Re: M-4 Again

Rich wrote:
> Well this is truly frustrating trying to post this. Now I'll try it in
> parts.

And part three.

> I'm curious, why aren't the Achilles and Archer criticised
> for being "badlty [sic] armoured"? The first is exactly
> the same vehicle as the you critize, while the second
> had even less armour.

>> I'm glad you can spot typos, though I'm not sure why you
>> think they are important.

Again my honest apology, I was being shirty and had no cause to be.
Worse, given the rather glaring typos in my own post, I was being
stupid.

>> The Archer and Achilles were designated and used as SP
>> AT guns, fired from cover by troops in a tactically
>> defensive posture. Armour is not an issue for such guns.
>> The US M-10 and M-18 were designated and used (albeit
>> briefly) as tank destroyers expected to go out and find
>> tanks. Armour is very significant for such vehicles.

Unfortunately I think you have fallen into the error of believing that
the ex post facto opinion of what US Tank Destroyer and armor doctrine
was is correct, when in fact it is not. Myriad's of historians,
commentators and others have pontificated regarding the "errors"
found in the US doctrine, usually while very evidently having failed to
actually read that doctrine. Worse, they have become fixated on
nomenclature rather than operational and tactical use.

So, the simple fact of the matter is that the M-10, M-18 (and M-36,
M-6, and T-12) were all designed and used as SP antitank guns. In fact
if one wants to be a strict nomenclaturist, they were actually
"designated" as "Gun Motor Carriages", not "Tank
Destroyers".

To be clear the "weapons system" was a self-propelled antitank gun
that shared many of the same characteristics as most other systems in
use by other countries, but which also had some unique features. And
also like those of other countries the system matured through
experience, although that process did not follow the exact same path as
in other armies. So, for example the initial systems were ad hoc
combinations of existing chassis with existing (towed) antitank guns
- a common thread in all countries. But the British and Americans did
not follow the development path of Germany and the Soviets for these
weapons systems. They stayed relatively lightweight although the
British designs returned to limited traverse unturreted guns due to
chassis limitations (in the strictly technical sense, although the
chassis of the Challenger did have problematic limitations as well).

But the tactical employment of those weapons was similar, they were
always supporting weapons rather than an independent maneuver branch,
drawing distinctions between an "SP AT gun" and a "Tank
Destroyer" whatever the language, is semantical camouflage.


> Why is the 3-inch, which armed many of the Achilles,
> "inadequate" when its cousin, the 76mm is
> "barely adequate" although in fact the 3-inch
> performed slightly better?

>> My understanding is that the 3" as fitted in the M-10
>> could not use APCBC ammunition (or that there was a
>> shortage of it), which made its actual AT performance
>> inadequate, whereas the 76mm with APCBC in the M-18
>> was barely adequate.

Unfortunately your understanding is incorrect. The projectiles of the
3-inch and 76mm were identical, only the cartridge was different. In
fact, the exact same nomenclature and types of rounds were available
for both.

And to be precise, since the cartridge case was smaller in the 76mm,
with less propellant and a lower chamber pressure, at least in theory
it should have been slightly less capable. However, in actuality there
was little or no real world difference between the two.

> Why is the 57mm "inadequate" when in US
> use, but is included - without explanation
> note - as "excellent towed AT guns" when
> in British use?

>> You are right. I forgot the explanatory note.

Thank you. Of course I could simply have snipped this out, but then I
suppose I wouldn't be replying to your "whole" post. <UTF16-F04A>

> BTW, there were "assault" and "infantry support" tanks
> in considerable numbers in US service, the M8 HMC
> and the M4 105mm. That you try to dismiss them
> by apply the British definition to US doctrine is
> questionable.

>> The M8 was not a tank by *any* definition of the term
>> (no turret, for a start), so it's entirely fair to dismiss it as
>> not being an assault or infantry support tank. I'm certainly
>> happy to acknowledge that the British did not have large
>> numbers of direct-fire 75mm howitzers on light tank
>> chassis. But they did have the Churchill instead...

Uh, however did you get the idea that the M-8 wasn't turreted? It
was. Of course we now enter into new semantical and nomenclatural
problems. The M-8 was in fact designated a Howitzer Motor Carriage and
not a tank. But it was used as an "assault gun" supporting the
"assault" of infantry and/or armor. In fact in the US Tank
Battalion, Separate (Light) it was organizationally part of the assault
gun platoon at battalion headquarters. Its predecessor, the T30 HMC
also filled the same function and was also utilized by UK forces as an
"assault gun", although in this case they were termed "close
support" weapons.

Also, the "British" did have large numbers of direct-fire
howitzers, albeit few on "light tank chassis"? What else were the
various 3-inch and 95mm "CS" systems for?

