Re: Pelosi & Reid Will Not Like Progress Cited in Iraq Quarterly Report

Roger wrote:
Islander wrote:
Roger wrote:
Islander wrote:
Roger wrote:
Islander wrote:
Roger wrote:
Islander wrote:
Roger wrote:
Islander wrote:
Roger wrote:
Islander wrote:
marib wrote:
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The latest quarterly progress report is the eighth to date. It was submitted to Congress for review under terms of the 2007 Department of Defense Appropriations Act.
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010-Final-20070608.pdf

<G>


This is from 4 pages, less than 10 percent, of the report.
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010-Final-20070608.pdf


Four more pages of the report.


and your point would be....?????


The point is read the report. There is plenty room for optimism when read for comprehension.


You clearly seem to feel that there is material that is included in this report that is a) credible, b) verifiable from another source, and c) justification for sacrificing additional American lives. Would you care to identify exactly what is a) credible, b) provide additional independent verification and c) state how many additional American lives should be sacrificed in the name of your optimism?

No, I doubt that you will since you seem only capable of parroting the lies of this administration. Prove me wrong! Show a bit of independent thinking!

How does that go.....when ya can't rebut - attack the messenger?


Do you feel attacked because I asked you to demonstrate a bit of independent thinking? Or do you feel attacked because I asked you to state how many additional American lives should be sacrificed in the name of your optimism? It is easy to post propaganda, but your passive support of this war is costing lives. How many young men and women do you feel should die for your passivity? How many should come back with their bodies, minds, and lives shattered?

Are you sincere enough in your beliefs to answer those questions?

I believe you're exhibiting what the title of this thread alludes to. Liberals don't like the progress cited in the report.


Quite the contrary. I don't see anything in the report to give me optimism that the surge is working. But, you could pose an argument to the contrary. Instead, you simply post more of the report as if that proves your case. It doesn't. Do you have an original thought, or are you just a shill for the Bush administration? Why are you afraid to answer my questions?


Pelosi and Reid not only do not support the war effort, they do not want our troops to win and it is getting harder every day to pretend that they do.

Reid has called General Petraeus a liar for saying progress had been made in Iraq, and more recently he has called Petraeus and outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs,Marine Gen. Peter Pace, "incompetent."

No wonder Reid is attacking Petraeus, with Petraeus giving interviews resulting in reports like the following one in USAToday this week:

"When Gen. David Petraeus drives through the streets of Iraq's capital, he sees 'astonishing signs of normalcy' in half, perhaps two-thirds of Baghdad. The scenes provide a sign that the new strategy in Iraqis working, although many problems remain. Five months after President Bush ordered an increase of 20,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, data suggest that sectarian violence in Baghdad has declined. Other tentative signs of progress have included a rise in Iraqi army enlistments and some quality-of-life improvements such as fewer electricity blackouts in the capital."

Wednesday Reid, along with Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, told the President that his surge policy is a failure. The two wrote in a letter to the President, "As many had foreseen, the escalation has failed to produce the intended results." Never mind that all of the surge troops are not even in place yet. Never mind that Reid and Pelosi don’t want to give those troops even the opportunity to produce results. Never mind that the report on the progress of the surge is not to be made until September. Democrats cannot afford to wait for results.

Frederick W. Kagan recently reported potential signs of progress in a piece for the Weekly Standard posted at CBSnews.com:

"We are serving as the bridge between the Sunni insurgents and tribal leaders and the Shia government. Before the end of last year, there were virtually no Sunnis willing to step on that bridge. Now, five months into the surge, tens of thousands are walking on it. It will take time to get them all the way to the other side, and it is possible that the Shia government will ultimately make it impossible. But one thing is certain: if we pull out now or abandon the current approach, the bridge collapses and it's the end of the story. But make no mistake about it: This is a strategy for success, if it works. In the meantime, violence is way down in Anbar and people who had been our sworn enemies are now swearing to fight al Qaeda both in Anbar and in Baghdad. Any objective observer would see these for the positive signs that they are."

Democrats knew that one immediate result of us increasing troop presence and the pressure we put on insurgents would be increased violence. The President and military advisers said from the beginning that violence would almost certainly increase in the short term, yet Democrats cite recent monthly "death counts" as proof the surge has failed, while ignoring signs that progress has been made. Democrats know that what Kagan said is true, "if we pull out now or abandon the current approach it’s the end of the story." If this thing is to be truly lost, no time can be wasted waiting for it to be fully put into effect. Opponents of the surge must declare defeat preemptively.

