Re: IBM
- From: ":))" <BennyPooh0@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 18:15:39 GMT
On 20 Dec 2005 09:41:25 -0800, "tuna" <tuna2@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
:QTTT
:Tho+`i ddo' thi` no' cha^'m ba(`ng punch cards tho^i
:
:Co`n ma^'y 2 ca'i ma'y o+? Danang (1968) cu?a Navy bi. VC pha'oki'ch,
:va` ma^'y ca'i o+? Long Bi`nh dda^u ? :-)))
Ma^'y ma'y na`y la` cu?a My~ xa`i chu*' kho^ng co' chuye^?n giao cho
VNCH.
Va`o tho*`i 70s thi` nhu*~ng ngu*o*`i Viet bie^'t xu*? du.ng ma'y IBM
mainframe ra^'t i't.
Ba`i thi tu' ta`i toa`n II cho toa`n quo^'c tho*`i ddo' thi` cu~ng
pha?i bo? vo^ ma'y cu?a bo^. [TTM QLVNCH] dde^? cha^'m ba`i luo^n vi`
kho^ng co' ddu? nha^n vie^n dde^? ddie^`u khie^?n ma'y. ;-))
Ho^`i ddo' o^ng gia` tui bie^?u ba` chi. tui ddi ho.c nhu*~ng c/t
dda^`u tie^n do My~ hua^'n luye^.n ve^` IBM. Nhu*ng ba? ham ddi cho*i
ho*n.
Va` no'i tha` ho.c tru*o*`ng Phu' Tho. chu*' kho^ng the`m ho.c dda.i
ho.c IBM.
;-)
Pooh
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:
:http://historynet.com/vn/blwhiteshirtsandties/index1.html
:
:http://thehistorynet.com/vn/blwhiteshirtsandties/
:
:Tha(`ng IBM tham gia chie^'n tranh Vietnam va` made money on service
:business. Lie^.u DDa?ng ta co' cho la` pha' hoa.i ca'ch ma.ng, co^.ng
:ta'c
:va`o bo.n thu` ddi.ch cha(ng ??? :-)))
:
:
:hehehehhe
:tuna,
:----
:
:As the war escalated in the 19651968 years, more and more
:data-processing equipment found its way to the growing Army, Marine and
:Air Force bases around Saigon and at Long Binh, Bien Hoa, Cam Rahn Bay,
:Nha Trang, Qui Nhon and Da Nang. IBM posted permanent personnel at all
:those locations (as well as at several base locations in Thailand and
:the Philippines), and also supported equipment at the more remote camps
:and bases by driving or flying to required maintenance situations.
:
:As the war became more complex and sophisticated, the number of unit
:record machines and computers grew and grew until the war was being
:managed to a large degree by information processing applications.
:Examples of a few of the better-known installations or applications
:were Air Force projects, including Seek Data II, PIACCS and Igloo
:White; Command and Control at MACV's Data Management Agency; the Army's
:Supply System; the Navy's Stock Points supply system; the Da Nang
:Marine's Command and Control applications; the Information Data
:Handling Systems for the Intelligence community; and the AUTODIN
:communications requirements and government work at USAID (U.S. Agency
:for International Development). By the early 1970s, the U.S. Armed
:Services could claim to have some of the most sophisticated computer
:applications in the world, but without the comparably few dedicated
:IBMers who maintained it, much of the equipment could not have been
:operated.
:
:The IBM volunteers were all bachelors (a requirement of the
:assignment), and the average age was probably under 30. There were
:probably never more than 50 IBMers in Vietnam at any one time, but a
:few men stayed for four years. Each man was selected on the basis of a
:particular set of skills and had to have an adventurous and independent
:spirit. Many of the men were what IBM chief executive officer Tom
:Watson called "wild ducks," IBMers who perhaps did not fit the
:classical corporate image. Most of the men adapted fairly well to the
:unique environment of war-torn Vietnam. Each man held a Secret, Top
:Secret or Special clearance, each carried a "noncombatant" card and
:each held a GS-equivalency level depending on his particular
:combination of education, skills and responsibilities.
:
:The way that the GS levels were determined is an interesting story.
:Sometime in early 1967, when the planned IBM presence in Vietnam was
:being negotiated, the liaison between the Federal Marketing Unit in
:Honolulu and CINCPAC HQ was through an Air Force Command and Control
:office at Hickam Air Force Base. A protocol officer there initially
:tried to establish the equivalency levels at GS-7, which meant that no
:IBMer would have accepted an assignment in Southeast Asia (for
:logistical support reasons). The protocol officer had obtained an IBM
:corporate organization chart and equated CEO Tom Watson to the CINCPAC,
:then worked downward from there to the GS-7 for branch office
:personnel. IBM's federal senior marketing manager then gave the
:protocol officer a chart showing CINCPAC at the 19 level, equal to
:himself (since he was in charge of IBM's Vietnam operation), which
:meant the managers in Vietnam would be GS-18s and so on. That, too, was
:unacceptable. A compromise was established at GS-11 through GS-15 for
:Vietnam technicians and managers. These levels provided the IBMers with
:certain privileges of rank, mostly having to do with dining in any
:military mess hall and aircraft travel orders; they were levels that
:were never unnecessarily abused.
