Strategic Chess
- From: "fuwalter@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <fuwalter@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2007 19:37:27 +0800
Strategic Chess
Tag it:Gavin Pao
18 September 2007
Do four-power military exercises and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
foreshadow a new sphere of conflict?
Big-power military blocs appear to be back on the table in Asia. In a vast
geographical exercise held with surprisingly little publicity earlier this
month, the navies of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India took to the
Bay of Bengal for war games stretching from Andhra Pradesh to the Andaman
Islands. The first security exercise by the ?Quadrilateral initiative,? as the
group is known, it also included a small contingent from Singapore. It involved
two US carriers, the Kitty Hawk and the Nimitz, plus 25 other surface ships and
submarines.
This display of floating iron, one of the biggest exercises of its kind ever, is
notable because it came just after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
comprised of China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries, held its group
summit and military exercises. It remains to be seen if the SCO will become more
than a symbolic talking shop, but it seems to have energized India into becoming
involved in a way the previous Congress governments would have abhorred. In the
past, they saw the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality,
particularly nuclear neutrality. Today, ships like the Nimitz, which are assumed
to carry nuclear weapons as a matter of routine, are allowed to berth in Indian
ports.
And, whatever the claims to the contrary, it is clear that the Quad initiative,
as it has come to be called, was formed with the express aim of countering the
Shanghai bloc, and in particular containing China. Defense papers published
independently by all four countries have recently listed China as a potential
?military threat.?
The quad countries assert that the joint military actions are not directed
against China, which to Beijing seems disingenuous. But the budding alliance may
think this a perfectly justified explanation because they consider their moves
purely defensive.
The military exercises may also have been timed to coincide with the recent APEC
meeting in Sydney so as to ensure that the games were not front-page material.
While the Shanghai cooperation group joint exercises in August were subject to
extensive coverage and fanfare in the international press, with images of
Chinese, Russian, and Central Asian forces storming simulated ?terrorized
villages? in the Russian Urals, coverage of the Quad games has been relatively
light, with more attention being paid to the amount of barbed wire being used to
cordon off the Sydney Opera House for the APEC leaders.
Apart from cooperation on energy and ?counter-terrorism,? the SCO is seen as a
bulwark against perceived US meddling in Central Asia, and as such it has been
labeled by some as a ?NATO of the east? that pointedly excludes Washington. How
close this perception is to reality is debatable. Unlike NATO, the SCO has
little shared substance, ideological or otherwise, and appears to be formed
through expediency for all parties concerned.
As with the SCO however, there are legitimate and pragmatic reasons for the Quad
nations to conduct joint military cooperation, revolving mainly around the twin
issues of energy and security. All four Quad countries are keen to ensure that
the Malacca Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia, the world?s busiest waterway,
is kept free of threats. Roughly 30 percent of the world?s cargo trade passes
through the strait and the need to ensure safe passage is certainly paramount.
The strategic importance of the strait as a conduit for oil imports is
sacrosanct to a number of countries, including China, Japan and South Korea.
However, with the Quad exercises being conducted with a heavy arsenal that
included aircraft and submarines, it is clear that potential threats posed
unconventional forces, like terrorists or pirates, have hardly been accorded
first priority. Moreover, effective patrolling of the strait can be enforced
primarily through close coordination between Malaysian, Singaporean, American
and Indonesian intelligence agencies, without any need for substantial Indian or
Japanese involvement.
The irony regarding the argument for protecting the Malacca Strait is that
controlling it through a forum in which China is not involved effectively hangs
a psychological noose over China?s head. Roughly 60 percent of China?s foreign
trade and 75 percent of its oil imports also pass through the Malacca Strait,
and it explains why China has been so aggressive in creating new transport
outlets for itself away from the coast.
Such projects have come in all sorts of forms, from blasting the banks of the
Mekong River to deepen its waters and facilitate river transport, to expanding
road networks to create a direct link between Kunming in China?s Yunnan Province
and Bangkok, and onwards to Singapore.
In addition, China has also shown strong support for a Malaysian initiative to
lay new oil pipelines traversing peninsular Malaysia. If realized, oil from the
Middle East could potentially be transported by ship to Malaysia?s west coast,
where it would then be piped over to the east coast, stored, and then shipped
again north to China. Such a route would completely bypass the Malacca Strait
and also reduce transportation expenses.
It is important to put the recent display of Quad initiative military solidarity
into proper perspective. This is by no means a showcase of the four powers
firing off threateningly on all cylinders. In fact, the exercises are arguably
nothing more than an expansion of recent naval exercises conducted exclusively
between India and the US, known as the ?Malabar series,? with new additions
Australia, Japan and Singapore.
The US contributed 13 warships to the Quad exercises and India seven, Australia
was only represented by one frigate and a tanker, and Singapore one frigate.
