Post presidential election analysis

I found this article on naharnet. It was interesting so here is a
repost.

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Whatever else is said about the agreement between Lebanon's leaders
reached in Qatar on Wednesday, it will likely transform the country's
political landscape. With the election of a president, alliances will
change and with that we may see growing intricacy and reversals in the
relationships between March 14 groups and opposition groups.

One thing that will not change, however, is the attitude of a majority
of Lebanese when it comes to Hizbullah's behavior. Party officials
have recklessly downplayed their armed occupation of Beirut two weeks
ago, but no one, least of all the Sunnis, will soon forget what
happened. So even if genuine politics return, those of compromise and
shifting calculations, the structural inability of Hizbullah to
coexist with a sovereign Lebanese state will not disappear. This may
push domestic parties to acquire weapons for when Hizbullah again uses
bullets to overcome its political shortcomings.

Like most compromises, the Doha agreement has created winners and
losers on all sides - but remains nebulous enough so that the losers
still feel they might gain from it. But it's difficult not to
interpret what happened in Qatar as a definitive sign that Syria's
return to Lebanon is no longer possible. No doubt the Syrians were in
on the arrangement, and the suspicious delay in establishing the
Hariri tribunal until early 2009 makes one wonder whether a quid pro
quo is taking shape behind the scenes. Reports of a breakthrough on
the Syrian-Israeli track, the Iraqi Army's entry into Sadr City,
certainly with an Iranian green light, and signs that a truce may soon
be agreed in Gaza, suggest a regional package deal may have oiled the
Lebanese deal.

If there was one message emerging from the recent fighting, it was
that Syria could not conceivably return its army to Lebanon without
reconquering the country. Hizbullah committed several mistakes, of
which two were especially egregious for Syria: The Sunni community,
like the Druze and many Christians, are mobilized and will fight any
Syrian comeback; and the Lebanese file is more than ever an Iranian
one, because Hizbullah's destiny is at stake. Syria's allies, other
than Hizbullah, were ineffective in Beirut and the mountains, in some
cases even siding with the majority. This confirmed that Damascus has
less leverage than ever when it comes to employing those smaller armed
groups it completely controls.

The election of a president, even if he is the troubling Michel
Suleiman, opens a new phase in Lebanon, one in which it is possible to
imagine consolidating a state gradually breaking free from Syria's
grip. That's the priority today, and has been the priority since April
2005 when the Syrian Army withdrew from the country. Whether Suleiman
likes it or not, from now on he is a president, not a candidate
maneuvering to become a president, which will require him to take a
strong position on defending the sovereignty of the state both vis-ˆ-
vis Syria and Hizbullah. That could either push him closer to the
position favored by March 14 and most Lebanese, or it could damage him
if he proves to be indecisive.

Will March 14 survive after this? It probably will in the face of an
armed Hizbullah and Syria's foreseeable efforts to regain a foothold
in Beirut. But the parliamentary majority may transform itself into a
looser alignment, united on the large issues but with its leaders
behaving parochially when it comes to elections and patronage. Once
Suleiman is elected, he becomes an arbiter, an axial figure, in the
political game. Politicians will have to position themselves either
for or against him, as the president strives to build up a power base
for himself in the state, particularly in Parliament. Expect Suleiman
to use the army as his bludgeon, which would be regrettable, and
expect tension between the officers and traditional politicians.

One unanswered question is who will be prime minister. If it is Saad
Hariri, and it is difficult to imagine it won't be, the relationship
between him and Suleiman will determine the face of Lebanon in the
coming year before parliamentary elections. Neither of the two would
relish a return to the discord between Emile Lahoud and Rafik Hariri.
On top of that, if Saad becomes head of the government, he would
benefit from using that position as a foundation to create networks of
alliances transcending those of March 14. An electoral compact with
the Armenians, particularly the Tashnag Party, would be a smart move,
and could shift the balance in Beirut decisively away from Hizbullah,
Amal and Syrian peons.

Another question is what happens to Walid Jumblatt? The Druze leader
has placed himself at the center of March 14 - a key mediator and
usually prime initiator of the coalition's policies. With a new
president in place, Jumblatt's role will be largely determined by the
relationship between Suleiman and his prime minister. If the prime
minister is Hariri and Hariri and Suleiman work well together,
Jumblatt could find himself isolated. In that case, and if history
provides any lessons, he will soon be contesting Suleiman and the
officers the president relies upon. Jumblatt also will have to keep
Suleiman away from his Christian electorate in Aley and the Chouf.
Expect him, in that case, to move closer to Christians as
unenthusiastic about Suleiman: Samir Geagea and Michel Aoun.

Aoun is the great loser from a presidential election. It's not like
the old general wasn't warned. He could have used his parliamentary
bloc to be presidential kingmaker; instead he decided to obstruct
everything in order to be elected himself. Now he has only dust to
feed on, and in his final years he may find himself trying to protect
his shriveling flock from the overtures of Suleiman, who, if he is
clever, will pick up a large share of the disoriented Christians. One
can already imagine most of Aoun's parliamentarians in the Metn
gravitating toward Suleiman, knowing that their re-election depends on
the goodwill of Michel Murr, who will be instrumental in moving the
district the president's way.

Samir Geagea is in a better position than Aoun, both because of his
close ties to Hariri and the Christian community's propensity to
create counterweights to its presidents. However, his power in the
Cabinet is uncertain and he too will have to fight off Suleiman's
poaching among his voters. That's why his rapport with Aoun is bound
to improve.

The matter of Hizbullah's weapons will be the first test for Suleiman
once he is elected. The president risks losing the Sunnis if he comes
out with a limp formula that sidelines any serious discussion of the
topic. Now is the time to put the question of weapons on the table
seriously, and Suleiman, as a former commander of the army, is in an
ideal position to propose a sensible compromise. A second test for the
president will be the choice of a new army commander. The head of
military intelligence, George Khoury, is pining for the post, but
given the army's indolence during the fighting in Beirut and Hariri's
deep doubts about what happened, Suleiman may need all his dexterity
to propose a successor who satisfies all sides.

Can Hizbullah be pleased with the result? It will now be able to say
that it received veto power in the government and that the matter of
its weapons was not discussed in Doha. It will also be able to
convince its supporters that this was its latest victory after the
government's decision to withdraw the two decisions last week that
Hizbullah found offensive. But that may be only half the story. By so
foolishly taking over Beirut militarily, the party only scared the
other communities into sustained hostility. The two decisions the
government went back on were decisions it could never have implemented
anyway, so Hizbullah effectively revealed its coup plan at an
inopportune time and for little gain. The party also has lost two
cards: It has dismantled its downtown protest camp and won't be able
to close the airport road for some time. Its weapons have become a
subject of legitimate national discussion. And what kind of war can
Hizbullah hope to wage against Israel in South Lebanon when most
Lebanese, and quite a few Shiites, have no desire for war? Most
importantly, Hizbullah has been about the negation of the state. If
the post-Doha process is about the building of a state, then the party
and that state will eventually clash.

Much will depend on Michel Suleiman. That the president will get only
three ministers in a new Cabinet affirms he has serious credibility
problems on all sides. Suleiman is an unknown quantity. Will he be a
faithful partner of Syria, as when he was army commander? Or will he
realize that he can be more than that? In many ways Suleiman is a
peculiar creation as president, someone never destined to inherit the
office. Now he has a chance to become the long-awaited patron of a new
and consensual Lebanese political order. Let's hope he's up to it.

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