Railroad question
- From: Louis Capdeboscq <louisec00@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 10:44:44 -0400
In another forum, a thread on North African railroads made me dust off some notes.
The thread is here;
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=99035&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=0
Caveat: some of the information in this message I'm shamelessly lifting from that forum e.g. the characteristics of the Stanier locomotive (other than water consumption) and the New Zealander railroad engineer history bits. The rest is either information which I supplied myself and even more shamelessly pasting here, or from my notes and therefore "original" content. The questions are at the end so those who are train buffs but uninterested in the North African stuff can scroll down directly.
I. Egyptian rail-road.
The rail line from Alexandria to Mersa Matruh (294.4km) was decided upon in late 1935. The first 74km were opened to traffic on January 17, 1936 with the remaining following suit three months later. That part of the line was a normal one, i.e. properly ballasted and with normal infrastructure.
During the war, it was extended to Sidi Barani, which it reached in December, 1941. Here's a link to a NZ history with some of the details
http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Engr-c3-3.html
That extension was built at least partly without ballast (completely without ballast according to an Italian source, which is likely wrong on that score, first unballasted and later on with ballast according to a NZ source which I haven't checked directly, take your pick. Pictures from 1942 are unconclusive either way because of the sand) taking advantage of the sandy & rocky ground underneath. There were sleepers but no supporting "plates" (this is my tentative translation from the Italian, given that I'm no RR specialist and in particular I don't know the specific terms in English). It reached a point 1 mile south-east of Bir Suesi (near El Adem, i.e. roughly 10km south of Tobruk) on the 12th of June, 1942. Tobruk fell to the Axis on the 20th.
The British had been using 2-8-0 Stanier 8F steam locomotives, replaced in May 1942 by some US-built 65DE14 Whitcomb de la Rodelle locomotives. All of these were evacuated after Gazala and the capture of Tobruk, only a damaged 1-3-0 old steam locomotive being captured by the Axis. The British subsequently turned their steam locos over to the Egyptians. More on this below, in section V.
II. Axis rail operations
The Axis were very ambitious but extremely poor (this is a good overall characterization of the Italian war effort in general). In particular, they lacked rails.
a- Their first project was a rail link between Tobruk and Tunisia. There was already a small network around Tripoli, with one branch to the south, another to the west, and a very small one to the east. Totally useless from the point of view of military supply, but that's where the population was. So on the wake of Compass, the idea was to establish a link with the French Tunisian rail network going to Gabes, so as to draw supply from the Vichy French Tunisian ports. There were numerous problems involved, like the fact that French narrow-gauge railroad was 1 meter wide while the whole Italian network was narrow-gauged at 0.95m, but work progressed relatively well and the distance all the way to Zuara was complete except for the tracks (more on this below). The French didn't do anything from their end, then Rommel's successes pushed the front farther away and this project, after being briefly revived on the wake of Crusader, was definitively shelved. What remained were some well-built stations watching over non-existant track.
b - The second one was a Tripoli to Benghazi railroad. That would be a huge achievement, both because of the distance involved and because of technical difficulties: marshy soil along the gulf or Sirte, hills afterwards. Work had progressed relatively well, with some 240km being surveyed, picketted and levelled and another 139km almost complete by December 1942. Progress had slowed down considerably when the RR units had been redeployed to other projects.
c - Next was the extension of the Benghazi to Barce railroad net (still narrow-gauged) to Tripoli. The RR units at first had to restore the installations following Rommel's counteroffensive of early 1942, and the RR helped carry some supply from Benghazi to the front initially. Work progressed relatively well though this was a fairly difficult engineering task, with in particular the problem of the steep escarpment on reaching the coast. Again, stations were built, ground was levelled, plates were laid, picketing etc was done, but very little track laying was done. Italy had shipped 4 brand-new Fiat-built diesel-electric locomotives to Benghazi, the first of which had just been assembled when the British captured the port in the post-El Alamein pursuit, with another being assembled and the last two still in crates. The British kept one for evaluation purposes but don't seem to have used them.
