
conceptually detect it.

Giving a synonym doesn't really answer. If something is
conceptually undetectable then in what way can it be
said to "exist" or "be real"?

What properties would it have that are consistent with the
fact that "it exists" and "it doesn't exist" are conceptually
indistinguishable?

Easy. If the "God-created-mutation" is, ex-hypothesis, not
random, then I can distinguish it from random mutations by
checking their randomness.

I am unaware of that test. How does it work?

Randomness and non-randomness give different
patterns. Indeed the meaning of "non-random" is
"different pattern than random". The test is simply
to check whether the pattern is random.

Really? Richard Dawkins seems to think the random process
of mutation, coupled with selection can result in apparent design.
If patterns of apparent design can emerge from stochastic processes,
how can you distinguish them from non-random patterns?

What is the problem? If I have a radioactive source that
gives random decays, followed by a selective filter (say,
rejecting all those that occur during night-time) then the
output of the filter is non-random. But that doesn't prevent
me checking whether the radioactive source is random.

And just how do you reliably detect a pattern of design
without knowing the intent of the design and the attributes
of the designer?

In the usual way, by comparing differing hypotheses
for their explanatory success and predictive power.

You are arguing that semantics is more important than reality.

Absolutely the opposite. I am arguing that semantics
is less important than reality. You are suggesting above
that there is a difference between "God-created-mutation"
and "random" even if the pattern of the mutations is
identical in all particulars.

At the very least, there is a difference in origin.

I assert not. Either the "difference in origin" has
consequences for some observable, somewhere,
sometime, or the two origins are not "different".

You are dismissing that difference based either on semantics
or on the basis that it would not make a difference to science.
Either way, it is a philosophical proposition.

I am dismissing any "difference" when there is no
difference in reality but only in the superficials of
the label.

What is the difference between "mutation" and
"mutation-whibble-whibble"?

What is the difference between "Le Tour Eiffel"
and "The Eiffel Tower"?

Just because you can make the label appear
superficially different does not mean there is
a difference in the thing being referred to.

And there is no difference between "supernatural"
and "natural" if you state that there is no possible
way of distinguishing between them.

I am replying that in that case the two are "in reality"
identical, despite the differing verbiage.

That is an assertion that the origin of the mutation in the
supernatural is unimportant to *you*.

No, see above. A difference in origin is indeed
important. But there is no difference in origin
if the two origins are conceptually indistinguishable.
[If they are distinguishable then great, we simply
distinguish between them.]

It seems from above that
you would have to argue that "X" can "exist", even if
"X existing" is forever indistinguishable, even in principle,
from "X not existing".

Things can be conceptually indistinguishable to humans
and other finite beings and still be not identical.

This sentence seems confused between:
A) "They are conceptually distinguishable, but we limited
humans are not up to the task", and
B) "They are conceptually indistinguishable, even to
an infinitely competent being".

I've accepted the possibility of A several posts ago.

But presuming B, I disagree entirely that such things
can "still be not identical". Indeed, "identical" would
have no meaning if that were the case.

What sort of an existence is that? In other words,
describe some properties of this "existence", while
preserving that indistiguishability from non-existence.

Don't you think that demanding a "description* of an
existence rather assumes I, as a human, can observe it?

Err, yes. ;-)

And doesn't that beg the whole question, which is whether
only that which we can observe is real?

Again, it is really a matter of how we define "real".
You are asserting that something can be "real "
despite its existence being conceptually indistinguishable
from its non-existence. I'm just interested by what
_you_ mean by "real" in that usage.

"Being conceptually indistinguishable from its
non-existence" seems a pretty good definition
of "non-real" to me. In fact, I'm beginning to like it.

Chimp

.

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