Re: That Old Anthrax Case

On Aug 12, 5:00 pm, Islander <nos...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
al Guacamole wrote:
On Aug 12, 7:51 am, Islander <nos...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
George Z. Bush wrote:
Islander wrote:
George Z. Bush wrote:
Islander wrote:
al Guacamole wrote:
On Aug 9, 8:08 am, Islander <nos...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
al Guacamole wrote:
On Aug 8, 3:40 pm, Islander <nos...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
al Guacamole wrote:
On Aug 8, 6:44 am, Rumpelstiltskin
<PleaseDoNotReplyByEm...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Fri, 08 Aug 2008 08:31:03 -0700, Rita <R...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Fri, 8 Aug 2008 00:19:27 -0400, "George Z. Bush"
<georgezb...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Islander wrote:
<snip>
If the government really believes the story that is being told,
there
are some people at Ft. Detrick who should also be prosecuted.
While that might affect the goats chosen to take the rap for any
disclosed sins performed in those sensitive areas, there
probably
are
a lot of goatherders much higher up in the food chain who
deserve
a
lot closer scrutiny than they're likely to get.
George Z.
If Ivins is indeed a patsy, he was well chosen since the man was
more
than eccentric. And thus would be a perfect choice to pin the
anthrax
attacks on.
But remember the government thought it had a previous very likely
suspect and hounded him for years. That suspect just won a large
damages suit against the government.
Isn't it amazing, the skepticism that's meeting the federal
government's claim that Ivins was for sure the perpetrator?
Apparently it's not just myself who feels lied-to so much that I
don't
trust anything that comes from the federal government anymore.
From Wilkipedia:
Although Attorney General John Ashcroft labeled Dr. Steven
Hatfill
a
"person of interest" in a press conference, no charges were
brought
against him. Hatfill, a virologist, vehemently denied he had
anything
to do with the anthrax (bacteria) mailings and sued the FBI, the
Justice Department, John Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzales, and others
for
violating his constitutional rights and for violating the Privacy
Act.
On June 27, 2008, the Department of Justice announced it would
settle
Hatfill's case for $5.8 million.
Every time I hear a settlement like this, sometimes much
bigger than this, that ends in big financial transfer but no
criminal prosecution, it destroys any sense in me that justice
was served or held to be of any importance. It looks just
all about the money.
It's amazing that the govt continues to pursue this when the news
media reports that a co-worker who knew him rather well, insists on
Ivin's innocence. Apparantly security is rather lax and there are
other folks at the lab who have access to the anthrax. What might
be
more relevant is whether the Feds zeal in pursuing this man made
him
mentally unstable enough that even his therapist was alarmed enough
to
report him. Other critics say it doesn't make sense that he would
use
his own stuff. Wouldn't it have been traced to him eventually?
Bruce Ivins mental health problems predate the Anthrax scare.
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-na-ivins7-2008au...
When someone has mental problems, he/she can easily be pushed over
the
edge. I believe there is a case that can be validly made that his
suicide was induced by the harassment of the investigation on him. If
he survived the investigation, then he could have probably been
awarded much more in punitive damages that the govt inflicted on him,
than the previous suspect. Let me be clear that you say that he is
responsible for his own mental problems?
Of course not, but allowing someone that unstable to continue to have
free and unsupervised access to biological agents is irresponsible in
the extreme. Evidently security was so lax at Ft. Detrick that even
basic laboratory safety procedures were not followed.
Management at the lab should be prosecuted.
It depends on if they think that he can be trusted. Since he had a
long and good track record at the laboratory, they probably felt that
he would continue to do good work there. Besides anyone can
understand that harassment will produce problems in those who are
mentally unstable. The staff there don't think that he did the deed
and the evidence is only circumstantial and like you state security
was lax. Sometimes too strict security procedures will make the work
impossible. But it doesn't mean that some kind of surveillance is
unnecessary. We would at least like to know if security is breached in
a more timely manner instead of years afterwards-- if we can't prevent
it.
There is no excuse for lax security procedures and even less excuse for
lax laboratory safety procedures. Our clean room for microfabrication
at Stanford had an iron clad rule that there had to be a minimum of two
people in the lab at any time. Strictly a safety precaution and the
security system made sure that the rule was obeyed. If we could do that
at a university, I would certainly hope that it could be done at Ft.
Detrick. But, Ivins evidently worked solo in the lab at about the time
that he would have acquired the Anthrax.
As far as security procedures are concerned, the Navy has systems which
require two people to access critical systems. That hardly prevents
them from performing their mission.
Maybe well and good, but Ft. Detrick was an Army installation. Maybe
they
had a different albeit less perfect view of lab security than the Navy
had.
George Z.
No excuse, George. Even the Army has no excuse for abysmal lab security.
I'm an Air Force weenie.....I don't make excuses for either the Army or the
Navy. My comment wasn't meant to be taken as an excuse......it was offered
only as a possible explanation.
George Z.
It is easy for a lab to lapse into lax practices. While I was at
Stanford, we built a new laboratory clean room in which many of the
individual faculty labs were incorporated. Fortunately our lab manager
was a stickler on safety and security - we had some pretty nasty
chemicals in that lab. There was some pissing and moaning from the
researchers who had worked independently in their own labs before, but
security and safety were essential requirements for accessing the
greatly increased capability of the new lab. We included a laboratory
automation system which not only assured that there were at least two
people in the lab at all times, but also required that only trained and
qualified individuals could operate any specific machine and it time
stamped their usage. Likewise, materials were tracked in the automation
system to make sure that we could account for their use. That may seem
excessive to some, but it produced a very safe and professional working
environment.

