Re: Some observations about raising of US airborne divisions

Well, we continue to talk past each other a bit, but this is
interesting, so...

Robert Willett wrote:

> Try google using 120 mm anti-tank gun. Several sites mention the Brit's 130
> mm recoilless rifle for one. However because of it's weight the idea of
> using it as a towed weapon quickly went by the way and it was truck mounted.
> I read some time ago that development began in late 44 but it was not
> deployed until after the war. There is at Aberdeen if I remember correctly
> a conventional 120 mm tube on a two wheeled mount with gun shield the was a
> X model never accepted or issued. I did not say the 120 mm towed anti-rank
> gun was deployed in WWII but work on it apparently began during the war.
> Note my initial comment speciofically mentioned 120 mm towed and did not say
> anything about vehicle miunted tubes. We were somewhat talking past each
> other.

I did, without result pertinent to a US-developed 120mm antitank gun.
Nor did the British produce a 130mm recoilless (BAT was 120mm/4.7-inch)
and I am not sure how that is relevent anyway to US developments? The
"conventional" 120mm at Aberdeen are the 120mm AA Gun M1 and I believe
they have an M1906 4.7-inch corps gun? I think what you saw at Aberdeen
may have been the T8 90mm Field (Antitank) Gun. But AFAIK the postwar
development of the 120mm as an antitank weapon were all in tanks or
GMC. In any case, the issue is minor.


> I had not heard the 50 cal/37mm combo called a Patton special before this
> week when I ran across a web article that said they were Patton's idea.

Yes, something of a conflation from the 443rd AAA Bn History. In fact
Patton requested the battalion be assigned to his command for TORCH,
primarily for the sensible wish to get mobile AAA firepower ashore and
in action ASAP, which the SP AAA could do easily. But he had as little
to do with their design and creation as he did with halting development
and deployment of an M4 replacement.

> As to comparison with the navy at D-Day almost everyone agrees that a
> deficiency of planning was having too few destroyers to go close inshore and
> provie the accurate fire of their 5in/25s and 5in/38s to targets on the
> beach and immediately behind.

Unfortunately that may be the accepted course of events, but a more
careful examination of the timeline reveals some problems with it. The
destroyers began to close the beach and employ direct fire at different
locations between 1030 and 1100 (IIRC without digging out the relevent
source to double-check times), which almsot certainly had some effect.
However, by that time most of the critical movement off the beach had
already occured (Cota's party approached the Vierville draw from inland
after climbing the bluffs at about that time and received some fire
from the destroyers). Nor could the destroyers provide "accurate fire"
on anything except for the beach defenses (where there were not US
forces in the line of fire) and on the bluffs, what was inland might as
well have been on the moon.

And "everyone" may agree, but that doesn't mean they are right. :) The
planning provide as many destroyers as were available, they were as
close inshore as they could get initially without threatening to run
down the myriads of landing craft maneuvering offshore, and it was a
crowded anchorage already. The actual main "deficiency" in the planning
was to land the assault waves directly opposite the exits, although a
"better" plan landing them between the exits may have faired no better,
given the problems encountered with the current.

> Some destroyers went so close inshore as to stir up mud and close enough to
> fire their 40 mm at specific targets. My late friend Lloyd Barnett was on
> one of these cans. He was a gunnery officer.

Yes they did and they did have an effect, it just doesn't appear that
they were the primary reason that the landing succeeded, although it
makes for a simple explanation. The more complex explanation is that
the earliest success was through simple infantry maneuver by troops
fortuitously landed in the "wrong" place, aided by the firepower of the
surviving tanks, later aided further by the additional firepower of the
AAA automatic weapons along the surfline, and then cemented by the
supporting firepower of the destroyers.

And BTW, note that I am not saying that the destroyermen that day did
not display big brass ones, they did. :)

> Read it again. The M2 is the 26% of the 90 mm AA weapons that had some
> practical utility as a direct fire weapon. The 74% would be tha M1's and
> M1A's which because of their awkward mounting might have claimed a dual
> purpose role but it better be in a position where quick displacement of
> position was not required.

Okay, I see the math, but again, except in the Med and in some
semi-mobile Gun Battalions in the ETO, the M1 (less than 200 actually
built IIRC) and M1A1 remained in CONUS and overseas as a static defense
weapon. Mobile Gun Battalions were AFAICS issued the M2, so the point
is moot. Of course no towed antitank gun much bigger than a 57mm was
capable of "quick displacement", so essentially you can eliminate all
towed TD battalions, British 17-pounder AT batteries, German Pak 40, 41
and 43 batteries and so on.

> Again you need to read. The comparison above was only for the the M1. M1A
> as opposed to the M2. ie a comparison of AA weapons. As you have stated the
> M3 was not deployed in

But the M1 never served out of CONUS (well, it may have been in Hawaii)
and was produced in such small numbers as to be insignificant. The M2
was specifically produced and deployed as a dual-purpose weapon, but
suffered the same problems of size and weight found in all of the large
dual-purpose weapons in its class such as the 3.7-inch and 8.8cm.

> Okay so an "even" amount went to Tanks versus TD's but my point was they
> were not AA weapons. As you have stated the M3 wasn't really a follow on to
> the M1, M1A and M2 AA weapons but were developed to be vehicle mounted in a
> tank or anti tank role without an AA role.

Exactly.

> But Rich in both cases with the AA the lack of need for these units was
> definitely known to the 1943-44 leaders which caused them to divert the
> personnel to other uses. Therefore I see no conflict with my statement.

That statement would be a source of amusement within Eighth Air Force
circles in 1943. "Definite" remains a pretty slippery term in this
context.
--

.

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