Hans palkarz - niemiecki antysemita


Podaje tutaj ten artykul, ze specjalna dedykacja dla pana
levi437 i jego mlodszego nasladowcy Tzva Adonai.
Przyjemnej lektury, mam nadzieje ze dowiecie sie czegos
nowego.




Everyday Anti-Semitism in Pre-war Nazi Germany: The Popular Bases
Source: M. H. Kater, Yad Vashem Studies XVI (Jerusalem, 1984), pp. 129-159.

Part A

The thesis that manifestations of "anti-Semitism" in the Third Reich were largely a
result of manipulations by Nazi politicians rather than the reflection of true
sentiments among the German people appears firmly established nowadays. This thesis
treats the course of German history as being devoid of a specific anti-Semitic
tradition and regards what authentic symptoms of anti-Semitism there were, before
and during Hitler's rise to power, as merely incidental 1 . One might well agree
with Hajo Holborn's suggestion that Hitler, the supreme propagandist of his Nazi
Party (NSDAP) and of the Third Reich, conjured up anti-Semitism by arousing hatred
within the Germans, in order to further the regime's ultimate goals. But then one
cannot, like Eva Reichmann, altogether discount pre-existing notions of Judeo-phobia
among the German people and, by implication, absolve them of their complicity in the
Holocaust 2 . Since the appearance of Reichmann's and Holborn's writings, certain
younger scholars, while indubitably presenting cogent arguments, have overemphasised
the degree of high-level Nazi management of anti-Jewish action. Conversely, they
have downplayed the spontaneity of such action and its general popularity with the
German public. In so doing, however, they have come close to mis-comprehending the
social basis of anti-Semitism in the Third Reich and to ignoring its important
historical antecedents 3 .

In this essay these antecedents will be briefly reviewed, in order to document the
continuity of anti-Semitism in German history primarily as a social phenomenon. Even
though the factor of manipulation of the anti-Semitic issue by the Nazi rulers from
1933 to 1939, for instance in the guise of anti-Jewish "legislation," cannot be
denied, more attention will be paid to the grey zones of overlapping
responsibilities of a semi-legal and semiprivate nature, as in cases of seemingly
spontaneous pogroms by the Stormtroopers (SA), which were witnessed by neutral and
often astonished bystanders. A further focus of this paper will be arbitrary,
hostile activities visited upon the Jews by civilians or nonofficial institutions
after 1933 that must be seen as a consequence of decades, if not centuries, of
anti-Semitism in Germany.