There was an overall plan to link Tripoli to Egypt in one giant project, though that was complete science fiction.
d - What were the problems encountered ? First, and most crippling, was lack of rails. There were 60 km (40 miles) worth of rails in Italian stocks that the Italians kept mentioning but don't appear to have actually shipped to North Africa, or at least not entirely. Dismantling the southern branches of the Tripoli rail network would have yielded another 17km or so (because not all the track could be re-used). Needless to say, this would have been pitiful for all the projects above, except the one linking Tripoli to the Tunisian border. The Italian industry supplying additional rails doesn't seem to have been an option, at least I haven't seen it discussed (but I have yet to read the "Verbali"). The Germans were approached but flatly refused: their own railway operations were stretched with the Reichsbahn covering an immense network, what with Russia and everything, and they were making do by plundering their own stocks as well as those of occupied countries. They got quite a bit of rolling stock from the French, they made the French turn over their stocks of rail and de-track various stretches to get the rails for themselves. I suppose that they did the same to other "rich" railroad networks, like those in Belgium and Holland.
Anyway, all that the Germans offered the Italians were sleepers. The Italians appear to have shipped 65,000 to North Africa (don't know what distance would be covered with that), and the Germans offered some 100km worth of sleepers, though these sleepers would only be long enough for 0.95m gauge track i.e. existing Italian networks. They wouldn't work for the projected extension toward Tunisia (which was planned at 1m, like the French network, with a switchover at Tripoli or Zuara, I forget) or for the captured British network (which was standard gauge i.e. 1.435m). Additionally, the Italians studied the possibility of using eucalyptus wood for sleepers (it seems that this would be less than ideal but it could do in a pinch, anyway rails were an even more pressing problem than sleepers so this didn't move beyond the test phase).
Getting sufficient railroad and engineer personnel was also a problem, but came second to the material difficulties above. The Italians - and even more so the Germans - kept complaining about having to rely on inadequate local manpower, but they still had sufficient engineers to run what rail net they managed to build and retain, as well as to do their construction projects - as long as no track laying was involved. When one looks at a map the Italian effort looks pitiful but if one counts the "almost ready except for the track laying" then the work is more impressive. Sure, the Allies did just as well e.g. in Syria but in terms of civil engineering, the Axis effort in North Africa and the Allied one in the Western Desert are not as far off as the mileage of track laid suggests.
e - The last Axis project was the Tobruk to Egypt line. It had been built by the British, and captured by the Axis all the way to El Daba (roughly 120 miles to Alexandria). The Italians tried to connect it to Tobruk, using captured British rails - generally speaking, they maintained that stretch with the stocks left by the British, which were ample by Axis standards - and by the end of July 1942, on the Bir Suesi to Tobruk segment, 11,200m had been built while the remaining 12,000 were waiting for rails. Initially, I thought that the connection had been complete by early August when a convoy sailed into Tobruk with rolling stock, including German diesel locomotives.
That bit is a bit problematic, actually. I'm getting this information from "L'Italia è Piccola ? - Storia dei Trasporti Italiani, volume 41 - Terre d'Oltremare, volume sesto" by Francesco Ogliari, Cavallotti Editori, Milano 1981. This is a generally pro-Italian source, mostly narrative but with lots of interesting bits. I would have liked more statistics even at the cost of less anecdotes, but there you go. Anyway, the chronology is as follows (page numbers are from this source):
1. Axis capture the rail line in June.
2. One Italian RR company was ordered to make the detailed survey necessary as early as June 1942. (p.2072).
3. Then, the source says (p.2110): "Alla fine del luglio 1942 per il tronco Bir Suesi-Tobruk sono armati circa 11.200 metri di nuova linea mentre sono approntati per l'armamento altri 12.000 metri di raccordi e piani caricatori" ... which I translate as "at the end of July 1942 for the Bir Suesi to Tobruk segment, nearly 11.2 km of new lines were laid while another 12km of links and loading planes were ready" (actually, I find that my ability to translate this into English is far less than optimal as I don't know the correct RR terms - native English speakers who are railroad-savvy, you are welcome to offer a better wording).
