Re: Why wasnt the British army semi-elite?

Nicholas Smid wrote in message ...

(snip)

>U-boats had no real problem getting into the Meb via the streights so I
>don't see the US subs having any problems, so long as they stay in the
>western basin they have nice deep water to play in so there size isn't going
>to be a crippling problem as it was for the big RN boats sent into the
>central Med shallowes.

Point 1) the problem was usually not entering the Mediterranean the
problem was leaving, the currents flow into the Mediterranean from
the Atlantic with speeds of a considerable fraction of a WWII submarine's
underwater speed. You need bases in the Mediterranean to sustain an
operation or the straits of Gibraltar open.

Point 2) the submarines had to go where the targets were, there were
main ports in Mediterranean North Africa in places like Tripoli and
Tunisia.

Point 3) The standard US submarines in WWII came in at 1,500 tons
versus the British U and V type at 550 tons and T type at 1,100 tons.
The "big RN boats" were in the order of 1,500 tons.

(snip)

>The Tizard mission gave the US CM radar about the time France fell, so
>unless butterflyes are flapping up a storm they have it before the Brits
>pack it up.

So the US obtains all the historical advantages of British ideas
even though it loses the British military in 1940. Unlikely.

>Even if not its quite likely the Brits pass alot of stuff on out
>of shear spite.

Yes thought so, the US obtains everything again, no disadvantages.

>What they don't have is lessons from the convoy battles,
>which the USN ignored anyway, but by the same token the Germans don't have
>it ether, and without the Brits to fight the U-boat arm is going to get
>short shift in favour of the big ships the German admirals realy wanted.

Point 1) the great convoy battles really occurred in the middle of the war
when the Germans had enough U-boats and the allies had significantly
reduced the number of ships sailing alone.

Point 2) the US anti submarine doctrine was probably its weakest point,
and the US only started to build DEs in 1942 because the British had
not ordered them. Similar for things like depth finding sonar and
hedgehog, since the RN was leading the research in anti submarine
warfare.

>ASDIC/SONAR tech was pretty much the same everywhere at the time, though if
>anything the USN might well have had better sets, the RN's sets started off
>pretty crude.

The opposite is the case, the USN sets were behind the RN and not
all destroyers had a set.

>So the U-boat arm is smaller and the USN escort force is smaller but if it
>comes down to a building race I'll put my money of US ship yards, the first
>year of the war is pretty rough for the US but after that a tidal wave of
>DE's start arriving and the Happy Times they are well and truly over.

Simply put the US can avoid exposing much of itself to the U-boats in the
first year of a US German war by staying close to the US. No invasions
in the Atlantic area.

Any invasions and the US losses will go up given the amount of shipping
needed and the lack of escorts and doctrine.

(snip)

>Right after the decleration of war the US lands troops in Iceland to protect
>it from the beastly Hun, shortly after they have a very nice base there, and
>Iceland was the launch point for alot of Russia convoys.

Given Denmark is under German control, unless there is a surprise
declaration of war by the US then the US will need to invade Iceland,
not simply land there.

Alternatively if there is a European peace then Denmark is back to
neutral.

In any case Iceland perceived itself as an independent nation. If the
US starts invading neutrals expect a reaction against the US.

>Also Persia wasn't British, it was independent,
>not that anyone much cared about that, the Brits and Russians occupied it to
>ofcourse protect it from the beastly hun, the US and Russia could occupy it
>just about as easaly.

The British could occupy Iran from nearby bases in Iraq and India,
and Iran was effectively on the supply line established to service
the forces in Egypt. The US had no bases in the Indian Ocean area.

>The US would have bases in Australia, the Aussies will
>be sweating bullets about Japan and probably not viewing the Mother Country
>as a reliable allie by now.

So the idea is Australia is at war with Japan but Britain is not?
Given the way the Commonwealth and Empire were structured
either both are at war or neither.

Japan, if in the war, would prefer to concentrate on the US, and
if the Commonwealth is neutral can simply trade with it.


(snip)

>Two under strength Panzer divisions are not going to make a big difference
>in Russia, the aircraft might help but the Germans main problems were supply
>and a lack of any clear idea what they'd got themselves into by attacking
>Russia.

The reality was there were significant occupation forces in western
Europe, which could have been used in the east. Certainly the
supply issue is present in the first year of an attack, but not in the
second.

Add Italian units and possibly French to the force mix in the east.

>>From early 1942 when the first convoys start reaching Mermansk
>Hitler is going to start having night mares about an invasion of Norway,
>plus the USMC can make just as big a pest of itself an the Comandos ever
>could.

So you are assuming despite a general peace in Europe the Germans
do not withdraw from any of the territory taken in 1940, in which case
why not occupy Britain as well?

Alternatively Norway is neutral.

>In 1942 the units in the west were far from first line outfits.

