The Syrian-Iranian Axis.
- From: "Sandy" <sandy853@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 17:58:08 +0100
Syria and Iran share a history of strategic coordination based on
intersecting regional interests. These interests matched perfectly when
Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party governed Iraq. They also aligned near
perfectly in opposition to Israel's forays into Lebanon, which gave rise to
their creation of Hezbollah as a counterweight to Israeli power. Iran and
Syria continue to share common interests in Iraq where they have cooperated
due to their mutual antipathy toward the United States. It is in Lebanon
that their interests most directly converge; Beirut figures prominently in
both Syrian and Iranian strategic calculations.
The Syrian-Iranian Axis.
Damascus is the junior partner in this relationship since it has less to
offer and has chosen to cast its lot with Iran. Tehran wields greater
geopolitical heft. With Iranian assistance, Damascus believes it can stave
off international pressure while expanding its freedom of action in Lebanon.
This is a deal its Sunni-dominated Arab neighbors, which are troubled by
Tehran's influence over Damascus, will not offer.
For its part, Tehran counts on Syria to facilitate the continued primacy of
Hezbollah in Lebanon in order to advance its own interests in the region and
beyond. For Tehran, Hezbollah represents an effective threat to Israel and
is a central pillar of Iranian grand strategy. A strong Syrian-Iranian axis
only fortifies Hezbollah's position in Lebanon and, therefore, Tehran's
position.
In late January of 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad traveled to
Damascus in order to cement ties between the two increasingly isolated
countries. Both states are closing ranks in an effort to allay mounting
international pressure.
Tehran maintains a keen interest in keeping the foundering Assad regime
afloat, lest it lose a key facilitator of its regional strategy. Tehran
harbors concerns about Damascus' straitened position in the face of the U.N.
investigation into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in Lebanon and the
defection of former Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam, who is openly
advocating regime change in Syria. Present at this meeting were high-ranking
officials closely linked to Hezbollah, possibly including Imad Mughniyahits,
the group's operational commander. Perhaps not so coincidentally, a suicide
bomber carried out a successful attack in Tel Aviv around the time of the
meeting.
Reports also indicate that the two countries reached an accord whereby Syria
would agree to store Iranian "materials" and weapons should Tehran come
under U.N. sanctions. Reports also suggest that Syria may already be storing
Iranian WMDs. Tehran also allegedly resolved to provide safe haven to any
Syrian intelligence official indicted over the Hariri assassination. Tehran
would also provide further military aid to Damascus and financial aid to
offset Western sanctions.
Veiled Threats from Syria and Iran
The recent upheaval surrounding the Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet
Mohammad was a windfall for Damascus and Tehran, which almost certainly
played a joint role in orchestrating some of the more spirited protests. The
Danish and Norwegian embassies were put to the torch in Damascus and Beirut
as masses of enraged demonstrators ran amok in the streets.
It goes without saying that Syrian security forces would not have acted so
munificently if the protests were directed against the regime. Those same
security forces, however, prevented the protesters from storming the U.S.
and French embassies for fairly obvious reasons. In Beirut, it is alleged
that Syrian security forces, dressed like civilians, played an instigative
role in the protests.
Both Tehran and Damascus planned to exploit the cartoon imbroglio to
demonstrate the underlying Muslim rage in the region, and to provide a
foretaste of what would ensue if the West pursues action against either of
the governments. The message, put none too subtly, is that any such actions
could potentially convulse the entire region and set in train a cascade of
destabilizing events. It is, therefore, not in American interests to place
undue pressure on Tehran or Damascus, or any of their regional proxies --
such as Hezbollah -- for that matter.
The Assad regime's message conveys a particular clarity. Damascus is telling
the United States that if its government is removed from power, Islamists
will be waiting to take power. In fact, Damascus has feverishly attempted to
depict itself as a victim of radical Islamic militancy to counter charges
that it promotes such activity, and has more or less staged clashes between
Syrian security forces and militants to prove the point.
Damascus is also exploiting the cartoon flap to foment sectarian strife in
Lebanon in order to reclaim its influence over that country. Its still
considerable intelligence presence in Lebanon affords it the ability to
aggravate the sectarian tensions that have divided the country. Reports
suggest that Damascus has recently covertly moved radical Islamists into
Lebanon to stir the pot, which has not gone unnoticed in Beirut. It has
focused its efforts on the Christian dominated neighborhoods of Beirut, the
focus of the recent riots.
