Re: Pearl Harbor radio silence myth

pha1941@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote in message ...
>RE: Radio silence myth about Kido Butai (Japanese carrier Pearl Harbor
>Striking Force).
>
>There are four issues:
>
>1. Japanese Navy order.

Transmit in extreme emergency, silence otherwise, fake radio traffic
to be sent to cover the strike force, the only force to be given the
cover of fake messages.


>2. NSA cover-up of messages and D/F (radio direction finding) reports.
>3. Japanese claims.
>4. Evidence of radio messages.
>
>1. Striking Force Operations Order Number One ordered all 31 Striking
>Force ships to use long wave radio communications and the Battleship
>HIEI to use shortwave radio to communicate with Tokyo and other fleets
>(the Japanese serial number of this JN-25B order is Striking Force #
>820 and the National Archives identification of the translated message
>in English is SRN-115397. This is published also in a NSA publication
>available on the net).

In other words if you use radio this is what frequencies you use. Going
to mention the orders about only in emergency?

The message quoted above actually says,

"16 Nov 1941
From: CINC1stAirFlt
To: CdrDesDiv15, CdrDesRon1, CdrSubRon1, 1stAirFlt (less CarDiv4,
CarDiv3), CdrBatDiv3,
Info: CINCSAllFlts
Tokyo DF Control
"Strike Force OPORD#1: Commencing 0000 19 November, 'Battle Control'
effective for short wave frequencies and 'Alert Control' for long wave."
SRN-115397

By the way there were orders about when to use the main guns on the
battleships and cruisers, so presumably they spent a lot of time shooting
on the way to Hawaii.

>David Kahn, who has ties to the NSA, in his
>classic THE CODEBREAKERS, page 9, stated that the Striking Force freely
>used long wave radio.

No.

>This admits 31/32 of the revisionist claim the
>Striking Force did not maintain radio silence.

In other words the surviving IJN logs from the force, the post attack
report by the IJN written in 1942 and the post war interrogations of
key personnel are going to be ignored. All say no radio traffic before
the attack. Instead the US files are supposed to hold the evidence,
you know the brilliant conspirators who pulled off the attack did not
stop things going into the archives in the first place or purge them later.

>The only remaining issue
>to debate is short wave radio transmissions by one ship. This long wave
>admission strongly supports the S.S. LURLINE story that Japanese Navy
>radio transmissions originating northwest of Hawaii were intercepted
>"on the lower marine bands," i.e. long wave channels.

Alternatively the Lurline picked up non IJN traffic and was a ship
of interest because it was relaying the distress messages of the
merchant ship Cynthia Olsen, sunk with all hands 1000 miles
NE of Hawaii by gunfire from the I-26 just before the attack on Hawaii.

>2. The NSA is still hiding and covering up more than 25 percent of main
>fleet code JN-25B radio messages intercepted by the US in November and
>the first week of December 1941.

The usual the evidence is being hidden claim.

>This is not evidence that the Striking
>Force was radio silent (one cannot prove a negative) but it is obvious
>that the NSA has a purpose in still classifying these messages more
>than 60 years after the war and making all of our UK-USA partners hide
>them as well - a purpose of deceit.

In other words no evidence, just declare people guilty.

>These messages were never
>secrets, by the way, not even Japanese secrets since they were
>broadcast.

So once a message is broadcast it is not secret? Like say the
orders to invade Normandy sent on 5 June 1944? Why use codes if
the messages are not secret?

>The only reasonable explanation they are still classified is
>that the headers show that the Striking Force sent many radio messages.

In other words without evidence simply announce the preferred conclusion.

So how does the NSA prove a negative, that there are no more messages
to declassify?

>Furthermore, the NSA is still classifying many of the Pacific D/F Net
>reports from this same period because they tracked the Striking Force
>as it broadcast like WTBS across the North Pacific.

In other words a group of messages is declared missing, and this lack
of evidence is proof of evidence supporting the preferred conclusion.

>3. There are only three known Japanese witnesses that (jointly) made
>the claim that there was radio silence. But two of the three later
>repudiated the claim.

So detail the names and who recanted, because the reality is they
did not recant and their reports are backed up by the IJN documents.

>Thus the Japanese claim of radio silence is not
>credible or, more accurately, does not even exist. I discuss this in my
>book so I won't belabor it here.

In other words we have missing messages that prove all followed
by claims unnamed IJN officers said favourable things.

>Furthermore the one true expert on
>this issue, the radio man of the Battleship HIEI Commander Kazuyoshi
>Kochi, was interviewed after the war and asked directly if the Striking
>Force maintained radio silence and he denied it.

It is really simple, Kochi dismantled part of the transmitter to ensure
no accidents and is in record as stating the force did not transmit
until after the attack, when it sent the report to Yamamoto.

>So if we balance the
>retracted positive Japanese claim of radio silence against the
>credentialed Japanese claim against radio silence, the net result is
>decisively against the claim.

In other words the lack of evidence enables fiction writing.

>4. There are only a few radio messages from the Striking Force sent in
>late November 1941 released by the NSA to the National Archives (see my
>webpage for one).

By the way radio silence was not imposed until after the force left
the main Japanese ports, with the last ship departing November
19th. Oh yes, remember the Japanese sent fake messages to
imitate the ships and also messages to the fleet informing the force
of the conditions in Hawaii.

The Japanese are all quite positive they sent fake messages.

>But the fact is that in a case where one side is
>arguing a negative, even one contrary piece of evidence decisively and
>completely destroys their case. There were also interceptions by Hawaii
>of messages sent by the Striking Force reported in the Hewitt
>Commission Report and the 1946 Congressional Report.

No.

>Recently, fake D/F
>bearings from the Philippines for Striking Force messages sent in late
>November have been released to the NA. Obviously there was no reason
>for COM16 in the Philippines to have gone to the work of faking
>bearings for Striking Force messages unless the Striking Force was
>broadcasting.

Ah I see, the unit could have not made a mistake instead they are
part of a conspiracy. Oh yes, the bearings from the Philippines
put the transmitters in or near Japan, where the fake messages
were being sent from.

Usual logic, declare something fake without evidence and use the
declaration as evidence of conspiracy.

> What is remarkable about the newsnet discussions and even book
>discussions of the radio silence myth is the dishonesty of the
>Roosevelt apologists. On this issue it is not that FDR apologists are
>uninformed or terminally stupid but rather that they simply lie. For
>example, they always lie about the order the Striking Force sailed
>under (one above). They advance this lie as their best argument. When
>they have to lie to make their case for radio silence, that is an
>admission their case is weak.

Mark usually destroys himself with claims like this, see the message
above.

>Mark Willey


(snip of advertising URL which seems to be the point of the posting.)

People can visit soc.history.war.misc for the full text of the insult
paragraph in a post dated 20 September. The above is an edited
version.

"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything the Japanese were
planning to do was known to the US"

Isn't that clear enough, or is the claim the attack was done on 6 December?
Mark drops the first phrase of the sentence in his advertising.

Also, from the same report as the above quote.

Page 297 of the Army Board:

"1. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK:

a. The attack on the Territory of Hawaii was a surprise to all
concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Department.
It was daring, well-conceived and well-executed, and it caught the
defending forces practically unprepared to meet it or to minimize its
destructiveness."

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
--

.

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