I don't know whether or not the surge will ultimately achieve the desired result, but I do know that progress is being reported from some regions of Iraq that were considered lost causes not that long ago. I also know that if we do not give the surge even a chance to work it will certainly fail and that Democrats are heavily invested in failure in Iraq. The President will be judged by what he did and what he tried to do in Iraq. That judgment might not come for many years and even if it is ultimately deemed a failure, I believe history will record that the President did what he thought was best for the country. There is no doubt that the President wants to win in Iraq. Unfortunately the same cannot be said for most of the Democrats in Congress.


Now, back to the report:

Assessment of the Security Environment—
Central/Northern Iraq
Outside of Baghdad, this reporting period
saw increased inter-sectarian violence in
Diyala, increased high-profile attacks in
northern Iraq by AQI, and Coalition and Iraqi
forces confronting the JAM—the Shi’a
militia associated with the radical cleric
Muktada-al Sadr—in Diwaniyah. Ongoing
ethnic and sectarian violence in central and
northern Iraq is a reflection of AQI and JAM
elements competing for political control of
Diyala Province—particularly as some of the
Baghdad militia fighters moved to the
province. On a positive note, there are initial
signs that some tribes in Diyala are discussing
ways of countering AQI. Coalition forces
are using lessons learned in tribal engagement
in Anbar to help reconciliation efforts in
areas such as Abu Ghraib, Samara and Bayji.
In Ninewa Province, Mosul is AQI’s northern
strategic base and serves as a way-station for
foreign fighters entering from Syria. There,
insurgent and terrorist groups have increased
the frequency and intensity of attacks on the
local police. AQI’s efforts to reignite sectarian
violence in Tal’Afar through high-profile
attacks against civilians reflects its desire to
undermine stability along sectarian fault lines
and deepen the conflict in Iraq. Coalition
forces deployed to Baqubah in mid-March
and local ISF units have been unable to
diminish rising sectarian violence contributing
to the volatile security situation.
AQI has shifted some of its focus to the
north. This is due in part to expanded
Coalition and Iraqi operations in Baghdad
and the rise of ethnic tensions in Kirkuk.
These tensions may mount as property is
reallocated to Kurds displaced under the
previous regime’s Arabization programs and
as the prospect of a census and referendum on
Kirkuk’s status looms. Kurdish and Sunni
Arab concerns about fair distribution of
hydrocarbon revenues also could exacerbate
tensions.
Assessment of the Security Environment—
Kurdish Region
The overall security situation is stable in
Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah, and several
foreign countries are establishing consulates
and pursuing oil and energy business interests
in the Kurdish region. However, the attack
on May 9 against the Kurdish Ministry of
Interior in Irbil demonstrates that AQI
maintains its ability to strike in the Kurdish
region. Violence occurs mostly in outlying
areas near the border with Iran. Traditional
conflicts with Ansar al-Sunnah (AS) have
ebbed and flowed in the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) region since the mid-
1990’s. The newly formed Brigades of
Kurdistan announced their intent to attack the
Kurdish government but the capabilities of
the group is unknown. While AQI’s
increased presence in northern Iraq is of
growing concern, AQI largely conducts its
anti-Kurdish operations in Kirkuk and Mosul,
rarely venturing to more remote areas in the
region in large part due to the presence of
Kurdish security forces.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
has provided relatively good governance over
the three Kurdish provinces. The existence of
the Kongra Gel (KGK) and the potential for
border skirmishes with Turkey or Iran, and in
the case of the KGK, possible cross-border
operations by the Turkish Army, are issues
that could increase tensions in the Kurdish
region.
Assessment of the Security Environment—
Southern Iraq
The security situation in southern Iraq is
characterized by competition between various
Shi’a militia, factions, tribes and organized
criminals aligned with various parties
positioning themselves for greater influence
over local authorities and resources.
Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (formerly
SCIRI) (SIIC) maintains a strong political
presence in the south. Increased political
competition between SIIC and the Office of
Martyr Sadr (OMS), the political arm of
JAM, has resulted in clashes between their
respective armed wings, the Badr Organization
and JAM. Some JAM members
relocated to the south in response to FAQ in
Baghdad, further empowering JAM in
confrontations with both Badr and provincial
authorities. In Basrah Province, the OMS
and the governing Fadilah Party vie for
dominance over local economic activity,
adding to the intra-Shi’a violence. This intra-
Shi’a violence has contributed to a significant
increase in attacks against Coalition forces in
Basrah and an observed greater hostility
towards Coalition presence, as well as highlighted
the failure of the Iraqi police to
challenge Shi’a militants in southern Iraq. In
Diwaniyah, however, a reported increase in
JAM presence and aggression prompted local
officials to request military action to lessen
JAM’s influence and local control.
Relatively little AQI activity has been
observed in southern Iraq.
Overall Attack Trends and Violence