No one could seriously dispute the importance of anti-Semitism as a social,
economic, and political force of great vitality in the history of Germany, more
precisely: in the history of coexistence of Germans and Jews since the late Middle
Ages 4 . In the centuries following the Protestant Reformation German Jews were able
to improve their lot slowly, although they had to wait for the Enlightenment and for
Napoleonic rule in order to experience real emancipatory progress. In the nineteenth
century they gradually received full political, if not full social, rights.
Significantly, the rate of Jewish integration into German society was not
commensurate with the degree of political equalisation - a condition that still
distinguished this minority from other Germans 5 . As George L. Mosse, Peter G.J.
Pulzer, and others have indicated, the fate of German Jews again deteriorated at the
dawn of the twentieth century, as the new factor of ideology that claimed to set the
Jews anthropologically apart from Gentile Germans came into play. Perhaps one of the
most negative side-effects of the budding modern democracy in those decades was that
anti-Semitism, as a novel racist creed, could now be articulated with impunity at
various political levels. Due to the efforts of such politically influential men as
Heinrich von Treitschke, Max Hugo, Liebermann von Sonnenberg, and Heinrich Class,
anti-Jewish prejudices once more had become well entrenched within German society by
the time of World War I 6 . For many German Jews the phase of the Weimar Republic
from 1918/19 to 1933 promised to complete the process of emancipation begun so
prodigiously before 1914 7 . At the outset, this impression surely seemed justified,
especially when the Republic was compared with Eastern European countries 8 .
However, precisely because the Republic became associated, in the mind of the German
public, with increased liberties for Jews, it provoked further Judeo-phobia. Hence,
one can argue that there was a continuation of previous anti-Semitic trends, notably
the ideologically motivated strains of the post-Bismarckian era, facets of which
eventually merged easily with the pronouncedly virulent Jew hatred of the Nazis 9 .
Despite the fact that Jewish soldiers took full part in military activities during
WW I, they were sometimes discriminated against in the armed forces, and the
anti-Semitic German press characterised German Jews as war shirkers who would stay
behind the front lines in order to engage in war-profiteering 10 . Anti-Semitism at
the grass-roots level became manifest in the fall of 1918, when angry mobs in Munich
and Berlin physically attacked Jews during the turmoil of the revolution 11 , and in
1923/24, when in several areas of the Reich, including the capital, Jewish
shopkeepers were manhandled and even killed 12 . The concentration of Jews in
certain occupations (e.g., cattle-vending and tailoring within the lower middle
class, and legal and medical practice within the upper class) and their
preponderance in urban locations like Berlin, Frankfurt am Stain, Hamburg, and
Breslau, facilitated random attacks on and wanton discrimination against them
throughout the Weimar Republic 13 . In her recently published memoirs, the
German-Jewish physician Dr. Kaete Frankenthal writes that in the early days of the
Republic she was ordered an opportunity to engage in postdoctoral studies at the
University of Greifswald (hardly a mainstay of anti-Semitism). Yet she did not
accept the position, as she had doubts whether she would be tolerated there
sufficiently to enable her to finish her studies 14 . Anti-Semitism, with all its
well-known signs,' writes a surviving eyewitness, the German-Jewish high-school
teacher Dr. Heinemann Stern, fully showed itself at a time when Hitler and his
movement were still the object of curiosity or of casual jokes.' 15 In the Weimar
Republic, many of these Jew-haters turned to National Socialism because it offered
them an outlet for their anti-Semitism 16 . Historically, many privately or
spontaneously executed acts of anti-Semitism during the early years of the Third
Reich can be linked to precedents perpetrated by vicious anti-Semites in the
republican era. Hence in Hanover, at a public meeting in July 1922, after local Nazi
leader Gustav Seifert had blamed all of Germany's ills on the influx of Eastern
Jews, his remarks were loudly applauded by the audience 17 . The Nazis formulated a
specifically anti-Jewish platform as part of their February 1920 program and toward
the end of the Republic they reiterated that in a Third Reich Jews would be deprived
of their rights by legal process.' 18 They consistently fanned the flames of
anti-Semitism by the fabrication and distribution of hate propaganda, especially
after 1929. Their tirades were ingeniously contrived to cater to all manner of
German groups, whatever their anti-Semitic motives. Many German women, for instance,
customarily bore grudges against Jews for religious or aesthetic reasons, so the
Nazis tried to reach them on those grounds 19 . Since in some areas of Germany,
predominantly the small towns and rural districts, the myth of Jewish ritual
killings of young Christian boys was still given credence, Der Stuermer, the weekly
paper of Nuremberg Jew-baiter Julius Streicher, published spurious evidence on
Jewish child-murders that was received from as far afield as East Prussia 20 .
Many Germans of the Weimar Republic resented the Jews as economic rivals, be they
doctors or lawyers within the upper segments of German society 21 , or shopkeepers
and tradesmen in the lower middle class 22 . The latter found a particularly
accommodatipolitical champion in Adolf Hitler, and the Fuehrer and his lieutenants
in turn fully exploited thSemitism of carpenters, greengrocers, and their likes. The
durability of this alliance must be regarded as one of the chief reasons for the
success of the Nazi movement until 1933. Examples of this mutually complementary
relationship are plentiful. In January 1928 a paperhanger from Rheinish Krefeld sent
a linocut he had made to the regional Nazi Party headquarters; it depicted a
National-Socialist knight galloping over a Jewish dragon 23 .

Three years later East Prussian tobacco vendors were said to be joining the Nazis
because of the competition in the trade by "Eastern Galician Jews." 24
It must be said that the Nazis appealed to these feelings with a great deal of
sensitivity, and it is entirely possible that with their clever slogans and specious
but effective argumentation they inculcated anti-Semitic resentment among those
members of the lower middle class who had formerly been neutral or impervious. A
case in point is the well-known Nazi campaign against German chain stores, many of
which were indeed owned by Jews, in the midst of the Great Depression in December
1930. The Nazi allegation, directed toward Gentile shopkeepers and corner-store
proprietors, that "Jewish department stores are destroying the retail trade," not
only fell on the open ears of those who had started to suffer from economic setbacks
and were, typically, blaming the Jews already, but it may also have reached and
converted to Nazism those who were afraid of running into trouble in the future.
Squarely, the Nazis told them who would be responsible on all counts: the Jews.
Hence new anti-Semites could easily have been reared 25 . It was at about this time,
after the Nazis had made astonishing gains in the September 1930 elections, that the
first serious anti-Jewish pogrom broke out in Berlin, orchestrated, it is true, by
the Nazi Wolf Heinrich Graf von Helldorf, but staged by people who, if they were
National Socialists, certainly had not been compelled to join Hitler's movement by
anything but their own decision, however that was motivated 26 .


