Re: Operation C3 [a.k.a. Herkules] 10 - Kriegsmarine
- From: "Andrew Clark" <aclark@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2005 20:50:24 GMT
"Davide Pastore" <davide.pastore@xxxxxxxx> wrote
> This would have mattered only with the smallest
> boats, since MZ/MFP would have made the
> direct trip Sicily-Malta-Sicily (they routinelly reached
> Lybia). For the Italian beachheads, only big boats
> from MZ upward would have approached Malta,
> while all the assorted little mosquito-fleet of
> converted little boats etc. would have took
> care of Gozo. After a few days, these would
> have been transferred to Malta and used for
> shuttling to the coast the troops of the 2nd
> wave from their cargo ship - in this phase,
> all the problems you listed would have shown
> themselves;
I am a little confused here, perhaps because I have not read
your excellent posts with the attention they deserve.
It sounds as if there were three invasion elements:
1. Large landing craft
2. Smaller landing craft
3. Cargo and troop ships
The plan, as I understand it, was for element one to carry
their invasion troops and vehicles from Sicily direct to
Malta and once there to land all their forces ashore in a
single landing operation. Then element one would head back
to Sicily.
Element two would carry their invasion troops and vehicles
from Sicily direct to Gozo and once there to land all their
forces (plus, no doubt, several gallons of vomit per man) in
a single landing operation. Then element two would head to
the ships waiting off Malta to tranship troops and vehicles
for carriage to Malta.
Element three would carry their invasion troops and vehicles
in their holds from Sicily to a holding position off Malta,
where they would slowly steam up and down waiting for either
element three to come back from Gozo to tranship or a port
on Malta to be captured to enable them to dock.
This is Sealion all over again. While element one is at
least expendable (and would almost certainly be expended),
the success of elements two and three are intertwined. If,
as is very likely, element two is significantly degraded in
size and efficiency by the landings on Gozo, element three
is useless unless the troops landed by element one (and the
paratroops) can capture a port *in working order*.
LIke the similar element proposed for Sealion, the merchant
ships are likely to be hanging around at sea for several
days before being able to dock or reach a sheltered
anchorage. And that gives the RN ample chance to attack
them by surface and submarine.
> by this time there would be no more enemy reaction
> near the beachheads (assuming the 1st wave had
> not be massacred, in which case the ships would
> have returned to Sicily...) and so the operation
> could have been carried without *too much* hurry.
The problem is that merchants ships cannot dock without
harbour facilities. Even simple things like blowing the
bollards off jetties and wharfs is a major problem.
The best plan, really, would have been to ignore Gozo, ship
the smaller landing craft on the merchant ship derricks, use
the larger landing craft to land a force which, with
paratroops, could capture Valetta, and then anchor the ships
in the harbour and use the smaller craft to ferry the
contents to shore. Expending your only effective means of
quickly getting your main force to shore in an assault on
Gozo seems foolish.
> However, to repeat myself, the sand was
> really the last of the problems. Actually most
> MZ crews would probably have prayed
> for a little soft sand, instead of ugly rocks.
The problems expand the more you look. I see from some old
Admiralty charts that getting anything bigger than a rowing
boat anywhere near most of the Maltese beaches is a
challenge due to off-shore rocks and sandbars...
> These boats would have been used by Germans.
> Well, their crew was expert in use them in
> shallow waters... since it was a river
> assault army unit!!!!
These would be the same river assault units that in 1940
left their equipment out on the sand near the water's edge
and came back to find that the big river called the Channel
had mysteriously grown?
Actually, German river crossing units were generally very
good at small boat handling. But because most German and
continental rivers tend to be deep and sluggish, they were
very bad at calculating the effect of tides and fast
non-linear currents. They also tended not to be very good at
at-sea embarkation. An open sea approach through rocks and
shoals to a dangerous shore with dangerous riptides would
certainly test their abilities up to and probably beyond
their limits.
How do you say "mincing machine" in Italian?
.
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