Re: Pelosi & Reid Will Not Like Progress Cited in Iraq Quarterly Report

Islander wrote:
Roger wrote:
Islander wrote:
marib wrote:
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The latest quarterly progress report is the eighth to date. It was submitted to Congress for review under terms of the 2007 Department of Defense Appropriations Act.
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010-Final-20070608.pdf

<G>


This is from 4 pages, less than 10 percent, of the report.
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010-Final-20070608.pdf


Four more pages of the report.

Rule of Law
Promoting the rule of law and institutions that
serve its development is central to helping the
GoI develop strong democratic institutions
that impartially serve all Iraqis. While
several Coalition-supported initiatives are
moving forward, strengthening the rule of
law requires a sustained, long-term effort.
Problems persist. For example, Iraqi judges
frequently face death threats and attacks. In
the past two and a half years, 24 judges have
been assassinated. Some judges decline to try
cases related to terrorism or the insurgency
because of intimidation and security
concerns. As a result, in some provinces very
few serious criminal cases result in convictions.
MNF-I and local PRTs are working
with Iraqi judges to reinvigorate criminal
courts in areas where these courts have been
reluctant to try terrorism and major crimes
cases. For example, MNF-I and PRTs are
coordinating transportation for CCCI judges
from Baghdad to Major Crimes Courts with
enhanced security. In Ninewa Province,
these efforts have reduced the backlog of
cases and enhanced the provincial government’s
authority and credibility. The Higher
Juridical Council (HJC) and the CCCI
support using transported judges in Salah ad
Din, Diyala, and Anbar.
There is some good news. On April 2, the
first judicial proceeding at the ROLC was
conducted before an Iraqi investigative judge.
Since then, nine Iraqi judges and a staff of 15
support personnel have been appointed to
permanently staff the new court (now
officially known as the “Central Criminal
Court of Iraq at Rusafa”). Seven of the
judges and their families have taken up
residency in the secure living compound
located only a few hundred yards from the
courthouse. Twelve Iraqi Police investigators,
all recent graduates of a six-week FBI
training course, have been selected to serve as
members of the LAOTF and will also live
within the residential compound. The
Department of Defense (DoD) has assigned a
total of 67 judge advocates, paralegals,
investigators, and intelligence officers to the
LAOTF, the first of whom will arrive in Iraq
on May 15, 2007. The Department of Justice
has agreed to staff the LAOTF Director and
two trial attorney positions. The first trial
before the permanent three-judge court in the
new ROLC court facility is tentatively scheduled
for May 27, 2007, and the LAOTF is
expected to be fully capable by July. Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq
(MNSTC-I) and Embassy-based programs
also are strengthening the Iraqi Major Crimes
Unit and the Iraqi Major Crimes Task Force,
respectively. MNSTC-I and the MoI are also
adding about 4,000 forensic specialists to the
police force.
As a result of FAQ, the number of persons
held in detention in March and April was
nearly 20% higher than the monthly average
for December through February. Consequently,
the U.S. is working with the Iraqi
government to increase short-term detention
capacity by constructing facilities that will
hold an additional 6,000 beds by mid-
September 2007. In addition, detainee abuse
is a problem in Iraqi pre-trial detention facilities
run by both MoI and MoD. MoJ’s pretrial
detention facilities and post-trial prisons
generally meet international standards but are
overcrowded. To help relieve overcrowding
at MoD and MoI pre-trial detention facilities
as well as “jump-start” the criminal justice
process, the HJC is sending teams of investigative
judges, judicial investigators,
prosecutors, and legal clerks to detention
facilities to perform a judicial review of
detentions required by Iraqi law. As part of
broader efforts to improve the capability of
the Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS), U.S.
advisors encourage the MoJ to increase the
salaries of corrections officers to a level equal
to that of the Iraqi Police to attract more
qualified personnel and reduce corruption.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
PRTs are a mainstay of U.S. efforts to build
the capacity of Iraq’s local, municipal, and
provincial governments to deliver goods and
services to the Iraqi people, given the limited
capacity of the central government to do so.
PRTs continue to work closely with the
central government in Baghdad while
extending and expanding efforts to help local
communities and leaders transition to selfsufficiency.
PRTs are an interagency effort.
As part of the New Way Forward, the USG
has doubled the number of PRTs to 20,
embedding the new PRTs into Brigade
Combat Teams and is increasing the total
number of personnel from roughly 290 to
over 600. For example, during the reporting
period, DoD assisted DoS by identifying over
100 personnel to staff the increased PRTs on
an interim basis. DoD is providing just under
90% of initial staffing of the new PRTs as of
this reporting period. The first portion of
these teams deployed during this period and
developed plans for their assigned areas. The
remaining personnel will deploy by mid-July.
Replacement of the DoD interim personnel
by longer-term DoS contracted personnel is
pending passage of supplemental funding for
State.
Using both civilian and military resources,
PRTs attempt to bolster moderates, promote
reconciliation, support counterinsurgency
efforts, foster economic development, and
build capacity at the provincial and local
levels to improve Iraqi project planning and
execution. Through targeted assistance,
PRTs foster Iraqi self-sufficiency and help
integrate the central government and the
provincial governments where security gains
have been made. In addition, the PRT
program provides technical expertise at the
regional and local levels to assist Provincial
Councils with budget formulation and execution.
PRTs will continue to play a leading
role in coordinating U.S. programs, including
Iraqi Provincial Reconstruction Development
Councils and USAID's local governance,
community stabilization, economic development,
and community action programs.
Transnational Issues
Promoting support for Iraq from its
neighbors, the region, and the international
community; ensuring the territorial integrity
of Iraq; and limiting destructive Iranian and
Syrian activity in Iraq are important U.S.
objectives. There have been some positive
developments, including the May 3-4, 2007
meetings Egypt hosted for the International
Compact with Iraq and the Iraq Neighbors
Ministerial. Iran and Syria, however,
continued to support lethal and unlawful
