Re: Darwin's Appendix

On Sep 3, 6:03 pm, Matt Silberstein
<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Thu, 3 Sep 2009 11:11:45 +0000 (UTC), in
soc.culture.jewish.moderated , Amitai
<chr0...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> in
<6aa6c725-c430-46ea-b803-536d5dedb...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

On Sep 2, 6:16 pm, Matt Silberstein
<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Wed, 2 Sep 2009 14:48:08 +0000 (UTC), in
soc.culture.jewish.moderated , Amitai
<chr0...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> in
<9fcf91e5-022a-4a30-a907-7b3f09b44...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

On Sep 2, 12:06 am, Matt Silberstein
<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nos...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Tue, 1 Sep 2009 09:06:05 +0000 (UTC), in
soc.culture.jewish.moderated , Amitai
<chr0...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> in
<a9892f5c-3383-44dc-9a8d-c84fffd88...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

[snip]

Can we agree that the most reliable system to use in the discussion
of natural phenomena is Scientific Method - incorporating Popper's
criterion of falsifiablity?

Popperian falsifiability is better in concept than reality. One can
always find a way to modify an existing theory to incorporate new
data. That is, theories are not really falsifiable as Popper proposes.
Nor does it make sense for a single fact to be sufficient to overturn
a million previous observations. Real science is not some logical
model that is junked at the first contrary fact, there is a give and
take as evidence is added. As modifications are made to the existing
model some will look for a single simpler explanation. So, in fact, a
number of observations caused problems for Classical Mechanics
pre-Einstein, but people could make changes and go on. The theory
worked, but it looked more and more fragile, so Einstein's work was
welcomed as a simpler solution. It was not that the Michelson Morley
Experiment falsified Newtonian physics and then Einstein presented a
new system. Rather Lorenz "solved" the problem M-M presented and, at
that  time, Classical Mechanics stood. Einstein stepped in and gave us
a simpler, more consistent replacement. But no falsification at all..
(There is, actually, question as to Einstein's knowledge or concern
with the M-M experiment, but the point stands.)

I wrote "INCORPORATING Popper's criterion of falsifiability". It isn't
sufficient on its own,

My point is that Popparian falsifiability is wrong. He was wrong about
how science works. Again, David Hull does a better job at presenting
what goes on.

but neither is Occam's razor.

The Razor provides a distinctly different service. Parsimony is almost
a definitional standard: science is, among other thing, that which
eliminates all unnecessary assumptions.

Let's not
belittle Popper. IMO, falsifiability and Kuhn's idea of the paradigm
shift were the two big advances in the philosophy of science during my
career as an active scientist (that ended nearly 20 years ago).

It is too bad, though, that they were not accurately presenting how
science really works. Those paradigm shifts are quite elusive when you
try to track them down and actual theories are not falsifiable in the
manner that Popper claims.

Do I detect a whiff of arrogance here? Disposing of Popper and Kuhn in
one fell swoop!

No, you detect a person with a significant interest in the philosophy
of science. Again, read David Hull for a good view.

After such a strong repeated recommendation, I have no choice.

There is no single way in which "science really works";

Yep.

it depends on
the area of research, the intelectual stature and personalities of the
scientists involved, the size and composition of the scientific
community directly concerned with that branch of science, serendipity,
etc., etc...

Yep. You are now dismissing Popper and Kuhn on your own.

Not necessarily. I don't have to swallow things whole.
Jewish content: "Rabbi Meir found a pomegranate, he ate the pulp and
threw away the rind."

In my half century or so as a practicing scientist, I found that
advances in my field f research, Physical Organic Chemistry, as well
as in others - even those as broad as Quantum Mechanics, usually
followed the pattern that I outlined schematically in my earlier
post:

I was not rejecting your comments, I was speaking about Popper's and,
to a somewhat lesser extent, Kuhn's. Your description did not fit
Popper all that well either. Models were not judged by being
"falsifiable", when you got new conflicting evidence you both modified
the existing theory and looked for ways to change things.

See above.


Science is by no means just a set of major breakthroughs like
relativity, QM and evolution. The numerous minor advances that enhance
our understanding in the various scientific disciplines occur in
pretty much the same way as Matt describes above for one of the
whoppers:

1. There is a consensus on the theoretical basis of a  given subject,
usually too narrow and of interest to too small a group of scientists
for it to merit the designation "paradigm".
2. An observation contradicts the consensus and is usually pooh-poohed
as being due to experimental error or flawed interpretation of the
results.
3. The observation is confirmed by other investigatprs and prompts new
experiments to be undertaken, the results of which also do not fit
into the current theory. When the number and/or severity of the
exceptions is great enough, the theory, as it stands, can be regarded
as having been falsified.
4. Attempts are made to revise the theory in order to accommodate the
new results. If successful, the theory has been salvaged, usually at
the cost of making it more cumbersome by increasing the number of its
postulates.
5. The revised theory is falsified as above (3) and revised again (4)..
Cumbersome as it may be, it is retained for want of nothing better.
6. Someone comes up with a new theory with fewer postulates. With luck
it may even subsume the old theory.
7. After a period - sometimes quite long - in which the diehards
adhere to the old theory and perhaps even patch it up some more, the
consensus shifts in favor the new, more parsimonious theory.