During the early days of the Third Reich the German Jews were not persecuted within
the framework of a rationally conceived scheme nor according to a secret master
plan, although Hitler's instinctive antipathy to them always remained, implicitly,
the ideal guideline. After January 30, 1933, Nazi policy against the Jews came to
resemble a pattern of interactions between private or personal initiative,
semi-legal activities (in which the avant-garde of the Nazi Party, notably the SA,
were often pitted against the more temperate officials of the state), and, Finally,
governmental legislation. Such legislation was introduced relatively haphazardly and
appeared to touch only on major aspects of what was officiously called the "Jewish
Question," but it was intended to be synchronised with the less official action.
Evidently Hitler and his cronies hoped that such action would in itself suffice to
motivate the German Jews to leave the country. Paradoxically, when popular and
official persecutions did begin, the opportunities for Jewish emigration abroad were
progressively curtailed until, in the end, Hitler and his followers consolidated and
carried out the plan of the Final Solution 27 .

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, official anti-Semitic policy, which not only
lacked the sanction of populist initiative but transpired entirely beyond the
control and even knowledge of the common people, was implemented at two levels: that
of the state and of the party. This distinction is important, because activities at
the party level -at least potentially -allowed for the participation of "Aryan"
civilians and thus could provide visible proof of the kind of popular, spontaneous
anti-Semitism which the Nazis were always at great pains to demonstrate,
particularly to foreign critics. There were two main ordinances at the governmental
level, and two additional lines of action at the party level that were
government-inspired and officially supported. The first governmental law against
German Jews was the one regarding the "Reconstitution of the Civil Service" of April
7, 1933, and it was later followed by the Nuremberg race legislation of September
15, 1935 28 . The anti-Jewish machinations instigated by agencies of the NSDAP
consisted of the boycott of April 1, 1933, and the events of the so-called
Reichskristallnacht of November 9 to 10, 1938, about which much has already been
written 29 . In both these scenarios, the main protagonists were members of the
predatory SA. Taking his cue from these Brown Shirts, who had been molesting Jews -
especially those with small and medium-sized business - indiscriminately since the
political take over at the end of January 1933, Hitler, while trying to ensure full
control over the SA, decided to give them free reign in the boycott of Jewish
businesses and offices on April 1, 1933, thereby attaining several goals at once.
First, he could teach German Jews a harsh lesson by letting them know that his brand
of anti-Semitism was not trivial but serious 30 . Second, he was able, momentarily
at least, to placate the impatient Brown Shirts who were increasingly crying out for
the fulfilment of a "second" Nazi revolution; at the same time he could attempt to
contain them. And third, he could utilise these initial anti-Jewish measures to gain
a sense of future direction for himself, in terms of how far the German people would
be prepared to go, the Jewish reaction with a view to emigration, and the technical
and logistic aspects of the implementation of anti-Semitic policy.

References:


1. The first view has been succinctly stated by Thomas Nipperdey, ?1933 und
Kontinuitaet der deutschen Geschichte,? Historische Zeitschrift 227, 1978: 98. An
example of the second view is in William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power:
The Experience of a Single German Town 1930¯1935 , Chicago, 1965, p. 77, who writes
that the inhabitants of the small North German town of Northeim (?Thalburg?) were
drawn to anti-Semitism because they were drawn to Nazism, not the other way around.'