I think we are getting into the "rose by any other name" territory.
:)

>> The M4 105mm was certainly an infantry support tank
>> and I was wrong to omit it.

Thanks. :)

>> On the other hand, being mounted on the M4 chassis, it
>> was an inadequate infantry *close* support tank
>> compared to the Churchill 75mm or the Churchill AVRE.

Why pray tell? It was effectively as well armored against its typical
opponents as were most of the common marks of Churchills and utilized
effectively the same weapon.

BTW, the AVRE was *not* an infantry close support tank, it was a
specialized engineer vehicle, the only weapon that it carried that
could be considered as practical for infantry close support was its
hull Besa or the Bren carried inside the turret.

> As we have discussed before, proportianately there were
> *more* 76mm-armed M4 than there were Sherman 17-pdr,
> so if one is "limited numbers" then so is the other.

>> See below.

Uh, that wasn't exactly what I would call an illuminating answer?

> And it is as easy to describe the 17-pdr
> as "slightly more adequate" than anything.

>> Justification? The performance of the 17-pdr was
>> significantly superior to the US 76mm. In fact, with
>> APDS, it was probably the best tank killer of WW2 in

You are utilizing differences measured on the proving grounds to define
"adequate" when in fact the results on the battlefield tended to
show that frontally neither was what could be termed anything other
than "inadequate". Of course from the flank, things were
different, both were "more than adequate" and both could easily
turn in stellar performances in reasonable circumstances. One can cite
the Canadians at Norrey, the British (or Canadians, take your pick) at
Gaumesnil, or the Americans at Le Desert or Arracourt, among many
others, for examples.

> BTW, the M4A3E2 was not a
> "makeshift" it was a limited-production
> design produced for a specific
> purpose, which it fulfilled.

>> Hardly. The M4A3E2 was a M4A3 with applique armour
>> welded to the hull front, sponsor sides and gun mount.
>> That's a makeshift assault tank, especially given that the
>> applique armour was nowhere near as resistant as
>> homogeneous steel.

The "applique" armor of the M4A3E2 was unique to the 254
manufactured and were solid single pieces of armor plate that benefited
from nearly two years of improved manufacturing techniques and quality
control. The turret, transmission cover, gun mantlet, and hull front
were all single piece forgings, while the hull upper sides were in two
pieces.

Later in Europe a fair number of M4A3 were converted to a similar
standard by the addition of actual applique armor, but they are easily
distinguishable from the actual M4A3E2. Those certainly may be termed
"makeshifts" since they were converted as field expedients. It
would be as easy to describe the Churchill III and IV with additional
applique armor (later termed Churchill IX) as "makeshifts" although
since it was usually a complete factory rebuild I think I would
hesitate to do so.

BTW, the armor of the M4A3E2 was resistant enough to sustain multiple
hits from 8.8cm guns, "makeshift' or not. One of the first actually
lost sustained numerous hits on the mantlet, transmission cover and
hull front at 800 yards without penetration or damage until a fluke
round struck and penetrated the gunsight aperture, destroying the
vehicle.

> A "makeshift" is inserting a gun into a
> turret for which it wasn't designed, because the
> purpose-design tank destroyer that was required
> - the Challenger - was such a dogs
> breakfast.

>> The Challenger A30 was certainly a makeshift and far
>> from ideal tank. But it was consciously designed only as a
>> stop-gap pending the Comet (itself a stopgap pending the
>> Centurion). The same cannot be said of, say, the Sherman
>> 76mm, which filled the same battlefield role.

Uh, the idea that led to the A.30 Challenger was proposed in September
1941, that for the A.34 Comet in January 1943. The A.30 prototype was
begun in May 1942 and trialed in January 1943, the A.34 prototype was
completed in February 1944, so in no way could one be considered to be
a "stopgap" for the other. The A.41 Centurion is of course an
entirely different kettle of fish, but then since its proposal wasn't
let until July 1943 it still remains problematical how you can term the
A.30 and A.34, which then existed as prototypes, as "stopgaps"?

Perhaps this is some meaning of stopgap for which I have been
previously unaware?

OTOH, the M-4 was the same vehicle, with differing armament, developed
to meet changing requirements, that had been first proposed in early
1941 and which existed in mockup form by 19 September of that year. And
tests with the 3-inch/76mm began in July 1942. So how too can it be a
"stopgap" for a vehicle first proposed in April 1943?

Something seriously seems askew with your rationalizations.

> There were 107 M26 operational with units as of
> 5 May 1945, but nearly 450 on the continent,
> matching the numbers of the Comet,
> even though the use logistical lifeline was some
> 1,700 miles longer.

>> Yes, the US did very well to rush the M26 Pershing into
>> service in WW2 given the extraordinary muddle and
>> argument within US forces about the need for it. But,
>> given the immense capabilities of the US in WW2, one
>> expects more.

