Re: Last Days of World War II

georgeh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>
> So you might believe, but I believe David Glantz (MHQ, Spring
> 1995, pages 96 ->). And, the Soviets did execute a 60 mile,
> over water, invasion of Sakhalin. Yes, one can almost walk
> there, but look at a map. Pretty far north. The invasion went
> frm Sovietskaya to Olovo and Tonari (to use Soviet names). OK
> you don't believe this either, but Stanlay Weintraub (same ref.,
> pages 86 ->) does.

Once again, and typically, you conveniently leave out the part about
the Russians already occupying the northern half of Sakhalin Island and
having done so since 1905. And the part about the majority of the
action on that island being a drive south down the center of the island
from the border between the Russian territory and the Japanese
territory. And exactly where in Weintraub's article do I find the
reference to a departure from Sovietskaya and landings at Olovo and
Tonari? Are you just plucking names off a map based on the, and IMO
rather sketchy, map provided with the article? And what did you do,
scale off the distance to come up with your 60 miles?

As I detest typing the same things over and over, a lot of the below is
drawn from my posting responding to your posting of similar claims back
on 24 and 27 November 2004 and my response of 30 November; suitably
edited, of course, for the present instance.

Get out a map of Sakhalin (and hopefully something better than the map
in Weintraub's article); let me suggest
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/MapCenter/Map.aspx ).
Find Sakhalin. Find the 50th parallel. Under the terms of the 1905
Treaty of Portsmouth, the Russians retained everything north of the
parallel, roughly 60% of the island. The Japanese ended up with the
balance, everything south of the parallel. Note that the northern end
of the island approaches the Asian mainland, and Russian controlled
territory, closing to within about 6 kilometers through the Tartar
Strait at Pogibi.

So here are the Russians, with their portion of the island oh, so,
close to their own mainland, and with the capability to freely operate
their own vessels without interference from the Japanese. You have to
ask yourself why would they go to all the trouble of setting up a large
and complicated amphibious assault, something at which the Soviet North
Pacific Flotilla really did not have a whole heck of a lot of
experience, when they could already mass their troops on the island
without firing a shot? And if they were going to go to all that
amphibious trouble, with what resources were they intending to carry it
out? The answers to the questions are simple. They did not execute a
massive amphibious assault, they did mass the bulk of their forces on
the border, and they did not have the where-withal to conduct major
amphibious operations, being only able to conduct limited operations
with limited objectives. At no time was any landing conducted that
would have resulted in the capture of the island by itself, as you seem
to want to give them credit.

It's August 1945, and firmly established on the north side of the
50th parallel was the roughly 70,000 man strong 16th Army, commanded by
MGen LG Cheremisov. The 16th Army consisted of the 56th Rifle Corps
under Maj. Gen. AA Diakonov, including the 79th Rifle Division, 2nd
Rifle Brigade, Separate Sakhalin Rifle Regiment, and then the 6th
Separate Rifle Battalion; the 103rd Fortified Region; 104th Fortified
Region; 5th Rifle Brigade; 113th Rifle Brigade; 432nd Separate Rifle
Regiment; 540th Separate Rifle Regiment; 206th Separate Rifle
Battalion; 214th Tank Brigade; 178th Separate Tank Battalion; 678th
Separate Tank Battalion; 433rd Gun Artillery Battalion; 82nd Separate
Artillery Battalion; 428th Separate Artillery Battalion; and the 221st
Separate Antiaircraft Battalion.

Supporting the 16th Army was the North Pacific Flotilla of the Soviet
Pacific Fleet, commanded by VAdm VA Andreev, and consisting of one
patrol ship, one minelayer, six submarines, 12 minesweepers, numerous
torpedo boats and patrol cutters, and the 365th Separate Marine
battalion.

And exactly what and where were the amphibious operations. There were
exactly three. One at the village of Toro, then at Moaka, and finally
at Otomari. There were no landings at the fishing village of Orlovo.
(as an aside, it's nice to see that you've changed the destination
of your landings from your November destination Orlova to the correct
spelling, Orlovo.) Of course you need to remember that there are two
villages named Orlovo on the island. One, the aforementioned, roughly
half-way down the west coast of the Japanese held southern end of the
island and the other roughly ten miles southeast of the town of
Pobedino near the main north-south road and rail line. One should take
care not to confuse the two.

Actual combat operations began on 9 August with a three day bombardment
of the 50th parallel line by the 16th Army artillery. Jumping off on
the 11th and spearheaded by the 56th Rifle Corps the 16th Army attacked
south down the Poronai River valley towards
Poronaisk and Pobedino. The valley offered a north to south route down
the center of the island with the main north-south road and rail
running along the west side of the valley. The Japanese defenders
(some 20,000 regular troops and 10,000 reservists/militia for the
entire Japanese held portion of the island) had heavily fortified the
area around the village of Pobedino with defenses in stretching some 12
kilometers across the valley and 30 kilometers in depth (including the
area around the aforementioned inland village of Orlovo). This
position bogged down the Russian advance for a week, with the Russians
finally breaking through on August 18th.

