Re: Book-able view of ID as speculative science


"topmind" <topmind@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:1134938067.712079.44310@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Deadrat wrote:
> > "topmind" <topmind@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> > news:1134896689.947024.108530@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >
> > > Deadrat wrote:
> > <snip>
> >
> > > > > > > > Let's give him another chance. Hey, topmind, consider this:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > The anthropic principle is a counter to the argument that there must be
> > > > > > > > something special to our existence because the parameters of physical
> > > > > > > > law are so finely "set" that even small changes to them would produce
> > > > > > > > a universe hostile to life (at least as we know it). If the strong force were
> > > > > > > > a little stronger or a little weaker, then nucleosynthesis couldn't take place,
> > > > > > > > and stars and planets couldn't form, and, ... well, you get the idea. Notice
> > > > > > > > that this is an idea that deals with ultimate questions of existence, so it is
> > > > > > > > philosophy, not science. Science deals with what we find when we actually
> > > > > > > > measure things in the universe we're in.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > MU of AP predicts that there are or were other universes.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > No. It specifically does *not* predict that there are or were other universes.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > It predicts that there MAY be other detectable universes.
> > > >
> > > > This is not a prediction. A prediction says that there are detectable universes
> > > > or that there aren't.
> > >
> > > Predicting that there are other universes does not necessarily mean we
> > > can detect them. Yes, it is a "fuzzy" prediction, but science is not
> > > always clean. Otherwise, we would already have all the answers.
> >
> > We're not talking about how hard it is to interpret data. We're talking about
> > predictions. A fuzzy prediction is no prediction at all.
>
> Hogwash. Science does not always provide clear-cut or guarenteed clues.
> I don't know where you get the assumption that only ideas that have a
> wide nozzles gushing forth easy-to-digest evidence are science.

The clues are ambiguous. The scientific tests that attempt to make sense out
of the clues cannot be. That's where your problem lies. You have to come
up with a mathematically sound, specific test for your DNA patterns. It's
not enough to speculate that there might be a possible test.

> I am almost forced to face the possibility that you are messin' with
> the definition to keep ID-like ideas out at all costs.

No one is "messin'" the definition. Tell me your test.

>
> >
> > Q. How much rain will we get tomorrow?"
> > A. I predict somewhere between zero inches and fifteen feet.
> >
> > The anthropic principle does not predict whether or not there are other
> > universes.
>
> I disagree.

Then you don't know what the anthropic principle is. What do you think
it says?

<snip>

> >
> > No, it can't. The anthropic principle has nothing to say about probability distributions.
>
> As a rough guide, it can. If you are forced to choose between
> one-in-a-zillion chance or quantity, quantity is the more likely
> choice; the "better bet". Most will agree with me on this.

You've got two problems with this argument. The first (akin to the
anthropic principle) is that you're looking at this from the point of
view of the lottery winner. All lottery winners are surprised at winning,
but the lottery commission isn't surprised that they did. The second is
that you have no idea about the probability distributions involved.
Suppose you were playing poker and got a flush on every hand.
You'd be surprised and then suspicious because you know the odds.
But suppose at the end of the night you found out that the deck was
all spades. How surprised would you be then?

<snip>
>
> > The
> > anthropic principle uses a thought experiment that asks you to consider how
> > one would reason assuming there were other universes. No predictions are
> > made (nor are necessary) to follow this reasoning. Multiple universes are also
> > posited in some interpretations quantum mechanics, and at least one of those
> > (Everett's) is potentially testable and can thus be called science.
> >
> > If you want to make your version of ID acceptable as science, then comparing
> > it to the anthropic principle is no help to you. The anthropic principle does not
> > rely on the testability of multiple universes. They may be testable; they may not.
>
> Agreed. If followup info is available, it is a bonus. Being a bonus
> does not make it non-science.

What makes it non-science is that to make its point, it doesn't rely on testing at all.

>
> > The anthropic principle marches on as philosophical speculation. If you want
> > to make your version of ID acceptable as science by comparing it to Everett's
> > many worlds hypothesis, then you're going to have to come up with a test. Like
> > the example of a test for Everett's hypothesis, yours doesn't have to be doable
> > with current technology. But it must be feasible eventually and make an actual
> > measurable prediction.
>
> It predicts there may be other universes,

It predicts no such thing. Tell me what you think the anthropic principle says.

> and these other universes are potentially measurable.

Everett says that. Not the anthropic principle.

> Because they are "potentially" instead of "for
> sure" does NOT knock it out of being science. Science does not
> guarentee that evidence flows easily.

This is irrelevant. The anthropic principle makes no predictions.

<snip>

> > The anthropic principle is not a scientific explanation for fined tuned constants any
> > more than it explains why your neighbor won the lottery. It is a philosophic exercise
> > in whether fine tuning should surprise us.
>
> The lottery commission looks for odd patterns in winnership to prevent
> fraud. If a single neighborhood wins a disproportionate amount of
> prizes, then they set out to investigate further.

You've just stepped on your own argument. Assuming the lucky neighbors weren't
defrauding the lottery, but inadvertently buying from a faulty ticket machine, the
winners would still be surprised at winning but they shouldn't be.

> As another example, suppose you sat down at a park bench and peered
> down to see 50 coins all facing heads-down (you see only tails). In
> your head you have to pick between the hypoth of them all just
> happening to face down, or that some other selection process, such as a
> bored child, being involved in that placement. These kind of "which is
> more likely" scenarios are similar to what MU-AP does.

You've missed the entire point. In looking at flipped coins, I know the
odds. "Likely scenarios" for universes makes no sense, since I have no
evidence for what's likely.

>
> By the way, a "though experiment" is a "model", and science depends on
> models.

It depends on the "model." Not every thought experiment is amenable to
scientific testing.

<snip>

Deadrat

> -T-
>

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Book-able view of ID as speculative science
    ... > "Speculative science" and exploration does not require specific plans. ... Tell me what you think the anthropic principle says. ... >>> and these other universes are potentially measurable. ... The reason we are surprised is equivalent to the surprise of a powerball ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Book-able view of ID as speculative science
    ... > Multiple universes is potentially testable. ... >> with science. ... since I know the distribution. ... Not the anthropic principle. ...
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  • Re: Book-able view of ID as speculative science
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  • Re: Book-able view of ID as speculative science
    ... >>> It predicts that there MAY be other detectable universes. ... A prediction says that there are detectable universes ... The anthropic principle does not predict whether or not there are other ... >> for their testability and are not part of science. ...
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