:
:Headquarters for IBM's government office were at 115 Ming Mang, located
:one block north of Cach Mang Street off Tran Tan Buu and about half way
:between the Tan Son Nhut area bases and downtown Saigon. Most of the
:Saigon-based IBMers lived in rented villas nearby. Saigon management
:reported to an IBM federal office in Honolulu, which, in turn, reported
:to National Federal Marketing in Bethesda, Md. MACV provided a
:half-acre property for IBM's use that had previously served as a Red
:Cross office. It consisted of an old French farmhouse surrounded by
:high walls and protected by an iron gate and concertina wire. The house
:was converted to maintenance, systems engineering, sales and
:administrative office space and was occupied by the IBMers for more
:than five years. A huge diesel generator ensured back-up power for the
:building. Outbuildings stocked a full inventory of unit record machine
:and computer spare parts designed to meet needs for and repair almost
:any machine in-country.
:
:Southeast Asia was a long way from any major IBM parts depot, so a
:back-up spare parts warehouse was established on Okinawa. If "Oki"
:couldn't provide a necessary part, it was either repaired on-site,
:using creativity and pieces scavenged from less critical equipment, or
:ordered from the United States with a 24- to 48-hour delivery time.
:
:The heart of the IBM office compound, other than the people, was a
:Collins SSB (single side band) radio transceiver and 75-foot antenna
:capable of communicating with remote stations throughout Vietnam and
:Thailand. The office had a very old Japanese-made switchboard system
:(complete with operating instructions written in Japanese), but Saigon
:telephones were notoriously bad, and PTT had a terrible mess on their
:hands; consequently, the SSB radio system was made operational 24 hours
:a day. It was used for machine outage reporting, reporting up-country
:spare parts and supply requirements, planning preventive maintenance
:schedules, and monitoring the movements and status of the IBMers in
:residence up-country.
:
:The IBM customer engineers were also on call 24 hours a day, seven days
:a week, and the radio network often provided connectivity. The SSB
:network was used more than once by Army or Air Force personnel when
:their own telephones or communications systems failed. Each IBMer
:carried a portable Collins "handy-talky" used to report his whereabouts
:and parts requirements or, if necessary, to bash wayward cowboys intent
:on stealing his wristwatch.
:
:It was a standing company safety requirement for each IBMer to keep the
:home base informed as to exactly where he was and where he planned to
:go next--customer site, home, or bar. Each handy-talky was faithfully
:kept in a bedside battery charger at night in the "on" position. The
:Collins equipment worked flawlessly.
:
:IBM's military business in Southeast Asia was conducted under the
:guidelines of a yearly General Services Administration (GSA) contract.
:It provided for expedited DO/DX rated equipment purchase orders to
:ensure timely delivery of machines to Vietnam and Thailand. Most
:machines were shipped by air out of McClellan or Travis Air Force
:bases. The contract specified what machines had been approved for use
:in Southeast Asia and provided sales, rental and maintenance prices for
:all equipment and spare parts. The contract promised that IBM would
:provide at least two-hour or better maintenance response time in the
:event of a nonexpendable machine outage, although common sense had to
:prevail if a location were under attack and the situation was
:considered unsafe. The contract also provided for the logistical
:welfare of the IBMers in the war zone with respect to post exchange,
:medical, commissary, housing, recreation facilities and travel
:privileges.
:
:Each year the GSA contract became more comprehensive, more definitive
:and more cumbersome, but as a general rule the contract was the
:operative bible. Each year GSA renewed the contract months after the
:previous fiscal year's contract had expired, with the net result that
:the IBM bills could not be paid on time. It was said that our
:government knew how to order, ship and operate the equipment, but did
:not know how to pay for it. The IBM Corporation probably made money
:during the war, and at one three-year stretch between 1969 and 1971,
:the Saigon-based branch office could account for an estimated
:$70,000,000 to $80,000,000 in machine-based revenue. However, IBM's
:expenses were unique, unusually high, and the operation was clearly
:risky and subject to criticism by the United States government.
:
:IBM paid for employee housing, transportation, up-country 4-wheel-drive
:vehicles and portakamps, meals, inflated hazardous duty salaries,
:vacations, yearly R & Rs as well as the SSB communications equipment,
:and probably too many long-distance upper-management trips from the
:United States. Those millions in revenue also had to cover the federal
:sales, technical and administrative support organizations throughout
:the United States, the extra spare-parts system put in place across the
:Pacific, and of course the initial manufacturing of all the machines
:(and not all of them made it back to the States again) in use. IBM did
:not want to be viewed as profiteering from the war, but it is doubtful
:that they lost any money.
:
:IBM World Trade Corporation also had a sizable Vietnam-licensed
:business headquartered in downtown Saigon on Gia Long Street. The
:personnel at that site were almost entirely Vietnamese, Chinese or
:French citizens, with several American managers. This company sold and
:serviced computers for Vietnamese businesses, banks, the Vietnamese
:government and the VNAF (Vietnam Air Force [South]) and ARVN (Army of
:the Republic of Vietnam) military installations. IBM Vietnam was
:separate and distinct from this military support organization, with a
:completely different reporting structure through Hong Kong. It is only
:mentioned here to clarify the difference and to introduce what will be
:told in a follow-on story written about the 130 IBM Vietnam employees
:and their families who were trapped during the fall of Saigon in April
:1975
.
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