2. Hajo Holborn, ?Origins and Political Character of Nazi Ideology,? Political
Science Quarterly 79, 1964: 546; Eva G. Reichmann, Die Flucht in den Hass: Die
Ursachen der deutschen Judenkatastrophe , Frankfurt am Main, n.d., especially pp.
279¯82. For a recent, sympathetic criticism of Reichmann's view, see Michael R.
Marrus, ?The Theory and Practice of Anti-Semitism,? Commentary , August 1982: 38.
3. See especially Ian Kershaw, ?Antisemitismus und Volksmeinung: Reaktionen auf die
Judenverfolgung? (hereafter¯Kershaw, ?Antisemitismus und Volksmeinung?) in Martin
Broszat and Elke Froelich, eds., Bayern in der NS-Zeit II: Herrschaft und
Gesellschaft im Konflikt, Teil A , Munich and Vienna, 1979, pp. 291¯308; idem , ?The
Persecution of the Jews and German Popular Opinion in the Third Reich,? Leo Baeck
Institute Year Book 26, 1981: 261¯89; idem , ?Alltaegliches und Ausseralltaegliches:
Ihre Bedeutung fuer die Volksmeinung 1933¯1939,? Detlev Peukert and Juergen
Reulecke, eds., Die Reihen fest geschlossen: Beitraege zur Geschichte des Alltags
unterm Nationalsozialismus , Wuppertal, 1981 (hereafter¯Peukert and Reulecke), pp.
273¯92. Kershaw also underestimates anti-Semitism as a factor in the pre¯1933 rise
of National Socialism, in his ?Ideology, Propaganda, and the Rof the Nazi Party,? in
Peter D. Stachura, ed., The Nazi Machtergreifung , London, 1983, pp. 167¯68. To a
lesser extent Falk Wiesemann's remarks in M. Broszat et al., eds., Bayern in der
NS-Zeit: Soziale Lage und politisches Verhalten der Bevoelkerung im Spiegel
vertraulicher Berichte , Munich and Vienna, 1977, p. 430. Such interpretation is
supported, from the contemporary view of the 1930s, by judgements in the reports of
the exiled SPD. See, for example, Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen
Partei Deutschlands (Sopade) 1934¯1940 , Salzhausen and Frankfurt am Main, 1970, 2
(1935): 925; and ibid. 7 (1940): 260. A balanced assessment of the problem is given
in Lawrence D. Stokes, ?The German People and the Destruction of the European Jews,?
Central European History 6, 1973 (hereaft¯Stokes), especially pp. 173¯74, 182, 190.
4. See the relevant chapters in Max L. Margolis and Alexander Marx, A History of the
Jewish People , New York, 1974. See also Wanda Kampmann, Deutsche und Juden: Studien
zur Geschichte des deutschen Judentums , Heidelberg, 1963 (hereafter¯Kampmann), pp.
13¯34; Leo Sievers, Juden in Deutschland: Die Geschichte einer 2000jaehrigen
Tragoedie , Hamburg, 1979 (hereafter¯Sievers), pp. 21¯56.
5. Reinhard Ruerup, Emanzipation und Antisemitismus: Studien zur ?Judenfrageî der
buergerlichen Gesellschaft , Goettingen, 1975 (hereafter¯Ruerup), pp. 11¯73;
Kampmann, pp. 35¯224; Sievers, pp. 83¯224. For Stuttgart, see Maria Zelzer, Weg und
Schicksal der Stuttgarter Juden: Ein Gedenkbuch , Stuttgart, n.d.
(hereafter¯Zelzer), pp. 20¯60. For the example of Gerson von Bleichroeder, see Fritz
Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichroeder, and the Buildingof the German Empire ,
New York, 1977 (hereafter¯F. Stern), pp. 461¯93; for the example of Albert Ballin,
see Lamar Cecil, Albert Ballin: Business and Politics in Imperial Germany 1889¯1918
, Princeton, 1967, pp. 3¯142.
6. George L. Mosse, Germans and Jews: The Right, the Left, and the Search for a
?Third Forceî in Pre-Nazi Germany , New York, 1971, pp. 3¯76; Peter G. J. Pulzer,
The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria , New York, 1964
(hereafter¯Pulzer), pp. 76¯126. See also Ruerup, pp. 74¯114; F. Stern, pp. 494¯531;
Gordon A. Craig, Modern Germany 1866¯1945 , New York and Oxford, 1978, pp. 83¯85,
204; Richard S. Levy, The Downfall of the Anti-Semitic Political Parties in Imperial
Germany , New Haven and London, 1975; and the pre¯1914 chapters in Brewster S.
Chamberlain, ?The Enemy on the Right: The Alldeutsche Verband in the Weimar