activities in Iraq during this reporting period.
Prime Minister Maliki publicly criticized Iran
for providing deadly support to Iraqi militias
and Syria for providing safe haven to some
Iraqi insurgents, especially former regime
elements.
Neighbors Conference
Prime Minister Maliki intensified his efforts
to engage Iraq’s neighbors through a series of
neighbors conferences that established
working groups on border security, refugees,
and energy. An initial meeting at the subministerial
level took place in Baghdad on
March 10, and Egypt hosted the first
ministerial-level Neighbors Conference at
Sharm el-Sheikh on May 4, 2007. All of
Iraq’s neighbors, the five permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council, and
G-8 members participated. The ministers-
level meeting focused on the obligations of
all parties to assist in efforts to bring security
and stability to Iraq. These efforts to engage
Iraq’s neighbors are particularly important
because of the long history of social interaction
and religious association within the
region that transcends modern national
boundaries. In the wake of this successful
conference, the GoI is scheduling a follow-on
Neighbors Conference, as well as meetings
of the group to address specific regional
problems. Diplomatic relations need further
improvement, however. For example, as of
this report, nine of the 22 Arab League states
still lack a diplomatic presence in Baghdad,
and only one is represented at the Ambassadorial
level, in part reflecting concerns of
Sunni Arab states about the regional
implications of a Shi’a-led Iraqi government.
International Compact
The International Compact with Iraq
provides a five-year framework for Iraq to
achieve financial sustainability through
economic reform commitments between it
and the international community. This GoI
initiative, co-chaired with the United
Nations (UN), commits Iraq to reforming its
economy, establishing new investment laws
and regulations, building the institutions
needed to combat corruption, ensuring good
governance, and protecting human rights. In
return, members of the international community
commit to supporting these efforts
through financial, technical, and administrative
assistance, as well as through
forgiveness of Iraq’s external debt.3 The
Compact was formally launched on May 3,
2007 in Egypt. More than 70 countries, 30
of which were represented at a ministerial
level, attended the signing conference.
Participating countries at the Compact
meeting agreed to follow Paris Club
guidelines and made commitments to
undertake potentially more than US$30
billion in debt relief.
Iranian Influence
Various Shi’a and Kurdish politicians
maintain longstanding relationships with
Iranian officials and state organizations, and
Iran maintains longstanding economic and
religious ties to Iraq. The Iranians likely
seek a Shi’a dominated Iraqi government
that is deferential to and supportive of
Iranian interests. The Iranian regime’s
primary tool for exercising clandestine
influence in Iraq is the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Qods
Force (QF), which provides arms, intelligence,
funds, training, and propaganda
support to Iraqi Shi’a militants targeting and
killing Coalition and Iraqi forces, as well as
Iraqi civilians. The QF seeks to increase
long-term Iranian strategic influence in Iraq
and the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Among
the weapons it provides to Iraqi militants are
improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
advanced IED technologies (including
explosively formed projectiles (EFPs)), and
rockets and mortars used for indirect fire
attacks.
U.S. forces in Iraq are acting to disrupt any
network—regardless of nationality—that
provides weapons to Iraqi militants and
insurgents. These actions are consistent
with the mandate granted to the MNF-I by
both the UN Security Council and the GoI to
take all necessary measures to contribute to
the maintenance of Iraq’s security and
stability, as well as defense. The USG has
urged Iran to play a more constructive role
in Iraq.
Syrian Influence
Syria seeks to maintain ties with the New
Ba’ath Party in Iraq and to hasten the
withdrawal of Coalition forces from the
region. Syria has emerged as an important
organizational and coordination hub for
elements of the former Iraqi regime,
allowing these groups to engage in activities
hostile to our efforts from within Syrian
borders. Although Damascus has made
some recent improvements in combating
cross-border terrorist movements by arresting
insurgents it considers a threat to its own
internal security, terrorists and foreign
fighters continue to find sanctuary, border
transit opportunities, and logistical support
in Syria.
Tensions on the Border with Turkey
Turkey’s primary concerns regarding Iraq
continue to be terrorism executed by the
Kurdistan Peoples Congress (KGK, formerly
PKK) and the final status of the oil-rich city
of Kirkuk. Public disagreements between
Turkish and Kurdish leaders have strained
relations between Turkey and Iraq and
continued KGK terrorism in Turkey (along
with heightened civil-military tensions in
Turkey as it approaches national elections in
July) are likely to increase those strains. The
U.S. Special Envoy for Countering the KGK
continues to engage Turkish and Iraqi
counterparts to increase cooperation against
the terrorist threat from the KGK. Progress
has been made toward a tripartite agreement
on closing down Makhmour refugee camp,
which will eliminate a potential haven for
KGK propaganda and influence on young
Turkish Kurds.
Tensions in Kirkuk have nevertheless
increased in recent months. According to
Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, a
referendum must be held on the final
status of Kirkuk by the end of 2007.
Turkoman and Arab communities’ concern
over increased Kurdish control of Kirkuk’s
governing institutions has led Turkey to
speak out on behalf of the Turkoman community
in protest of the perceived Kurdish
goal of independence.
Conclusion
Strong democratic institutions that impartially
serve all Iraqis are critical to Iraq’s success.
The GoI appears to be committed to making
progress on the key legislation and economic
reforms intended to facilitate national reconciliation.
To date, however, progress has
been inhibited by the unwillingness of the
various factions in the CoR to compromise on
key issues. Reconciliation and the further
development of democratic institutions will
require more effort. Central to the U.S.
support of these efforts are the PRTs.
Through building capacity at the provincial
and local levels to improve Iraqi governance,
PRTs promote reconciliation and strengthen
democratic institutions. The launching of the
International Compact with Iraq this quarter
highlights the progress Iraq has made at
attaining support from the regional and international
community. Efforts to build regional
and international support for the reintegration
of Iraq into the region and world
economy will require continued intense
focus.
.

