Re: Some observations about raising of US airborne divisions
- From: "Robert Willett" <rbwillett@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2005 23:56:13 +0000 (UTC)
"Rich" <RichTO90@xxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:dj3p73$831$1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Robert Willett wrote:
Rich I am going to snip a lot o material not pertinent to continuing our
conversation
snip
> Robert, we may be talking past each other here a bit then. But I am
> unaware of any "late war and post war" attempt to develop a 120mm towed
> antitank gun, although there were various Ordnance development projects
> for many calibers (some 21 for the 90mm Tank Gun projects alone IIRC)?
> There were various experiments in using the 120mm in self-propelled
> applications, but none of them were completed prior to August 1945 that
> I am aware of? I would be interested if you have more information.
>
Try google using 120 mm anti-tank gun. Several sites mention the Brit's 130
mm recoilless rifle for one. However because of it's weight the idea of
using it as a towed weapon quickly went by the way and it was truck mounted.
I read some time ago that development began in late 44 but it was not
deployed until after the war. There is at Aberdeen if I remember correctly
a conventional 120 mm tube on a two wheeled mount with gun shield the was a
X model never accepted or issued. I did not say the 120 mm towed anti-rank
gun was deployed in WWII but work on it apparently began during the war.
Note my initial comment speciofically mentioned 120 mm towed and did not say
anything about vehicle miunted tubes. We were somewhat talking past each
other.
> "Patton specials"? I don't think I've ever seen them referred to as
> that? Unless you refer to the 443rd AAA (SP) Battalion and their
> deployment to TORCH? In any case, yes, they were very useful as direct
> fire weapons, quite possibly they played as much, if not more, of a
> role in suppressing the German defenders of OMAHA Beach, than did the
> US Navy.
I had not heard the 50 cal/37mm combo called a Patton special before this
week when I ran across a web article that said they were Patton's idea.
As to comparison with the navy at D-Day almost everyone agrees that a
deficiency of planning was having too few destroyers to go close inshore and
provie the accurate fire of their 5in/25s and 5in/38s to targets on the
beach and immediately behind.
Some destroyers went so close inshore as to stir up mud and close enough to
fire their 40 mm at specific targets. My late friend Lloyd Barnett was on
one of these cans. He was a gunnery officer.
>
> > > M1 and M1A1 AA Gun - c. 5,636
> > > M2 AA Gun on Mount M2 - c. 1,941
> > > M2 AA Gun on Mount M3 (fixed) - 254
> > > M3 Tank Gun - 4,653 (in M26, M36 and T25)
> > > T8 Field Gun - 200
> >
> > Let's see Rich (1941/(5636+1941))*100%= 25.62% I think that means the
> > majority of 90 mm AA weapons were not practically useful as direct fire
> > weapons.
>
> I trust your math, but am curious about your conclusion? The M2 was
> designed specifically so that it could be more easily employed in the
> direct fire role, but it was "not practically useful" in that role?
Read it again. The M2 is the 26% of the 90 mm AA weapons that had some
practical utility as a direct fire weapon. The 74% would be tha M1's and
M1A's which because of their awkward mounting might have claimed a dual
purpose role but it better be in a position where quick displacement of
position was not required.
How
> do you get there? I take it then that the extensive employment of the
> 90mm as a direct-fire counterbattery piece in Italy (due to limited
> availability of the 155mm M1 Gun), especially at Anzio and then in
> France and Germany was "not practically useful"?
>
> The T8 Field Gun (also identified as an antitank gun) may not have been
> "practically useful", since no more than apparently two ever saw
> action, and I think the fixed-mount M3 would qualify :), but it remains
> stretching it to claim that a weapons system that was actually found
> useful in a dual-purpose role had no use in one of those two roles
> (well, tri-purpose, since the M1, M1A1 and M2 was also intended as an
> anti-torpedoboat weapon :)).
Again you need to read. The comparison above was only for the the M1. M1A
as opposed to the M2. ie a comparison of AA weapons. As you have stated the
M3 was not deployed in
Neither the T8
>
> > Rich sorry you misinterperted my statement. The 90 mm Tank destroyers
were
> > a better anti tank weapon system than the towed 90 mm weapons. Do you
> > disagree with that. Also I realized through a typo I didn't note it was
the
> > majority of the M3 90mm tubes that went to the TD's.
>
> No I don't disagree, but then any more mobile weapons system is usually
> "better" than than it towed counterpart, but it is "better" in terms of
> mobility and maneuverability, which facilitates its employment in
> combat. And "majority" is truly a slippery term in this case. 2,329 M3
> Tank Guns were produced for 2,002 M26 (T26E1, T26E3, T26E4, and
> T26E5)and 40 T25, with 287 for spares and projects, but only 2,324 more
> were produced for the 2,283 Gun Motor Carriage M36 and its variants
> M36B1 and M36B2. So it was more like "even" than anything, more
> complete Motor Carriages were produced, but with fewer guns for them
> (US Ordnance combat vehicles were procurred "wothout armament").
Okay so an "even" amount went to Tanks versus TD's but my point was they
were not AA weapons. As you have stated the M3 wasn't really a follow on to
the M1, M1A and M2 AA weapons but were developed to be vehicle mounted in a
tank or anti tank role without an AA role.
>
> > But the units were determined to be unneeded and whatever personnel were
> > assigned to them were sent to other units. The determination they were
> > unneeded was based on a definite knowledge that the reason for which
they
> > were originally planned no longer existed (ie concern about the
Luftwaffe's
> > influence in the ETO).
>
> Again, just a subtle but important differance. The "definite knowledge"
> wasn't actually accrued until mid 1944. That is, prior to that it was
> realized that the AAA in CONUS were in excess to requirements for the
> number of divisions that could be shipped, while at the same time the
> replacement situation required large-scale combings of units for
> personnel. And of course, it wasn't only the AAA that was combed, the
> axe also fell on ASF and the Army Air Corps as well.
But Rich in both cases with the AA the lack of need for these units was
definitely known to the 1943-44 leaders which caused them to divert the
personnel to other uses. Therefore I see no conflict with my statement.
--
.
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