Republic, 1918¯1926,? PhD dissertation, University of Maryland, 1972.
7. Donald L. Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany , Baton Rouge and London, 1980
(hereafter¯Niewyck), especially p. 12; Egmont Zechlin, Die deutsche Politik und die
Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg , Goettingen, 1969 (hereafter¯Zechlin), pp. 554¯55;
Heinemann Stern, Warum hassen sie uns eigentlich? Juedisches Leben zwischen den
Kriegen , ed. Hans Ch. Meyer, Duesseldorf, 1970 (hereafter¯H. Stern), p. 163;
Wolfgang Scheffler, Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich 1933¯1945 , 2nd ed., Berlin,
1964, p. 15.
8. Undoubtedly, this is why many Russian and Polish Jews came to Germany after 1918,
even though some of them went on to France and the USA. See S. Adler-Rudel, Ostjuden
in Deutschland, 1880¯1940: Zugleich eine Geschichte der Organisationen, die sie
betreuten , Tuebingen, 1959, pp. 64¯150. For Heilbronn, see Hans Franke, Geschichte
und Schicksal der Juden in Heilbronn: Vom Mittelalter bis zur Zeit der
nationalsozialistischen Verfolgungen (1050¯1945) , Heilbronn, 1963
(hereafter¯Franke), pp. 106¯107.
9. This is ably shown in Monika Richarz's introduction to the book she edited,
Juedisches Leben in Deutschland: Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1918¯1945 ,
Stuttgart, 1982, esp. pp. 28¯30, 37. Also see first-hand accounts by survivors,
ibid., pp. 77¯227. Further, see the balanced judgements rendered in a volume of
essays edited by Werner E. Mosse, Entscheidungsjahr 1932: Zur Judenfrage in der
Endphase der Weimarer Republik , 2nd ed., Tuebingen, 1966 (hereafter¯W. E. Mosse).
The blending of pro-Nazi and Nazi impulses of anti-Semitism is most ably described
in Niewyck, pp. 46¯54.
10.Pulzer, p. 289; Zechlin, pp. 517¯53; H. Stern, pp. 96¯97, 106; Paul Sauer, Die
juedischen Gemeinden in Wuerttemberg und Hohenzollern: Denkmale, Geschichte,
Schicksale , Stuttgart, 1966 (hereafter¯Sauer), p. 196.
11.Theodor Abel, Why Hitler Came To Power , New York, 1966; first printing, 1936, p.
156; George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism , New
York, 1978, pp. 177¯78.
12.Julius Wissmann, ?Zur Geschichte der Juden in Wuerttemberg 1924¯1939?
(hereafter¯Wissmann) in Sauer, p. 200; Max P. Birnbaum, Staat und Synagoge
1918¯1938: Eine Geschichte des Preussischen Landesverbandes juedischer Gemeinden
(1918¯1938) , Tuebingen, 1981 (hereafter¯Birnbaum), p. 85.
13.For the demography and social conditions of German Jews, see Heinrich
Silbergleit, Die Bevoelkerungs- und Berufsverhaeltnisse der Juden im Deutschen
Reich, Berlin, 1930; Esra Bennathan, ?Die demographische und wirtschaftliche
Struktur der Juden,? in W. E. Mosse, pp. 87¯131; Gerhard Schulz, Aufstieg des
Nationalsozialismus: Krise und Revolution in Deutschland , Frankfurt am Main, 1975
(hereafter¯Schulz), pp. 615¯17. As an impressionistic account of Jews in Frankfurt,
see Valentin Senger, No. 12 Kaiserhofstrasse , New York, 1980, pp. 9¯53.
14.Kaete Frankental, Der dreifache Fluch: Juedin, Intellektuelle, Sozialistin:
Lebenserinnerungen einer Ärztin in Deutschland und im Exil , Frankfurt am Main, 1981
(hereafter¯Frankethal), p. 99. Also see the examples in G. L. Mosse, Final Solution
, pp. ¯79; Niewyck, pp. 55¯81; Franke, p. 110; Stern, pp. 104¯05, 163¯80; Michael H.
Kater, Studentenfreundschaft und Rechtsradikalismu in Deutschland 1918¯1933 : Eine
sozialgeschichtliche Studie zur Bildungskrise in der Weimarer Republik , Hamburg,
1975, pp. 146¯47; Franz Hundsnurscher and Gerhard Taddey, Die Juedischen Gemeinden
in Baden: Denkmale, Geschichte, Schicksale , Stuttgart, 1968, p. 22. In more general
terms: Zechlin, p. 565; Alex Bein, Die Judenfrage: Biographie eines Weltproblems ,
Stuttgart, 1980 (hereafter¯Bein), Vol. 1, p. 371.