To try to draw off the Japanese defenders, on 16 August a landing was
made near Toro (now called Shakhtersk), behind the lines of the
Japanese 88th Division. The patrol ship Zarnista, the converted
minelayer Okean, eleven patrol cutters, four minesweepers; fourteen
torpedo cutters; and two lighters land 1554 men from the 365th Separate
Marine Battalion and one battalion of the 113th Infantry Brigade.
After a relatively uncontested landing, a brisk fight ensued, but
within 24 hours the Russians had driven off the Japanese defenders and
captured the port area of the fishing village of Esutoru (now
Uglegorsk).

Four days later a force made up of Zarnista; Okean; seven patrol
cutters, four minesweepers, four motor torpedo boats, the submarine
Shch-118, three transports and two auxiliaries land the balance of the
113th Infantry Brigade (about 3500 men) near the port of Moaka (now
called Kholmsk). Evidently resistance was somewhat more than that
encountered at Esutoru as it took most of the day to secure the town.
Reported Japanese losses were 300 dead and 600 captured.

Please note that the 113th Infantry Brigade was already on the island;
before the outbreak of hostilities.

On August 25, Okean, eight minesweepers, four patrol cutters and six
auxiliaries, now operating out of captured Moaka worked their way
around the southern tip of the island and landed a force of 1,600 in
Otomari (now Korsakov). The Japanese garrison apparently had little
stomach for resistance and surrendered, leaving the Russians with some
3400 prisoners.

There were no other landings of which I am aware at Sakhalin.

Down the center spine of the island Japanese resistance continued, but
final defeat was a matter of days away. The Japanese forces on the
island surrendered on September 3rd.

Your Weintraub reference appears to be naught but a very simplistic map
on page 91 with no supporting text. Weintraub, while, in my opinion,
generally accurate, has been known to make a mistake or two. Perhaps
this is one? Or are you looking at the map and jumping to a
conclusion?

In any case, the landings were limited in both scope and mission. It
appears that the primary mission was to make demonstrations to threaten
the Japanese rear and thus force them to withdraw; a not unheard of
tactic. The bulk of the fighting was overland down the center portion
of the island and was conducted by a Russian force that was already in
place before war was declared. In fact, as you can see, with most of
the landings involving the 113th Infantry Brigade, the forces from
which the landing forces were drawn were largely from the previously
in-place units. Further, limited coastal/littoral operations were the
bread and butter of the Soviet Pacific Fleet n those days. This was
not a blue-water navy and was primarily defensive in outlook. Thus,
the operations were not particularly a test of seamanship nor
amphibious doctrine.

I think your choice of description would leave some to presume this
large force of Russians charging ashore a la Omaha Beach with all the
landing force specialized equipment and vessels. This simply wasn't
so. These operations involved running small, armed boats in at small,
and I do mean small, seaport piers and offloading a, really, very small
number of troops.


> BTW, Truman did also. He knew about the Soviet pans for invasion
> in early September from Maoka to Rumoi, Hokkaido. Stalin changed
> his plans on August 22nd.

You also seem top be forgetting that the Potsdam agreement allowed for
the Russians to conduct contingency planning for expansion of
operations beyond Sakhalin. The agreement, however, not only clearly
demarked Soviet and American occupation areas in Korea at the 38th
parallel, but, also, the US and USSR occupation areas in the Japanese
home islands. These areas were clearly demarked at La Perouse Straits.
Hokkaido was clearly in the US occupation area and Sakhalin was
clearly in the USSR area.

On 15 August the US informed the Russians of MacArthur's SCAP Gen Order
#1 which laid out occupation procedures and duties. On the 16th Stalin
communicated to Truman an interest in pursuing the Far East offensive
into Hokkaido. Though details were not communicated, the Russians had
a plan to land in stages three divisions to take on the two divisions
and one independent brigade stationed on the island by the Japanese.
They, rightly, believed these units were more oriented towards the
south and would not be able to maneuver fast enough to prevent the
landing of the entire force. Truman, however, would have none of it
and on the 18th advised that he would not approve any change to the
Potsdam agreement. Russian contingency planning continued with a jump
off day of 23 August, but Stalin called the whole thing off on the
22nd.

All of this information is in Glantz' article, but you seem to always
leave it out.

Are you ever going to look into this subject beyond two magazine
articles, one of which has a rather bare and inaccurate map? Or would
to do so shatter the cherished theory that the Russian vs Japanese Far
East actions were what actually forced the Japanese to surrender. I
suggest that you take a look at the text of the Imperial Rescript
announcing the surrender. Check to see how much emphasis is placed on
the actions on Sakhalin or the destruction of the Kwantung Army versus
the emphasis on the atomic bomb. Do you need a transcript?

Rich



> And the "documentary" never mentioned that the Potsdam Declaration
> changed the demand from unconditional surrender to "the unconditional
> surrender of all Japanese armed forces". If you say that is not a
> change, your understanding of English is poorer than the Japanese,
> who did understand the meaning of the shift.
>
> Japan did approach the USSR in an attempt to surrender, but the
> USSR did not pass along the information. The US knew about the
> communication as the Japanese codes were thoroughly compromised.
>
> Did you see any of this information on the "documentary"? What
> else was left out.
>
> Do you think that the "Great Raid" (on the screen) is real, or
> Hollywood?
>
> GFH
> --
--

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