The majority were occupation troops, but the reality is they could
release units from such duties in the east and those units could
fight.


(snip)

>By the end of 1942 the US has 'protected' Persia and has a supply line
>running there too, they have knocked off the Italian colonies east of Suez,
>or atleast have bases on the horn of Africa closing the Red sea.

The reality is the USSR may have occupied Persia to guarantee a
southern supply line but this would be something the British would
be very worried about.

Since you keep telling us there will be no real problem in running
convoys to Murmansk and ships to Vladivostok there is no need
for a southern route. This eliminates the need for the US to divert
forces to the Indian Ocean.

>Unless the
>British government is totally cravin by now they are making eyes at
>Washington angling for an offer to rejoin the war, since by now they are
>probably feed up with the Germans.

Again the US has all the advantages.

>Soon as that dance is consumated most of
>Africa and the middle east is suddenly Allied and the Italians are looking
>at a world of hurt rolling down on them, shortly after they will be
>screaming for German help. I'd expect Turky to stay out of it, after all
>whats in it for them? Tourch might be delayed untill the summer of 43 but by
>then the fighting is in Egypt and the Germans have lots of problems on their
>plate.

The US accused the British of taking the long way to Berlin via
French North Africa and Italy. Now you want to start even further
away in Persia and Egypt.


(snip)

>Small scale opposed landings by mid 42, army scale unopposed landings by
>late 42, a corp in Persia, mostly engineers but enough troops to keep the
>Iraqies from getting dilusions of adiquisy. A corp in Somalia to establish a
>beach head and close the Red sea then a push west, supply by sea.

Simply put the above timetable is far too generous to the US.

Look at the historical results, the US mounted a divisional sized
landing in the Pacific and a corps sized landing, using many British
ships in Europe.

Please show the areas the US could invade safely with a corps
sized landing.

For example for the course of the war some 21% of all US troops sent
overseas to all theatres were moved by British Ministry of War Transport
Ships. The British controlled the really big liners.

US cargo ship efficiencies to UK

January to December 1943, average 59.8 days for cargo ships.

January 1943 to March 1944, 1,412 ships, average round trip
69.4 days (22.0 days in US waters, 14.5 days outbound,
18.4 days in UK, 14.5 days inbound)

January to June 1944, 440 ships, average round trip 76.9 days,
(27.4 days in US ports, 16.5 days outbound, 15.4 days in UK
ports, 17.6 days inbound).

According to the shipping figures US to the Persian Gulf via
South Africa and return averaged 241.7 days while the Gulf
and return via the Mediterranean averaged 157.2 days.
Interestingly the voyage home was nearly 3 to 4 weeks longer
than the voyage out indicating the ships were picking up return
freight. Figures for the period January 1943 to March 1944.

So for every ship supporting an operation in Europe allocate
another 2 ships to do the same thing in the Middle East via
South Africa.

The US simply did not have the ships for extended operations
in Persia or Ethiopia. Even with the British and other merchant
marine on side the allies had a shortage of ships for the entire
war.

Better to close the Mediterranean and cut the areas off from
Europe.

>Clearing
>the Italians out of Ethiopia/Eritrea might take a while, or just leave them
>to wither on the vine well supplying the locals with lots of rifles. By the
>end of 1943 most of Africa has been cleared and the agrument starts where to
>make the next big push. Sardinia and Corsica would make nice forward air
>bases, probably something in southern Spain to open the streights.

So in other words the US will continually invade countries that would
probably be neutral, Spain, Iceland, Norway and so on. Or alternatively
under German occupation or mobilised thereby picking even more
fights.


(snip)

>Why would the Germans occupy Iceland with no war in the west, or if they did
>it would be a token force, something for the USMC to practice on but not
>enough to slow them down.

So far all the assumptions are the US has the random numbers in
its favour. It appears the war with the US will suddenly occur, leaving
the Germans with no chance to do things like fortify Iceland.

So tell us all if the Germans put a corps worth of troops into Iceland,
seeing how it is the obvious place for the US to start across the
Atlantic and also to send ships to the USSR, how quickly could the
US put together an invasion force that could be expected to win?

>Trying to supply a useful force there against the
>USN would be a quick way of losing alot of shinny new German ships.

Yes, thought so, the US keeps winning the US does not do things
like lose multiple carriers to u-boats. The bad weather and long
winter nights appear to play no part in the problems of maintaining
a blockade, nor the distance from US ports.

>Well
>Norway may not be much use for invading Germany it would make a jim dandy
>air base, close off the North sea to the German navy and protect the convoys
>to Russia. At the very least Germany has to tie up alot of troops there to
>cover the threat.

The basic problem is the assumption amphibious operations are
easy. So a US invasion of Norway against organised resistance
is assumed to be done. Instead of the Germans having the air
power and ground troops to make it a difficult operation in the
limited good weather time available and limited places to land.

(snip)

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
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