Re: IJN and Pearl Harbor: oil fields were left intact?

"Joe Osman" <Joseph.Osman@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:1180908341.768323.161410@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
The carrier raid on Lae and Salamaua was directly responsible for
delaying for over a month the Japanese attempt to capture Port Moresby
and Tulagi (Operation MO).

The Japanese occupied Lae on 8 March 1942.

The USN attack was on 10 March 1942.

According to the USN chronology, the raid

"sank armed merchant cruiser Kongo Maru, auxiliary minelayer Tenyo
Maru, and transport Yokohama Maru; and damage light cruiser Yubari;
destroyers Yunagi, Asanagi, Oite, Asakaze, and Yakaze; minelayer
Tsugaru; seaplane carrier Kiyokawa Maru; transport Kokai Maru;
and minesweeper No.2 Tama Maru. One SBD (VS 2) is lost to
antiaircraft fire. USAAF B-17s and RAAF Hudsons conduct follow
up strikes but inflict no appreciable additional damage."

The raid was originally planned to target
Rabaul and Gasmata, but once they heard of the Japanese landing at Lae
and Salamaua, they attacked there and sank enough transports to delay
MO. It also delayed completion of the Guadalcanal airbase by about a
month. The landing on Guadalcanal was not contested, but if the
Japanese had completed the airstrip and landed an defense force, it
would have been much more difficult. Capturing Tulagi wasn't easy as
the Japanese had already dug many tunnels. If they had an extra month
it would have been even more difficult.

As far as I am aware while it is clear the raid showed the Japanese
there was need for more air cover, and the USN was more dangerous
then the land based aircraft. The delays cannot be down to the one
action. The closer the Japanese came to Australia the more they
had to worry about the airpower and ships based there. They needed
stronger cover the further south they came.

The port Moresby Invasion force consisted of something like 12
transports and had 4 heavy cruisers and a small carrier as support.

The Tulagi force was a minelayer, a transport and auxiliary craft,
plus of course escorts.

The above shows the need to gather bigger invasion forces and
stronger surface covering forces.

It is always hard to assign the weightings of various reasons, but
I think the "raid only" ideas are incorrect.

There is no doubt IJN aircraft operating from Guadalcanal should
have given warning of any approaching allied invasion what level
of IJN aircraft on the island is assumed to make the invasion, "much
more difficult", given the 3 USN carriers in support and the lack of
Japanese ground troops to defend the airstrip? How about the
Marines are able to capture a working airfield at the start?

The more northern raids got the Japanese worried about Japan itself
being attacked and they started to plan the capture of Midway
(Operation MI). The Doolittle raid may have led to the Midway
operation getting slotted before the operation to capture Fiji and
Samoa (Operation FS).

As far as I am aware the IJN plan to attack Midway was decided
before the Doolittle raid. The raid's main effect was to convince
some of the doubtful supporters or at least silence them.

As of mid 1942 the Japanese had 2 major operations open to them
in the Pacific, go direct towards the Hawaiian islands or cut the
supply line to Australia.

The deciding factor was Admiral Yamamoto's desire to keep hitting
the USN as early as possible, knowing he held the initiative and
the odds were only going to become worse for the Japanese the
longer the war went on.

Both plans had supporters who said they would force the USN to
fight but Midway was considered the better lure.

See "The Battle for Guadalcanal" By Samuel B. Griffith, pp. 13+
Midway, 1942: Turning Point in the Pacific By Mark Healy. pp. 12+
"British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War,
1941-1945" By Brian. Bond, Ky ichi Tachikawa, pp. 58-61
http://www.users.bigpond.com/pacificwar/Yorktown/Lae_Salamaua_Raid.html

Thanks for the URL though I think it overstates the case for the
raid's effects.

The growing allied land based airpower and garrison strengths
had their part to play in delaying the plans the Japanese had for
advancing.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

.

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