Re: Dennett / Ruse Tiff Continues

On 25 Mar 2006 04:46:53 -0800, "Chimp" <pan_paniscus1859@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

catshark wrote:
Chimp wrote:

If there _is_ a systematic difference between the mutations
on the two hypotheses then it is simply a matter of acquiring
enough data to discern the pattern.

Not assuming your conclusion and instead assuming for the sake of
argument that one or more mutations is not naturalistic, how are you
going to test which are which? If you can't think how, then we can
agree that empiricism isn't up to the task. You can take the
philosophical position that it is unimportant to you but to take the
position that anything not confirmable by science cannot be real is
scientism.

I am asserting that the only "meaning" that can be attributed to
a statement is that "observables X, Y and Z are/were different
than if the statement were false".

In other words, you are asserting that the only real (meaningful) things
are those amenable to human investigation. This is still begging the
question and is not supported by your semantic argument below.


If there is something that can have no possible influence on
any observables then that something is "non-real".

Again, you try to define the problem out of existence. You have not
demonstrated that your definition corresponds to reality.

At least,
there is no way, even in principle, of distinguishing it from
being non-existent and non-real, so we might as well include
it in the items covered by those terms.

[If there is some seperate, causally-disconnected "universe"
that can never affect ours then I would accept the label
"seperate reality" for that, but since we can never know
about it it is _effectively_ non-existent for our "reality".]

So really I am defining the terms "meaning" and "real"
in this way. I guess if others want to regard as "meaningful"
and "real" something that can never have any influence
or affect on them, then that, to me, is a peculiar use of
language.

Yes. You are defining terms so that your position must be right. <Shrug>
that's easy and uninteresting, if that is all you want to do.


As I said above, I can agree that "enough data" might be
beyond our current capabilities, but that is not the same as
something being "philosophically" or "in principle" beyond
science.

Give me an empiric way to distinguish a God created mutation
from a random one.

Easy. If the "God-created-mutation" is, ex-hypothesis, not
random, then I can distinguish it from random mutations by
checking their randomness.

I am unaware of that test. How does it work?


If, on the other hand, the "God-created-mutation" is
hypothesised as random and indistinguishable, then
the two hypotheses are identical. There is no difference
between them, any more than if you had used the French
word for "random" instead of the English word.

There is no difference between French and English?


If you wish to postulate "meta-randomness" that is,
in all cases, indistinguishable from "randomness"
then I'd simply accuse you of wasting syllables and
suggest you use the more concise (and logically
identical) term.

You are arguing that semantics is more important than reality. It seems a
little silly to me as philosophy but as an argument about knowledge, it
fails to demonstrate the non-existence of what we find semantically
unnecessary.


In such a way, any postulate of the "supernatural"
only has any meaning whatsoever if it implies that
some observable somewhere, sometime will be different.

Only in your personal semantics, not necessarily in reality.


[And see above for my use of the word "meaning".]

Chimp

--
---------------
J. Pieret
---------------

Every man, wherever he goes, is encompassed
by a cloud of comforting convictions which
move with him like flies on a summer day.

- Bertrand Russell -

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Towards a theory of the semiotic mind-body link
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  • Re: Towards a theory of the semiotic mind-body link
    ... If with syntax you covered the vastly hierarchical interrelationship ... you will get pretty close to semantics. ... I believe the meaning or the semantics is defined by the complex ... The wiring of the brain, ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: An Inflationary Account - #2 - Informativeness
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