For this report, the term “attacks” refers to
specific incidents reported in the Multi-National
Corps-Iraq Significant Activities Database. It
includes known attacks on Coalition forces, Iraqi
forces, the civilian population and infrastructure.
Attacks typically involve improvised explosive
devices; small arms, including sniper fire; and
indirect fires. Not all civilian casualties are
observed by or reported to Coalition forces; as a
result, these data only provide a partial picture of
the violence experienced by Iraqis.
The aggregate level of violence in Iraq remained
relatively unchanged during this reporting
period. Violence has decreased in the Baghdad
security districts and Anbar, but has increased in
most provinces, particularly in the outlying areas
of Baghdad Province and Diyala and Ninewa
Provinces. Since January 2007, Coalitionreported
murders in Baghdad proper have
decreased by 51% as militia activity was
disrupted by security operations. Throughout
Iraq, the total number of attacks on Coalition
forces, the ISF, and Iraqi civilians increased by
2% in the February through May reporting
period compared with the previous quarter.
High-profile attacks, usually conducted by AQI,
are now causing more casualties in Baghdad
than do murders by militia, criminals, or other
armed groups. Spectacular attacks on historical
and significant infrastructure (such as Baghdad
bridges and the Parliament building) seek to
discredit FAQ, the Coalition presence, and the
GoI, rather than create casualties. In Anbar
province, anti-AQI sentiment is widespread,
with growing tribal influence as the primary
driver of decreasing violence levels. The total
number of attacks in Anbar has dropped 34%
since December 2006, with Ramadi—where
attacks are at a two-year low—accounting for
the largest decline in violence levels. Attacks in
Anbar have dropped from 35 per day in the
previous reporting period to just under 26,
dipping below average daily attacks in Salah ad
Din Province.
Less encouraging, the number of suicide
attacks across Iraq increased from 26 in January
to 58 in March and remained constant at 58 in
April. During the reporting period, the average
number of improvised explosive devices found
and cleared increased 15% from the previous
quarter, and the average number of vehicleborne
improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)
found and cleared rose by 69%. These gains
are likely due to increased civilian cooperation
and interdiction of the networks conducting
these attacks. The majority of overall attacks
continue to occur against Coalition forces,
while the ISF and civilians continue to suffer
the majority of casualties. Consistent with
previous reporting periods, most attacks
occurred in Baghdad, Anbar, Salah ad Din, and
Diyala provinces. Explosively formed
projectile attacks were at an all-time high in
April.
Public Perceptions of Security
Public perception of security is shaped by the
confidence the people have in the government
and its security forces, as well as the perception
they have of neighborhood safety. On security,
Iraqis continue to feel more positive at the local
level than they do at the national level.5 The
perceptions of safety inside and outside
neighborhoods correlate with their perception
of local and national tensions.6 Within
Baghdad, the Joint Security Stations contribute
to this improvement by providing local tip
hotlines, and local security force
responsiveness to these calls provide tangible,
visible proof that the security forces are
responsible to and for the people. These
actions may contribute to the continued support
for the dissolution of militias, not only in
Baghdad, but nationwide as well.7
The differences between local and national
perceptions indicate that it is easier to affect
local views through localized actions than
general views through news of operations
taking place elsewhere.
Although slower to adjust, national perceptions
showed improvement in March as confidence
in the GoI’s ability to improve the security
environment reached its highest level (63%) in
the previous twelve months. Although this
confidence declined in April, it remained above
the twelve-month average.8 Iraqi recognition
of the initial successes of FAQ in Baghdad has
led to similar plans and operations being
adopted by Mosul and by Diwaniyah Province.
These and other actions by the GoI are reflected
in public opinion, and twice as many people
agree than disagree that the government is
leading the country in the right direction.9
Additionally, public perception of the Iraqi
Security Force has improved due to their
increased interaction with the local populace
through initiatives such as the Joint Security
Stations.10,11,12
Conclusion
The conflict in Iraq is a struggle among
ethno-sectarian, criminal, and terrorist groups
to wrest political and economic power from
the democratically elected government. The
situation in Iraq remains complex, with each
region of the country posing different security
challenges. Although Iraqi and Coalition
forces have had initial success at reducing
sectarian violence in Baghdad, it will be
months before a trend emerges indicating
whether the New Way Forward and the FAQ
are sufficient to enable Iraqi leaders to
advance key political goals including national
reconciliation.

The next instalment will be 1.4 Transferring Security Responsibility, starting on page 29.


Reid and Pelosi already declared our troop surge in Iraq a failure and will not wait for the September report before turning their backs on the troops and cutting off funding.

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