4. Then there are various mentions of a convoy arriving on August 4 in Tobruk with, among other things, German locomotives about which more below. So I initially assumed that Tobruk had finally been linked to El Adem in the meantime as there are other instances of the narrative skipping over details in this fashion elsewhere in the book. Plus it would make sense that the missing rails would be part of the "railroad supplies" mentioned as unloaded (elsewhere, forgot the page number right now). Additionally, the narrative went on (p.2114) "Il primo treno che viene licenziato da Tobruk ogni mattina, alle prime luci dell'alba, porta il n°1 e quello in senso contrario, da El Daba, il n°2. (...)" ... which means "the first train that is authorized from Tobruk every morning, at first light, is numbered 1 and the one in the other direction, from El Daba, carries the number 2". The text carries on with the fact that as the transit lasted more than 24 hours there were two "number 1" trains and how the Italians went around that difficulty, etc.
5. Anyway, between that and other mentions of stuff arriving to the front by rail "from Tobruk", I had assumed that the rail link had been completed. But in fact looking up my notes I found that there was no precise such indication, and being a little wary of Ogliari's apologetic (if interesting and well-written) footwork, I decided to re-read the relevant sections of the book. And I found the following, in a passage relating to the evacuation of the railroad technicians and equipment following El Alamein (p.2186): "All'alba del 7 novembre 1942, l'ultimo treno da Marsa Matruh trainato da un solo locomotore, perché gli altri tre sono andati fuori uso lungo il viaggio, giunge a Tobruk dove la linea ferroviaria finisce a dieci cholometri dalla città". This means: "At dawn on 7 November 1942, the last train from Mersa Matruh, pulled by a single locomotive, because the other three had run out along the way [the train had started out with 7 "War Department" captured rail cars, pulled by 4 small Italian locomotives, and rescued plenty of fugitives along the way] reaches Tobruk where the rail line ends 10 kilometers from the city". So it seems that the junction was never fully completed after all, and that the 7 miles gap identified in late July was in fact permanent. I have no idea how the locomotives unloaded in Tobruk reached the "Tobruk to El Daba" rail line, as this looks like a heavy load to carry and I'm positive that the convoy unloaded in Tobruk. That is one of my questions (repeated below).
The planned capacity was 600 tons per day, but the Italians only managed half of that e.g. in August 1942, traffic was 66 trains with 454 cars and 4,000 tonnes. Railroad cars almost entirely consisted of captured "War Department" British cars, I have in my notes some breakdown about flatbed cars etc, which I can post if people are interested though I may need assistance in getting the technical terms right with the independent bogie stuff on rail cars.
As the Axis had captured no locomotives, they had to bring their own. First, the Italians shipped 40 shunters. 8 were sunk en route, the rest was unloaded in Mersa Matruh, of which 5 were kept for spare parts and of the remaining 27 there were generally 18 in operations and 9 in repairs. These had a top speed of 25 kph i.e. it would take them 20 hours at top speed to travel the 500km between El Suessi (El Adem) to El Daba, usually more. Additionally, the Germans shipped 3 diesel locomotives which arrived 2-4 August 1942 in Tobruk, one 3-axle and 360CV and two 2-axle and 200CV. "CV" stands for "steam horsepower" (my translation) and is probably the same as "hp" though there might well be a difference as between metric and imperial tons (or is the African swallow faster than the other one?). The Italian machines were 65CV Badonis. Another source says the Germans shipped 8 locomotives in total, the other 5 may have arrived later. Anyway, I have a picture of a train pulled by a German diesel locomotive transporting German tanks (plus some Marders) to the front, presumably from the Tobruk area where they had broken down/been refitted. Most of the German armor reached the El Alamein front that way.
In September, the Germans discussed building an embranchment running south from the coast behind the Axis position at El Alamein for supply, but the project didn't go beyond the initial study stage as the existing line already had problems remaining in operations under RAF attacks.
IV. British follow-on rail lines
The British (actually, mostly Commonwealth) troops, in addition to the Western Desert extension, had built a link across Syria which was a great engineering achievement as this was over terrain just as difficult as that faced by the Italians in Cyrenaica.
