Re: Anybody Read Pat Buchannan's Unnecessary War?

"Greg Schuler" <schuleg@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message news:f0cb90e1-f1b3-447a-a6fd-819c3ae06bd8@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
On Jan 5, 11:15 am, "Bay Man"

The German doctrine was not as mobile
as you think as most of the army was
horse drawn.

Irrelevant. The relevant mobile field forces
were not horse drawn and what relied on
horses was not crucial to the initial period of war.

The horse-drawn elements of the German army was a lead weight to the fast front. IT added no value whatsoever and was a major drawback. Only the Anglo-US army in Normandy was the only fully motorised army with fast logistics running behind.

They had the advantage of a dress rehearsal
in Poland that exposed flaws that were redressed.

Very little was practiced in Poland. The first "Blitzkrieg", a name given by western papers, was in France. The poor roads in Poland hindered any fast movement.

Most of the German army marched on foot
into Russia with horses pulling guns
and supplies. The Germans used around
3/4 million horses when invading
Russia.

How is that relevant to your argument
regarding the attack on France?

Barbarossa was based on France. As Tooze points out, the Germans could pin the allies against the Channel. In the USSR they could not do that. Tooze page 380,
"The different outcomes were fully explicable in terms conventional military logic".
"with more space in which manoeuvre, the basic Napoleonic criterion for military success - superior forces at the decisive point - would be far harder, if not impossible to achieve."

Russia and France present two completely
different scenarios and a discussion of one
has no real bearing on a discussion of the other.

See above.

While relying largely on horse-drawn supply might seem antiquated, it
makes more sense in the Eastern areas that lacked a developed
infrastructure - horse do better on some types of terrain and under
certain weather conditions than trucks, are easier to maintain (no
parts, just forage, which can be obtained locally).

The German generals knew that if they did not fully defeat the USSR with months they were doomed. Speed was essential. You cannot do that with 3/4 million horses, little supply trucks (because they were short of rubber) and an inadequate rail system, of which the Russian evacuated much of the rolling stock.

No after Poland, in which Germany lost a lot of equipment. German industry
was curtailed by the RN blockade and was impaired in making up the losses.

The French and British are still mobilizing
and deciding on strategy.

The Germans didn't even have a plan until February 1940.

France was looking to re-fight the last war

So was Germany to a large extent. They stockpiled masses of artillery shells in preparation in preference to tanks and the likes.

Page 371/372.
"Nor should one accept unquestioningly the popular idea that the
concentration of the Germans tanks in specialised tank divisions gave them a
decisive advantage. Many French tanks were scattered amongst the infantry
units, but with their ample stock of vehicles the French could afford to do
this. The bulk of France's best tanks were concentrated in armoured units,
that, on paper at least, were every bit a match for the Panzer divisions."

Bean counters drive me nuts. Where were
those tanks, how would they be used, what
was the level of crew training, the leadership, etc?

If they had been concentrated on the German attack to the south, they would have stopped it, the German plan was so flaky. It never happened. They were chasing shadows riding north mainly in Belgium.

The Germans did not have air superiority in 1940.

That is a laughably naive statement.
The Germans had air superiority
over the necessary parts of the battlefield
at all times.

Which could have been penetrated and stopped the attack.

In fact, the French had a decent idea where the Germans were. The
German plan anticipated how the Allies would react - head north,
because the Allies relied on the last war to fight the next war.

Not quite. Armoured divisions were there.

Even if the myriad issues affecting the Allies
could have been ironed out, they were always
going to react to the German initiative.

They have everything to gain by doing so. The Maginot Line was a success, and the German forces could only enter in a few points.

.

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