Thus, the ideas of Popper, Kuhn and Occams are all involved in the
process.

I did not *study* Popper and Kuhn and analyse their ideas about the
nature of falsifiability and the elusiveness of paradigm shifts, but
read enough of both to be pleased that important features of my own,
essentially intuitive approach to research had been formalized.

Of course they are not wildly nonsensically wrong. On the surface they
are sort of right, it is only if you look at what Popper said that
difference from earlier writers that you can see what makes Popper
Popper.

To me, falsifiability merely means that a hypothesis that cannot be
tested is not a scientific theory, and that if it is tested and not
falsified, it can be regarded provisionally as valid but remains open
to further tests.

That is not what it meant to Popper. To Popper a theory was not
correct unless one could do a single test that could refute the model.
You describe testability, not falsifiability. In Popper's view
theories need to be catastrophically brittle, not malleable.

I would have to read Popper more carefully to savor the distinction,
but I won't. Unlike you I am (at least, was) more interested in
science proper than in its philosophy. (I will have a look at Hull.)

My take on paradigm shifts is that the scientific community in its
broadest sense, as well as each of its many subcommunities separately,
has a common thought pattern that it is extremely reluctant to change.

Which turns out, by examination, to be false. Both Darwin and Einstein
were rapidly accepted. And accepted by both old and young scientists.
This is not, though Kuhn is a philosopher of science, a philosophical
issue, it is an empirical one. Either people accept new ideas or they
don't. So people when back and look at who and how Darwin's work was
accepted. And found that there was not the resistance, there was not
the age related disparity. Kuhn talked about dramatic shifts, what we
find instead is that there is usually an awareness of the problem and
that people are working on solving the problem.

I imagine - though I have not researched the matter - that Darwin's
ideas had been circulating among his colleagues for years before
publication of The Origin of Species, and Lamarck had set the stage
years before. As for Einstein, his ideas were certainly not
universally welcomed on the continent. Remember Stark, Lenard and
"Jewish physics; there was more to it than antisemitism. As to the
English speaking world, Einstein had gained tremendous prestige after
his Annus Mirabilis (1905), and the ground for General Relativity had
been set by Lorenz - as you pointed out. Moreover, the theoretical
physicists in that period were a particularly brainy bunch. All these
factors combined to ease aceptance of Relativity. Quantum Mechanics
was harder to swallow, partly because Einstein and de Broglie found it
distasteful.

Incidentally, I totally reject the inverse correlation between age and
open-mindeness. At 87, I would have to, wouldn't I.

New observations are digested, sometimes with difficulty, using these
generally accepted concepts as long as possible. Eventually, when the
explanations become strained, someone comes along with ideas that
require rejection of certain basic elements of what was the
"conventional wisdom" of the group.  When the process of rejecting
these elements and accepting the new ideas into the collective thought
pattern is essentially complete, a  paradigm shift can be said to have
taken place.

Far be it from me to belittle Occam's Razor, but the principle of
parsimony had been around long enough to be taken for granted.

Yes and it predates Ockham. It was Ockham's use of the Razor that was
important. And he used it as a *philosophical* tool (there not being
any formal science at the time). His point was that for philosophical
arguments (do things have qualities? do forms exist?) one has to
rigorously eliminate any assumptions that are not necessary for the
result. And the key use here was to remove God from such arguments. In
doing so he separated philosophy from theology. (He did not reject
theology as a endeavor and never suggested that God did not exist.) By
separating out philosophy it was able to grow and from that we get
Natural Philosophy, science. In science parsimony is not simply
important, it is a definitional feature. Science has to leave out all
that is not supported by the evidence.

My
admiration for Friar William is unbounded. To prove it (Sorry! to
"demonstrate"  it; the word "prove" has been overused lately!) I
deliberately named a method that I had developed for analysing the
relation between the symmetry propertes of molecules and their
reactivity in such a way that its acronym turned out to be OCAMS.

Good for you. As a committed Nominalist I find William rather
admirable myself. I assume you have read _Name of the Rose_.

Can you doubt it?!!!

Amitai
.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Darwins Appendix
    ... theories are not really falsifiable as Popper proposes. ... Real science is not some logical ... My point is that Popparian falsifiability is wrong. ... usually too narrow and of interest to too small a group of scientists ...
    (soc.culture.jewish.moderated)
  • Re: SR and GR without math
    ... >> And this counts in favour of Popper. ... > grabs then things may not be that rosy in philosophy after all. ... > falsifiability (and my recollections on the matter should certainly not be ... >> theories allow to make falsifiable predictions. ...
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    (talk.origins)
  • Re: Is God a scientific theory?
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    (uk.philosophy.atheism)
  • Re: Is God a scientific theory?
    ... the argument/logic of Popper when he put forward the point, ... where it is interesting to read that other philosophers of science ... In his book, Abusing Science: ... that falsifiability is necessary for a scientific theory. ...
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