Re: Von Paulus disobeys an order

Tero P. Mustalahti wrote:
Many historians argue that Paulus should have
taken heed of the intelligence reports suggesting an imminent Soviet
counter-offensive.

For the record, I don't think Paulus was a good commander. Still, from
his point of view and without the benefit of hindsight:

1. An imminent Soviet attack didn't automatically translate to
imminent danger. The average result of a Soviet attack was a ton of
casualties, most of them Soviet ones, for very little gain. Paulus
knew his flanks weren't very strongly held, but the Soviets were
supposed to be down to their last reserves as well.

2. Even if the threat of a Soviet winter offensive was real, the best
defense would still be to eliminate the Stalingrad defenders - who
were by then holding on to a mere strip along the river bank - and
redeploy the vast combat power of 6th Army to deal with it. Certainly
a better solution than pulling out troops - which might not be
necessary (or might not even be sufficient) to deal with the Soviet
attack while jeopardizing the clearing of the Stalingrad defenders.

My point here is that the decision wasn't necessarily obvious to
someone in Paulus's shoes at the time, and since Paulus was no
operational genius he chose what turned out to be a suboptimal course
of action.


LC

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