Japan was represented by two destroyers. As far as the Quad countries are
concerned, such initiatives are simply a natural extension of the well-molded
alliances between them, with both Australia and India having recently signed
cooperation pacts with Japan in the last year.
For India, the latest exercises symbolize the extent of cooperation with the
United States everything from "civil nuclear material" to counter-terrorism.
With India being a nuclear-armed country that has refused to sign the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty, US support of its policies is a major factor
deflecting intense scrutiny on the issue from the international community.
Mutual concern over China may be what really brings the US and India together.
Throughout the Cold War, the two were diametrically opposed, and often at
loggerheads, as India fought a border war with China and became the Soviets'
staunchest ally in the region, while the US threw its weight behind Pakistan.
The sudden shifts in allegiance after the Cold War suggest that US-India
concerns were based more on pragmatism than ideology. Certainly there is still
considerable anti-US sentiment in India in the form of economic protectionism,
as well as recent public demonstrations against the idea of India being seen as
an American puppet. But there is also the worry that Pakistan?s growing
closeness to Beijing needs to be countered.
India believes it has legitimate cause for concern over China. In 1962, the two
countries fought a brief but bloody war along their mountainous borders, during
which the Indian forces were comprehensively routed. To this day, border issues
remain among the most prickly of concerns between the two countries, with both
claiming large areas of land within each others? borders as their own.
India also sees China as a meddler on the subcontinent, traditionally an
India-dominant sphere of influence, and a direct competitor in other regions,
including Central Asia and ASEAN, in which China has the clear upper hand.
Recently, Chinese companies also outflanked Indian rivals on a number of
occasions to secure important energy contracts in Kazakhstan.
For its part, Japan will see the Quad initiative as a welcome boost for itself
in an Asia where, due to continuing animosity stemming from the Second World
War, it could not seriously depend on alliances with its neighbors to guarantee
its safety.
It will also see the Quad military exercises as a symbol of the renewed
legitimacy of Japan as it moves farther away from its post-World War II status
as a country without an offensive military capability. And as with India, China
has territorial disputes with Japan, as well as bitter arguments over deep-sea
oil rights in the East China Sea, which remain in deadlock.
Most importantly though, China?s always threatening stance towards Taiwan,
coupled with its disregard for the American military presence in the Taiwan
Strait, has caused Japan to feel that it can no longer look solely to the US
Navy as the ultimate guarantor of security.
It is the unpredictable nature of China's government, stemming from the passage
of its 2005 anti-secession bill that advocates the use of force against Taiwan
if it should it ever declare independence, that may be the most important reason
why China, the US, and other regional powers are unlikely to form a singular
grouping on regional security in the near future, despite this being the most
pragmatic and conciliatory approach for all sides concerned.
Fueling the incipient fear of China is its sheer size. China has the world?s
largest army, with roughly 2.2 million active troops and another 5 million in
reserve. It has roughly 14,000 tanks, 15,500 artillery pieces, and 450
helicopters, while the navy has 63 submarines and18 destroyers. The Chinese Air
Force operates more than 2,550 fighter jets.
As for the United States, the Quad initiative itself is hardly a foreign policy
priority. It seems just another convenient vehicle to help the US maintain its
strong footing in Asia, at a time when it is bogged down with disasters of its
own making in the Middle East.
Moreover, bringing the four countries together under a banner of democracy
encourages countries in the region, particularly in ASEAN, to remain close to
the US and Japan while simultaneously giving extra impetus to democratic reforms
currently under way in many of those countries, such as Indonesia.
Unsurprisingly, of all the major Asia-Pacific players, Australia has the most
laid-back and friendly attitude towards China. Popular perceptions tend to be
the least negative in Australia compared to the other three countries, according
to published polls.
This is partly due to Australia?s recent economic boom, which has largely been
fueled by Chinese demand for Australian resources. China is now Australia?s
largest trading partner, and Australia enjoys a trade surplus with China. At the
recent APEC meeting, John Howard signed a gas export deal China worth up to
AU$45 billion. In 2006, China bought an estimated US$250 million worth of
uranium.
Australia has done the most to allay Chinese fears, with its government
announcing in July that Australia, New Zealand, and China would hold their first
ever joint naval exercises later this September.
China, meanwhile, remains confident in its backyard, with much of the region
under its sway. While ASEAN countries still look to the US as the region?s
ultimate guarantor of security, Beijing has played a skillful diplomatic game in
Southeast Asia, according the region top priority during a time when the United
States has tended to take ASEAN for granted, as symbolized by Condoleeza Rice
skipping several key ASEAN summits. Philippine President Gloria Arroyo even
referred to China as a ?big brother? at an ASEAN summit this year.
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