Huh? So the fact that 107 M-26 were operational on 5 May 1945, 25
months after the proposal was made and just 16 months after the first
prototype was completed constitutes "extraordinary muddle"? So then
what does that make the fact that the first A.34 prototype was
completed in May 1943, five months after the proposal was made and that
it was operational in similar quantities 22 months later?

> So that's why the armoured division was organized
> with a separate armoured and lorried infantry
> brigade that doctrinally were not supposed to
> work together? In effect, the British took the
> US doctrine designed for armored and infantry
> divisions, and applied it at the brigade level.
> Like many lessons the US absorbed, the
> idiocy of doing so was discovered on the battlefield.

>> The British intention in 1944 was to employ at tactical
>> level self-contained all-arms battlegroups on the German
>> style, while still maintaining the concept of the division
>> as the main building block of armies. (snip examples of
>> organizations pertaining post August 1944, they have
>> little relevance to the organization as it was conceived in
>> April 1943).

That was most emphatically not the "intent" when the new armoured
division was organized in early 1943. Instead, the armoured car
regiment was replaced by a new armoured reconnaissance regiment, and
the support group was replaced by the motorised infantry brigade. But
the doctrinal precept that viewed the infantry and armour brigade as
two separate and distinct entities did not change.

>> Now, this degree of flexibility did not happen in some of
>> the more experienced divisions coming to NW Europe
>> from Italy - 7th AD for example - until later in 1944. The
>> WO intention, however, is very clearly seen in the UK-
>> raised and trained formations like 11th AD, which trained
>> on this basis for years before D-Day. Indeed, there was
>> bitter conflict between the new commanders like Pip
>> Roberts and more traditional corps commanders - the
>> former had to be specifically ordered before Goodwood to
>> detach his infantry from his tank squadrons.

The degree of flexibility you describe did not occur in any of the
armoured divisions prior to August 1944. Roberts did experiment to a
degree with combined arms pairings between the armoured and infantry
brigades in England, but only sporadically and in rudimentary form. But
neither the 7th or Guards did even that.

And the conflict between Roberts and O'Connor prior to GOODWOOD that
you apparently allude to, was over means and objectives, not
organization. Roberts problem with the plan was the requirement that 11
AD capture Cuverville and Demouville, requiring two battalions of the
infantry brigade and its associated towed artillery regiment. But
otherwise the advance of the armoured brigade was consistent with the
doctrinal separation of the two brigades in the division and was
similar to those used by 7th AD and Guards.

>> You appear to be mistaken.

No, you simply want to take changes that occurred through experience in
Normandy and declare that it was the "intent" of the War Office all
along. Balderdash.

> 76mm proprotions were higher than 17-pdr, so that means
> that the 76mm wasn't a "mainstay"?

>> See above.

Again, not what I would describe as an illuminating answer.

> And the verbige with regards to the 76mm can
> as easily be applied to the 17-pdr.

>> The 76mm was not a reliable tank killer. That statement
>> cannot be applied to the 17-pdr. Calling my post verbiage
>> doesn't alter that fact.

No, none of the 76mm, 17-pdr, 3-inch, 75mm, 6-pdr and others simply
were "reliable" killers of certain German tanks, at least when
confronted by their frontal aspects. Pretending otherwise is
delusional.

> I see, so you did know some of the facts, you just
> chose to manipulate them a bit?

>> Ad hominem.

How? You knew some of the facts, but did not post them until I
challenged you. That is a simple statement of fact that is evident from
your post. Whether it was intentional manipulation of the readers or an
unintentional failure to state the facts on your part is another
matter. I made no judgment or accusation, although either way it was
pretty sloppy on your part - crying "ad hominem" doesn't change
that.

> Yes, and your point is?

>> Possibly, with hindsight, that it is futile to cut paragraphs
>> into sentences and then challenge each sentence out of
>> context?

I fail again to see your point? I challenged those statements you made
that I believed to be incorrect. Why is that problematic for you?

> The Americans planned for a "rolling programme
> of changeover" to the M26 as well, and managed
> to acheive about as equal as a result, despite
> having to execute the change over 3,000
> miles from their production facilities, rather than being
> 300 miles from them. That the program did not
> begin in November 1944 was due to many problems
> associated with that and wih some poor decision
> making early in the development program

>> The UK probably lacked the industrial capacity to get the
>> Comet into service before December 1944, although it
>> saw the need and acted on it to the best of its abilities.
>> The US did not lack the capacity; it lacked the wisdom to
>> see the need. Which is more culpable?

Just exactly how much more "industrial capacity" was the US
supposed to allocate to building the M-26? Where was it supposed to
come from and how was it supposed to be known that it was required? And
where exactly is the difference between the events leading up to the
deployment of the Comet and M-26 that so clearly show the greater
British perspicuity and the greater American culpability?

.