If a university can produce a safe and secure laboratory environment,
there is no excuse for a government lab to do any less, especially where
the public safety is at risk.

With Govt work, you may not be aware that mil standards apply and the
environment must be certified. What would think of procedures that
wouldn't allow you to enter the room unless everything were certified
and signed off in there? What about signing out a key that must be
checked back in by a certain time? Wouldn't that mean that the system
for controlling the keys might have to be bypassed if some urgent work
is needed. For example, the worker might make his own set of keys for
his convenience-- off the books and unauthorized. The trouble is
usually not that the govt lab does "less", but that it does much much
more than needed. If you're not aware of this, then perhaps you have
been lucky. My experience is that this is the case.
Govt likes to hire contractors because the contractors can cut corners
that the govt couldn't get away with.

Mil standards are a separate topic and are intended to assure the
quality of the product produced. I have many problems with mil specs,
but that is a whole other story.

I assume that your second point refers to sensitive material control.
Sorry, if you cannot account for it you cannot control it.

Time limits for key distribution are intended to trigger followup if a
key is not returned. There are provisions for extending the time and if
you think that is too much trouble, you shouldn't be working in that
environment.

Security is mostly a matter of keeping honest people honest. You cannot
duplicate some keys using the local key shop, for example. I could
probably duplicate most mechanical keys with a modest milling machine.
But, most people do not have access to that equipment.

I'm not saying that some of these procedures are not too heavy handed,
but I spent much of my professional life working in a highly classified
environment. I never found the security or safety procedures to
interfere with my job. The people who design these security systems are
very much aware of the risk of making the procedures too intrusive.

Finally, I know of no instance where the government hires contractors
because they can cut corners on security or safety. On the contrary, it
is very difficult to get contractors to use security and safety
procedures that they don't use in commercial practice or if they do not
understand the reason. Your reason sounds to me like an excuse.

I think that I gave a number of examples where the govt did just that.
Of course, they will NEVER admit that the practice is to compromise
security or safety. Why would you expect them to say that? Their usual
response is just yours: private business can do it better with less
cost. And when there is a spectacular failure in the private business
end, then the business expects a bailout. What is also common is that
business engages in elaborate cover-ups of their screw-ups.
Documentation of problems are poor or just not required.

As I recall, Al Gore, when he was vice-president, had a job to
streamline govt operations. It is very much needed because of reasons
I discussed. It is just not sufficient to claim that you have never
encounter ("no instance") such problems when it happens all the time.
It just shows that you haven't been looking very hard or you haven't
looked in the right places. Congress and the President are not doing
their jobs. It's a bipartisan problem because they only take action
when something like this anthrax scandal takes place. And then they
spend most of the time finding scapegoats like Ivens, and doing
ineffectual reforms to their security systems.
.

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