Following El Alamein, RR troops and supplies were kept ready and, since the Italians hadn't had time to make a very thorough sabotage job, the line was quickly restored and prolonged all the way to Tobruk. As I wrote in a North African logistics thread a year or so ago, this allowed the Allies to transport some 2,000 tons to Tobruk daily, and turn Tobruk from a port of imports to an exporting port, with the importing port being Benghazi (or smaller ports west of Tobruk, but mainly Benghazi). This was more efficient than shipping from Alexandria and also spread the port capacity around.
They started extending the rail toward Benghazi, but the course of events ended up in that extension never being completed, since Tripoli and later Tunisia were captured first.
V. Technical stuff
1. Initially, the British used Stanier steam locomotives. These held 4,000 gallons of water in the tender with another 250 in the boiler, consuming between 60 and 80 gallons of water per mile (depending on temperature and handling, I suppose). This meant an autonomy of between 53 and 70 miles before another 4,250 gallons of water had to be found. 4,250 gallons are 19 tons, so that's a lot of water to store and it takes time to pump it.
2. By contrast, the US locos could run 24 hours on 280 liters (i.e. 62 imperial gallons) of fuel, and a full refill took 10 minutes.
3. According to a book on NZ railroad operations in the Western Desert, "At the peak of railway operations in 1940, a daily supply of 138,000 gallons was required at El Dabaa, and another 43,000 gallons was required at Mersa Matruh." This was provided by two trains daily, carrying only water. Ships were also used to carry water forward from the delta, as well as local wells. Interestingly, they couldn't use any old water as acidic or dirty water would wear out parts too quickly. There was a special water treatment facility in Alex, which the Axis obligingly left completely alone. It's loss or damage would have seriously compromised British rail ops. Trains would pick up 4,000 gallons at El Daba on their way to Alexandria, they would pick 8,000 gallons at El Daba on their way to Mersa Matruh, and another 3,000 at Mersa Matruh for the way back. They often carried additional water in specially-designed tenders.
4. Based on the above information, I did some quick calculations:
Fact 1: 138,000 gallons were delivered to El Daba, 120 miles from Alexandria, and 43,000 gallons were delivered to Mersa Matruh, 180 miles from Alexandria.
Fact 2: El Daba is roughly 120 miles from Alexandria, Mersa Matruh is 180 miles from Alexandria (actually might be 200 following the railway line, but 180 is easier)
Fact 3: Each Stanier loco needs 4,250 gallons to do an average of 60 miles (that's why I like the 180 miles better).
So for a round trip to Mersa Matruh a train leaves Alexandria, waters halfway to El Daba (I assume a plentiful water supply there), picks up 4,250 gallons at El Daba, reaches Mersa Matruh, picks up 4,250 gallons, back to El Daba, again 4,250 gallons and back to Alexandria. With 43,000 gallons in Mersa Matruh, that's enough for 10 round trips (including the one carrying the water), which will require 86,000 gallons from El Daba, leaving 53,000 i.e. enough for 12 train trips Alexandria - El Daba including the one with the water. So when the front is 180 miles from Alexandria, 9% of the overall traffic and 10% of the traffic to the front are self-consumption. I'm assuming that with 2 water trains and a total of 814 tonnes (metric tons) of water delivered, each train carried 400 tonnes with the Mersa Matruh train dropping some of its load at El Daba. If the trains carried their own water in addition to what they delivered, then that translates to an additional 191 tons so we would have 500 tons per train instead of 400 and I need to redo all the calculation, but this doesn't seem likely.
So we have 11 trains + 1 water train to El Daba and 9 trains + 1 water train to Mersa Matruh. Let's now assume that the front moves another 180 miles, to the vicinity of Tobruk, and only consider the trains to the frontline. Assuming 60 miles between each watering stop, you will need two intermediate stops between Mersa Matruh and Tobruk (the stations already existed, and I'm assuming that the infrastructure is teleported locally, all I'm interested in is the flow). As I'm still assuming that the stretch between El Daba and Alexandria takes care of itself, the trip looks like this: El Daba - Mersa Matruh - Watering stop 1 - Watering stop 2 - Tobruk. Technically Tobruk should be a bit too far, and if someone cares to assign more accurate names to the last 3 stops, that's fine with me as I don't feel like looking up a map to find the relevant stations right now.