By sowing this sort of discord, Damascus hopes, rather transparently for
those who care to notice, to maintain Lebanon in an ongoing state of
instability. It is a state to which Lebanon is certainly accustomed. In so
doing, it plans to poignantly remind Washington and, to a lesser extent,
Paris that Syria's presence in Lebanon was a sedative one and that Syrian
interests cannot be ignored.
Damascus is not averse to destabilizing its neighbors if doing so will
diffuse Western pressure. These neighbors most notably include Saudi Arabia
and Egypt. While they harbor little goodwill toward Syria's Alawite
government, they share a powerful interest in maintaining stability in Syria
at the present time, especially in light of the situation in Lebanon. They
simply see no attractive alternative to the status quo at present and fear
the instability that a cornered Damascus could visit upon them should its
gloves come off.
Saudi Arabia, which anxiously seeks the restoration to power of Syria's
Sunni majority, fears that Damascus may attempt to destabilize the Saudi
peninsula if pushed too far. For its part, Egypt has little interest in
seeing the Assad regime collapse given the potential fallout. In the face of
its own troubles with the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubarak finds little virtue in
an Islamist rise in Syria, even if Syrian Islamists tend to be more moderate
than Egypt's. Additionally, it would not enhance his son's prospects of
succession.
Arab Regimes Concerned over Shi'a Influence in Region
The Sunni-dominated Arab regimes are deeply concerned about the specter of
burgeoning Iranian influence in the region, which makes them especially keen
to pry Damascus away from Tehran's tightening embrace. Riyadh and Cairo have
sought to convince Damascus that its long-term interests are best secured
through their partnership; that their influence with Washington will protect
Syrian interests; and that Tehran is ultimately a weak reed upon which to
lean, given its increasing isolation.
These attempts have failed and will likely continue to do so, however, as an
alliance with Tehran affords Damascus the greatest opportunity to reassert
its most cherished desideratum -- control over Lebanon. Riyadh and Cairo,
which have, for their own reasons, tried to persuade Damascus to fully quit
Lebanon, cannot provide that.
The Sunni Arab regimes are particularly fearful of the emergence of a
notional "Shi'a Crescent" sitting athwart the Middle East should Iranian
influence grow unchecked, encompassing Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Their
fear is compounded several fold by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Tehran in
the vanguard. Accordingly, they seek to check Iranian influence where the
opportunity arises.
They have seen one such opportunity in Lebanon, although they recently
suffered a setback when Arab sponsorship of a Lebanese-Syrian accord failed.
This was not especially surprising, given the obstacles in place and the
local advantages their opponents enjoy.
Riyadh in particular seeks to counter Iranian influence in Lebanon so it can
establish its own leadership of the Arab Middle East and the greater Muslim
world. It must first undermine Shi'a influence, which it hopes will throw a
net around the Alawite regime in Damascus. In this manner, Sunni rule will
be restored in Syria and the Syrian-Iranian axis will be severed, thus
ending Iranian dreams of regional hegemony. Tehran is naturally working
equally hard to prevent such a development.
Conclusion
Damascus and Tehran are currently fellow travelers that will extract what
they can from one another. Their relationship does not rise to the level of
a full-fledged alliance, however, and it is a partnership that has its
limitations. In the first place, Tehran is not concerned, ultimately, with
the fate of Syria. Tehran is concerned about Syrian weakness inasmuch as it
affects Tehran's ambitions in the region and beyond. Accordingly, it appears
to be acting to cover its bases in Lebanon by carving out a strong Shi'a
bloc for itself at Damascus' expense.
Of course, part of this effort is also due to Tehran's fear of Saudi
machinations in Lebanon. Tehran is seeking to establish ties with the
Lebanese government by cementing ties with Shi'a leaders in Beirut, a
process begun under Ahmadinejad's predecessor, Mohammad Khatami.
Reports also indicate that Tehran is beginning to question the fealty of
Hezbollah's current leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and may be looking for
a successor to consolidate Iranian support within the organization. This may
prefigure a major rift within the organization and bears watching.
In addition, Damascus is the much weaker partner and must fear for its
future if Tehran ends up cutting a deal with the West over its nuclear
program that may set Damascus adrift, calling to mind the Thucydidean maxim
that the strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must.
Although not likely in the near future, the possibility exists that Tehran
will use its influence over Hezbollah to broker the party's ultimate
disarmament as a bargaining chip within the framework of a broad
international agreement.
Ironically, it was Bashar Assad's father, Hafez, who had held out the
possibility of disarming Hezbollah as part of a comprehensive peace
settlement that would have secured Syrian influence in Lebanon, sanctioned
by Washington. It is now Tehran that sits in a position to broker such an
arrangement, which would marginalize Damascus and leave it to the mercy of
others.
.
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