Re: Definition for "Non-Battle Casualties"

On Jun 19, 11:13 am, "Gianluca Turconi"
<luctur2004REMOVETHESEWO...@xxxxxxxx> wrote:

Well, this is already an issue for me. I didn't know Thompson was a "real"
casualty... :(

Ooops. Then maybe you need to be looking at different sources? :)

I was mainly looking for this explanation in order to see whether
"Non-Battle Casualties" could include dismissals for "non combativeness".

No, they do not.

While it is rather simple to create a false "illness" for the officers, as
you wrote below, since their number is rather low, I'm wondering if the same
thing could be done for soldiers.

Unlikely, I have the daily combat nominal ELRs for most of the
regiments for June and July, there was simply no need to fake sick
casualties, they were having enough real battle casualties.

90th Inf div in June 1944 was considered a "problem division" and I'm trying
to find out a clear border between officers' fault and soldiers' fault.

I see, attempting to apportion "blame" in those situations is pretty
problematic, especially if you are relying on possibly marginal
sources.

I've read several historians' and veterans' comments that state 90th
division soldiers in that period were simply too "green". For example,
future General William Dupuy, described this division as the finest machine
ever made for killing Americans (Williamson Murray "Mobilizing a Nation",
PROCEEDINGS OF THE US NAVAL INSTITUTE, August 2005, p. 15)

***DePuy*** was an excellent officer and tactician, he was also later
in his career the commander of TRADOC, Training and Doctrine Command,
where he used the experience of World War II as a "poster child" of
how not to train. So it is possible he was eggagerating to make a
point, I rather suspect he was.

For an inside view of the division I suggest you find a copy of John
Colby's "War from the Ground Up", it would probably help.

Since many other divisions were also "green" in Normandy, it's rather
strange to see this bad reputation only for the 90th division.

I suspect that the actions of McKelvie, which were well-known even if
hushed up throughout the Army, cast a bad light on the division. Note
also the "reputation" lasted for about seven weeks.

In the original Italian thread I previously cited, there are two opposing
faction. On the one hand, there is who says the low combativeness of this
division was fault of officer's cowardy and/or clumsiness, better German
resistance, incidental events (i.e. worst operational terrain ever found in
Normandy) and so on. On the other one, there is who affirms, like me, that
those elements are only a part of the problem that should involve the
"manpower" of the division too.

Oh dear, so tarring the division for McKelvie and Ginder's faults -
initially - and then Landrum's later is still rampant I see.

And how does "low combativeness" generate the casualty rates the
division endured in June and July?

Bad chain of command? It's likely. Bad divisional training? For sure. Lack
of soldiers' bravery under fire? Who knows that...

Bad chain of command? McKelvie certainly screwed up and his decision
to place Ginder in regimental command just before the invasion was
idiotic, but the "bad chain of command" could be better described as a
"dead chain of command" after their first week in combat. As far as
divisional training goes it was just like every other infantry
division and suffered as its main fault a lackof attention to combined
arms training with armor. And as far as the "soldiers' bravery under
fire" goes....no, I'll remain calm :) Seriously, the best attestations
to their bravery came from the Germans who couldn't believe the
persistance of the American attacks given the tactical situation and
the casualties they knew they were inflicting on them.

A high number of "Non-Combat Casualties" in that period would have been,
indeed, very suspicious as clue for the latter argument.

The casualties for June reported in the ELRs (Estimated Loss reports)
were 476 KIA, 2,809 WIA, 136 MIA, and 86 Captured. There were no NBC
reported at this time because the categorization in the ELRs at the
time included those with the WIA, however the July figures are known
and were 1,140 KIA, 3,702 WIA, 304 MIA, 118 Captured, and 1,002 NBC.
Which is not really higher or lower than any other division at the
time; the 1st ID for example had 166 KIA, 553 WIA, 60 MIA, and 1,341
NBC for July. So which then was the "braver" division by that
measure? :)

You might also note that an old World War I German measure of
effectiveness of a division was how low its ratio of C/MIA was to the
"bloody casualties". In that respect, in July the 90th was 0.087 and
the 1st Division was 0.083...not significantly different (and IIRC
both would have been rated very highly by the Germans).

Any other comment about the "officers' fault and soldiers' fault" matter?

See above. :)

Rich

.