To deliver 5 trains to Tobruk, you need a 6th train for water, so that's 12 round trips, consuming a total of 1,032 tons of water all the way to El Daba, including 344 tons between Tobruk and Watering stop 2. So you need more water trains along the way. The math is simple enough to reconstitute for those interested, and boring enough for those who aren't, so let's jump to the conclusion:
Assuming 400 tons per train, supporting 5 trains to Tobruk, 360 miles away, requires 3 water trains working full time (only 15 tons left from the last train). So at this point, the cost of the supply line itself amounts to 37.5% of the whole traffic (it was 10% at Mersa Matruh), with 1185.75 tons of water transported at various points just to push 2,000 tons of supply to the front.
VI Questions (finally!)
First question: the Stanier locomotive had the following characteristics: Wheel arrangement 2-8-0, engine and tender weight 127 tons. Weight on driving wheels 72.10 tons. Diameter of driving wheels 4'8.5". Cylinders bore and stroke 18.5x28". Total heating surface area 1895 sq ft. Boiler steam pressure 225 psi. Coal bunker capacity 9 tons. How does that translate in terms of horsepower, and in particular how do these locomotives compare in terms of power with the lend-lease US locomotives that replaced them ? It seems that this would translate to 60,500 lbs of force to each cylinder each time the piston moves, but again I'm uncertain of an equivalent in hp and thought I would ask here before I tried to take a refresher course in physics.
I have no idea what the characteristics of these locomotives were, appart from the fact that they were far more economical to operate. Generally speaking, a comparison of all the locomotives used would be useful, and/or a conversion chart between axle load, horsepower, and what not.
Second question: I'm pretty sure that the German locomotives unloaded in Tobruk, though it looks like the rail connection was never, in fact, established. I'd be really interested in how the Axis ran their supply line. I have clear documentary evidence that these locomotives were in operation in early August, and that the bulk of the supply unloaded was at Tobruk, later shifted by rail to El Daba near the front. What I'm not sure of is how difficult it is to transport a locomotive overland. I suppose that a 10 mile truck link between Tobruk and the railhead would be no big problem to organize, and the Italian locomotives were unloaded in Mersa Matruh anyway. References will also be welcome.
Third question: I have figures about water consumption, but what about coal consumption ? For example, the Stanier locomotives carried 9 tons of coal, and I wonder how long they could travel on that amount. Answers like "they would probably run out of water before they ran out of coal" I have already figured out for myself, but more precise indications for how far a ton of coal could get a train would be very welcome.
Fourth question: could Italian members please help me with the second sentence in the following extract ? It refers to the state of the work at the time of the retreat, in December 1942 "In particolare per il primo tratto, Tagiura - Tauorga di 231 chilometri, la piattaforma stradale è ultimata per l'82,85 per cento. A lato della ferrovia è realizzata una palificazione permanente sino a Misurata". I don't understand what "palificazione permanente" refers to, in practice. Is this picketting, sleepers, corduroy ? All my dictionary told me was that this had to do with stakes, which I already knew and didn't help me in that particular context. Thanks in advance.
If people are interested in more details, I may have a bit more which I simply didn't bother to type as I relied on memory and copy/pasting for quick archive.
Cheers,
LC
--
Remove "e" from address to reply
.
- Follow-Ups:
- Re: Railroad question
- From: Haydn
- Re: Railroad question
- From: Louis Capdeboscq
- Re: Railroad question
- Prev by Date: Re: British soldiers on Omaha Beach
- Next by Date: Re: Germans Killing Helpless Paratroopers at Normandy
- Previous by thread: Post-combat Poisoned German Liquor
- Next by thread: Re: Railroad question
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|
Loading
