Lebanon's Presidential Crisis
- From: BasilRathbone2010@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 16:54:02 -0800 (PST)
Analysis - Lebanon's Presidential Crisis
Tuesday, 27 November, 2007 @ 1:11 AM
By Robert Rabil *
Beirut - As the end of the Lebanese presidential term neared and then
passed on November 23, domestic and international forces have
ratcheted up their involvement in electing the country's new
president.
But the political focus of the presidential elections has shifted from
democratic and constitutional ideals to concerns about preventing
civil strife -- a potential reality if no consensus on a candidate is
reached between the two major Lebanese camps, the pro-Western March 14
alliance and the Hezbollah-led opposition.
Although many divisive political issues exist, the major obstacle has
been Hezbollah's insistence on a presidential candidate who would
reject UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, which together
call for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon (i.e., Hezbollah),
the end of Syrian intervention and presence in the country, and the
support for an international tribunal to investigate the assassination
of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Any compromise candidate who
does not support these resolutions will rob the March 14 movement of
its political legitimacy and pave the way for Syrian, and possible
Iranian, suzerainty over Beirut.
The Battle over Candidates
Hezbollah has successfully confounded Lebanese political parties and
the international community by threatening a military takeover of the
state and waging a shrewd and calculated political campaign to
undermine the prospects of March 14 presidential nominees. Pressured
especially by the French, and fearing a constitutional power vacuum,
Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir reluctantly agreed to create a list
of acceptable presidential nominees. (The Lebanese constitution
requires the president to be a Maronite Christian, making Sfeir a
possible presidential power-broker.) The list, which Sfeir prepared
following a November 13 meeting with French foreign minister Bernard
Kouchner, included ( pictured above from left ) , Michel Edde, Boutros
Harb, , Robert Ghanem, Nassib Lahoud, Riad Salameh, Michel Aoun and
Michel Khoury
Negotiations ensued between the March 14 parliamentary bloc leader
Saad Hariri and Nabih Berri, the Amal speaker of parliament who
represents the opposition. Their talks immediately focused on
selecting a compromise candidate, thereby eliminating Aoun for the
opposition and Harb and Lahoud for the March 14 alliance. While the
March 14 alliance was compelled to consider Ghanem, who has cordial
relations with Syria but has demonstrated sympathy for several key
March 14 issues, the opposition vetoed Ghanem and Khoury. The
opposition then started to press for the candidacies of Edde and
Salameh, and simultaneously requested that the chief of staff of the
Lebanese Armed Forces, Gen. Michel Suleiman, be added to the list.
Salameh, the director of Lebanon's central bank, was subsequently
removed because a constitutional amendment was required to approve his
candidacy; a similar constitutional problem scuttled Suleiman's
candidacy (although Sulieman may still be Syria's preferred
candidate). As a result, only Edde remained, but he was rejected by
the March 14 alliance. An octogenarian and former president of the
Maronite league, Edde is known for his anti-Semitism and for his
support for Syria -- best demonstrated by his infamous boast that he
would "lie down before Syrian tanks to prevent them from leaving
Lebanon."
To complicate matters, the dynamics of the negotiations have been
affected by international considerations. For example, although the
French preferred the constitutional formula of electing the president
with a simple 50-percent-plus-one parliamentary majority -- something
that would neutralize Hezbollah and Syria -- the French instead
persuaded the March 14 alliance to forego such a move because of its
potential consequences. The March 14 alliance subsequently lost its
leverage once it agreed to the French initiative of seeking consensus
with the patriarch's list. The tacit U.S. approval of the French
initiative, and Washington's reluctance to be involved, has also been
construed by some members of the March 14 movement as U.S.
backtracking from recognizing an elected president by a simple
majority.
Consequently, Walid Jumblatt, a key member of the March 14 alliance,
changed his position from demanding a no-compromise president to
supporting a compromise candidate. Moved by his desire to remain the
central figure in his ruling coalition, Hariri -- a Sunni Muslim --
also shifted his position, favoring the idea of a weak Maronite
president to ensure his own political ascendancy. All of this has
taken a toll on March 14 solidarity, which Hezbollah has exploited.
An Emerging Power Vacuum
Since no agreement was reached, the November 23 parliamentary session
to elect a president failed to convene. Although March 14 deputies
attended the session, an opposition boycott deprived parliament of the
two-thirds quorum needed to open the session. Subsequently, Berri
scheduled a new session for November 30.
This constitutional impasse has further polarized the country and
disheartened the March 14 movement despite the facade of solidarity it
projects. Immediately after Berri announced the new session's date,
the March 14 alliance issued a statement asserting it would not
undertake any action that might provoke civil strife. In sharp
contrast to the opposition's audacious attempts to elect a pro-Syrian
president, the March 14 movement is apparently making concessions,
driven by concerns of what Hezbollah would do if the majority
continues to support a no-compromise candidate.
Two things continue to be central for the March 14 movement: U.S.
reaffirmation of its support for the 50-percent-plus-one formula; and
American recognition of the Lebanese cabinet's executive powers until
a new president is elected. Before departing office last week,
President Emile Lahoud asserted that the March 14-led government is
unconstitutional, and authorized the Lebanese army to handle the
country's unraveling security situation.
Differing Concerns
Each party in the March 14 movement is now assessing its support and
power relative to the opposition, and is pondering the next steps.
Decisionmaking within the movement's constituent parties are, not
surprisingly, affected by their respective vulnerabilities. For
instance, Jumblatt's Druze party is concerned about a potential dual
attack from Hezbollah and pro-Syrian Palestinians, whose headquarters
are not far from his stronghold. Hariri's constituency -- Sunnis who
had no significant experience in the country's civil war because they
relied on the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Syria for
protection -- is struggling to come up with a defensive plan. In
addition, Samir Geagea's group is concerned more with potential intra-
Christian fighting than with defending the Maronite heartland.
Nevertheless, it is fairly confident that the Christian communities of
East Beirut could withstand a potential Hezbollah onslaught as they
did in January 2007.
Conclusion
Lebanon faces dangerous scenarios ranging from a political vacuum to
civil war. It is up to the Lebanese to choose whether their country
will be part of the international community or a militia-state linked
to an Iranian-Syrian axis. Nevertheless, given the high stakes of this
struggle, the international community should continue its support for
the March 14 alliance by helping Hariri obtain Arab cover and support,
especially from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and allaying Jumblatt's fears
by warning Damascus against any proxy attack on his Druze fiefdom. So
far, the consequences of this deepening crisis remain to be seen.
* Robert Rabil is an adjunct scholar at The Washington Institute and
director of graduate studies and an assistant professor of Middle East
studies in Florida Atlantic University's Department of Political
Science.
Sources: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Tags: aoun, edde, ghanem, harb, hariri, Hezbollah, jumblatt, Lahoud,
lebanon, president, salameh, suleiman, syria
.
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