Re: Some observations about raising of US airborne divisions
- From: thornley@xxxxxxxx (David Thornley)
- Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2005 16:02:17 +0000 (UTC)
In article <digopk$t5p$1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
Drazen Kramaric <draxNEVOLIMSPAM@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>On Fri, 30 Sep 2005 20:10:15 +0000 (UTC), grahams@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>(Stephen Graham) wrote:
>
>>The point would be that you would need to train fewer additional airborne
>>replacements, allowing those men to be directed to other areas, including
>>the standard infantry, where there was an issue.
>
>But why airborne? Why shouldn't the pools for anti-aircraft gunners or
>bomber machine gunners be reduced?
>
Why not airborne? We could argue endlessly about manpower allocation
in general, but right now we're arguing about airborne infantry
manpower allocation. (BTW, I presume that pools for AA gunners
were raided, since lots of the AA units were effectively disbanded
in Europe.)
>>Nor does it obviate the point that the US did break up other trained,
>>specialized formations as was found expedient.
>
>I guess some training was found less specialised than others. Probably
>army decided it could continue the war without light infantry or
>motorised divisions, but found having additional airborne division
>handy.
>
You're simply restating what the Army was doing here, which is not
relevant to the discussion. We're arguing about whether it was a
good idea for the US Army to raise and send overseas five airborne
divisions, not whether they did it or not.
>What I am saying is that shortage of infantry divisions or manpower in
>the rifle battalions wasn't going to be solved by turning 13th
>airborne into the replacement pool (too few men) nor by turning it
>into the ordinary infantry division (if anything, it would have slowed
>down its deployment to ETO).
>
The shortage of infantry divisions and manpower wasn't going to be
solved by any one simple action, since it was too large a problem
for that. It could have been alleviated by dumping 13th Airborne
into the replacement pool. Nor did would a delay of 13th Airborne
have been important, since in that case another infantry division
could have been shipped out in its stead, and it would have been
much more useful.
You have pointed out that divisions were arriving in the ETO
very shortly before V-E day. This is because of a perceived need,
and shipping out a division that was not to be used did not
address that need.
>>Yes, it should be blatantly obvious. Why do you think there was just
>>an argument about the employment of VIII Corps in Brittany?
>
>What would you expect if the length of the front line expands faster
>than the number of units? However, compared to only proper standard,
>i.e. the strength of the opposition, Americans were hardly in shortage
>of anything in August.
Logistics, but after Dragoon the US was putting as many divisions
as it could into France. With the exception of 17th Airborne, of
course, which arrived in theater in August and actually got into
combat in France in December.
>>And there weren't enough troops to cover the front, leading to the
>>obvious problem in December.
>
>In order to launch Ardennes counteroffensive, Germans had to strip
>their other fronts from everything which led to the utter disaster
>befelling on them in Poland and Hungary.
To launch the historical counteroffensive, yes. To launch a smaller
but still dangerous one, no. Eisenhower didn't want to leave the
Ardennes so lightly covered, but if he was going to have any offensive
ability he really had no choice.
>>You do realize that heavy weapons include more than artillery?
>
>I do. However, I consider artillery as the most important heavy
>weapon. As it turns, airborne divisions fought better with what they
>had than most of the ordinary divisions. I guess, fighting is not only
>about heavy weapons.
>
Of *course* it's mostly about the soldiers, not the weapons. It
is also true that good soldiers fight better with good weapons.
Using airborne as straight infantry was wasteful of the soldiers.
>>Besides, the point was to not activate the 13th as an airborne division
>>in the first place.
>
>Why? You would not get infantry division any time sooner, in fact, it
>would have arrived later.
>>
How about sending a real infantry division instead?
>>Still argues that there simply weren't enough divisions available for
>>the war that needed to be fought.
>
>What do you think Germans would have to say than? So, World War 2 was
>a conflict where every major power had a shortage of troops? I guess
>there is "shortage" and there is shortage.
>
Yes; the famous US shell shortage would have been considered a
surplus in many armies.
However, the idea is to be better off than the enemy. As a friend of
mine told me, strategy is the art of avoiding a fair fight.
We need to ask if the Allies were better off shipping 13th
Airborne Division to Europe in December or January or whenever
that was, or shipping something else. Obviously, they'd have
been better off shipping something else.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
david@xxxxxxxxxxxx | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
.
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