Relevant Pages

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    ... THE CRIMES OF NEO-LIBERAL RULE IN OCCUPIED IRAQ ... The scale and intensity of the appropriation of Iraqi ... contempt for universal principles of international law ... contracts conjured up in Executive Order 13303 and CPA ...
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  • Crimes of Neo-Conservative Rule in Iraq
    ... THE CRIMES OF NEO-LIBERAL RULE IN OCCUPIED IRAQ ... The scale and intensity of the appropriation of Iraqi ... contempt for universal principles of international law ... contracts conjured up in Executive Order 13303 and CPA ...
    (soc.culture.iranian)
  • Crimes of neo-liberal rule in iraq
    ... THE CRIMES OF NEO-LIBERAL RULE IN OCCUPIED IRAQ ... The scale and intensity of the appropriation of Iraqi ... contempt for universal principles of international law ... contracts conjured up in Executive Order 13303 and CPA ...
    (alt.politics.bush)
  • Women, Islam, and the New Iraq
    ... states that no law can be passed that contradicts the "established ... condemned by critics both inside and outside Iraq as a fundamental ... According to Isam al-Khafaji, an Iraqi scholar, the document "could ... easily deprive women of their rights." ...
    (soc.women)
  • OT: Captured Iraqi documents reveal Terror training camps
    ... What the documents captured from the former Iraqi regime reveal--and why ... Islamic terrorists from the region at camps in Iraq over the four years ...
    (alt.autos.toyota)