15.H. Stern, p. 168. As in this case, all translations of original German texts into
English are by the author.
16.This connection is explained in Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social
Profile of Members and Leaders , 1919¯1945 , Cambridge, Mass., 1983
(hereafter¯Kater, Nazi Party ), pp. 19¯71. See also Peter H. Merkl, Political
Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis , Princeton, 1975, passim.
17.John Farquharson, ?The NSDAP in Hanover and Lower Saxony 1921¯26,? Journal of
Contemporary History , Vol. 8, No. 4, October 1973, p. 110.
18.Niewyck, p. 53, Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy
Toward German Jews 1933¯1939 , Urbana, Ill., 1979 (hereafter¯Schleunes), p. 70.
19.See the reference to Unsittlichkeit (immorality) in an anti-Jewish flyer,
?Wohnungsnot und Juden-Einwanderung,? n.d. [appr. 1929], Staatliches Archivlager
Goettingen, Gauarchiv Ostpreussen, Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz, microfilms
Niedersaechsisches Staatsarchiv Bueckeburg (hereafter¯SAG), SF 6826, GA/101.
Examples of rabid anti-Semitism among German women of the upper classes are to be
found in Guida Diehl, Die Deutsche Frau und der Nationalsozialismus , Eisenach,
1933, pp. 15, 56; Hildegard Passow, ?Juedische Greuelpropaganda,? Informationsdienst
der NSF (Deutscher Frauenorden), No. 11, Munich, April 8, 1933, Hoover Institution
on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, NSDAP Hauptarchiv, microfilm 13/254.
20.Correspondence of Der Stuermer with NSDAP chapter Koenigsberg, December 1932,
SAG, SF 6818, GA¯29.
21.See Kater, Nazi Party , pp. 67¯68, 110¯11.
22.The anti-Semitism of the lower-middle-class members in the Weimar Republic is
treated in Heinrich August Winkler, Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus:
Die politische Entwicklung von Handwerk und Kleinhandel in der Weimarer Republik ,
Cologne, 1972 (see, for instance, p. 177). See also Schulz, p. 618.
23.Enclosure with letter from Beil to Gauleitung Ruhr, Krefeld, January 14, 1928,
Hauptstaatsarchiv Duesseldorf, RW 23/NSDAP, GauleitungRuhr.
24.Brettschneider to Heidrich, Elbing, January 23, 1931, SAG, SF 6819, GA¯35.
25.The Nazis argued wrongly, but, according to lower-middle-class shopkeeper
mentality, utterly convincingly, when they said: Cheap merchandise, manufactured
under the personal direction of Jews, is flooding the Christmas market. The golden
calf is playing the role of the Christ child! With typically Jewish cynicism one
rabbi says: Too bad that Mary did not bear two Jesus boys. Had she done so, our
people could now double their Christmas sales!!!' (flyer, ?Die Christus ans Kreuz
schlugen, machen das Weihnachts-Geschaeft!? Koenigsberg, n.d. [shortly before
December 12, 1930], SAG, SF 6826, GA¯101). See also Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter:
The Social Foundation of Fascism in Germany, 1919¯1933 , Chapel Hill and Lon, 1983.
26.Frankenthal, p. 237. See also Franke, p. 108; Birnbaum, p. 186.
27.The background for the above is in Hans Mommsen, ?Der nationalsozialistische
Polizeistaat und die Judenverfolgung vor 1938,? Vierteljahreshefte fuer
Zeitgeschichte 10, 1962: 68¯77; Schleunes; Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im
Dritten Reich , Duesseldorf, 1979 (hereafter¯Adam); and Raul Hilberg, The
Destruction of European Jews , Chicago, 1967, pp. 18¯105. Also see Mommsen, ?Die
Realisierung des Utopischen: Die Endloesung der Judenfrage' im Dritten Reich,'?
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 9, 1983: 381¯420.
28.Partial text is in Gerd Ruehle, Das Dritte Reich: Dokumentarische Darstellung des
Aufbaues der Nation , Berlin, 1933, pp. 112¯13, and cf. p. 145. The most exhaustive
interpretation of this law is still that in Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten
Reich: Mit ausgewaehlten Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Beamtenpolitik ,
Stuttgart, 1966, pp. 39¯61. See also Adam, pp. 51¯64. See Gerd Ruehle, Das Dritte
Reich: Dokumentarische Darstellung des Aufbaues der Nation: Das dritte Jahr 1935 ,
Berlin, 1935, pp. 254¯58, 277¯82; Schleunes, pp. 120¯32; Adam, pp. 114¯44.
29.A contemporary Nazi interpretation of Reichskristallnacht and its consequences is
provided in Gerd Ruehle, Das Dritte Reich: Dokumentarische Darstellung des Aufbaues
der Nation: Das sechste Jahr 1938 , Berlin, 1938, pp. 394¯404. Critically and in the
context of other official anti-Semitic measures: Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German
Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism , New York
and Washington, 1972, pp. 366¯68; Hermann Graml, Der 9. November 1938:
?Reichskristallnacht,î Bonn, 1958; Helmut Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden aus
der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich , Goettingen, 1966, pp. 177¯217; Schleunes, pp.
214¯54; Adam, pp. 204¯16. For local examples of how the destruction was organised
see, in the case of Mannheim, Hans Joachim Fliedner, Die Judenverfolgung in Mannheim
1933¯1945 , Stuttgart, 1971 (hereafter¯Fliedner), pp. 199¯204; in the case of
Stuttgart, Zelzer, pp. 194¯96.
30.In 1933 and even later, there was a sizeable number of German Jews who either did
not believe Hitler's judeo-phobic utterances or ¯ worse ¯ pretended to identify
themselves with them by pointing their fingers at ?bad? Germans or allegedly
inferior Eastern Jews. For the period before April 1, 1933, see the evidence in
Peter Hanke, Zur Geschichte der Juden in Muenchen zwischen 1933¯1945 , Munich, 1967
(hereafter¯Hanke), pp. 106¯108; Frankenthal, p. 235; entry for March 28, 1933, in
Erich Ebermayer, Denn heute gehoert uns Deutschland. Persoenliches und politisches
Tagebuch: Von der Machtergreifung bis zum 31. Dezember 1935 , Hamburg and Vienna,
1959, p. 49. See also Fliedner, p. 45; Carl J. Rheins, ?Deutscher Vortrupp,
Gefolgschaft deutscher Juden 1933¯1935,? Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 26, 1981:
207¯29; Hans-Joachim Schoeps, ?Bereit fuer Deutschland?: Der Patriotismus deutscher
Juden und der Nationalsozialismus: Fruehe Schriften 1930 bis 1939: Eine historische
Dokumentation , Berlin, 1970, pp. 9¯166; example Toni Ullstein in Hermann Zondek,
Auf festem Fusse: Erinnerungen eines juedischen Klinikers , Stuttgart, 1973, p. 171.
Especially telling is the telegram by the Jewish Centralverein functionary Dr.
Julius Brodnitz to Hitler [Berlin], March 23 [1933]: ?Zusammenstellung der Schritte,
die der Centralverein Deutscher Staatsbuerger Juedischen Glaubens e.V. gegen die
Greuelpropaganda des Auslandes [!] unternommen hat,? n.d. [1933], SAG, SF 6818,
GA¯29. For Goering's role in this see Birnbaum, p. 225, n. 3. The examples of the
Jewish Professor Otto Lubarsch, at the medical faculty of the University of Berlin,
and (honorary) Professor Paul Nikolaus Cossmann, in Munich, are particularly tragic.
Both were hyper-nationalistic and on the verge of anti-Semitism. Lubarsch greeted
Hitler's rise to power with enthusiasm. He died in April 1933 before the Nazis could
touch him, but Cossmann was deported and killed in Theresienstadt (1942). On
Lubarsch, see Walter Stoeckel, Erinnerungen eines Frauenarztes , ed. Hans Borgelt,
Munich, 1966, p. 180; Otto Lubarsch, Ein bewegtes Gelehrtenleben: Erinnerungen und
Erlebnisse, Kaempfe und Gedanken , Berlin, 1931, pp. 539¯68. On Cossmann, see George
F. W. Hallgarten, Als die Schatten fielen: Erinnerungen vom Jahrhundertbeginn zur
Jahrtausendwende , Frankfurt am Main, 1969, pp. 67¯76; Else Behrend-Rosenfeld, Ich
stand nicht allein: Erlebnisse einer Juedin in Deutschland 1933¯1944 , 2nd ed.,
Frankfurt am Main


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